Tom Hunter

Finally, a particular thanks to my PhD supervisors @sarahagemann.bsky.social and @sarahobolt.bsky.social who saw this through from the very beginning! I’m also grateful to @chrauh.bsky.social and @stefwalter.bsky.social (and many others!) for great comments and help along the way.

The Responsive Union Cambridge Core - European Government, Politics and Policy - The Responsive Union

It also builds on work on responsiveness in the EU from @cjschneider.bsky.social and @chriswratil.bsky.social . Check out this book! www.cambridge.org/core/books/r...

This builds on great work on blame shifting in the EU by the team at LMU: Lisa Kriegmair, Berthold Rittberger, Bernahrd Zangl, @heinkelmann-wild.bsky.social. Check out this book! global.oup.com/academic/pro...

On the other, the fact that the EU is only credited for issues citizens care little about, while governments claim credit for the issues that are electorally salient is more problematic… 👎

What does this mean for #accountability in Europe? On the one hand, the fact that the EU is blamed less than often assumed (and does receive credit!) is rather encouraging. 👍

And here are predicted probabilities at different levels of issue salience: as salience increases, this increases the probability of leaders claiming credit, and decreases the prob of sharing credit with the EU.

However, there are huge differences across issues: for the Environment (low salience during my investigation period) most leaders are happy to credit the EU, but for the Economic Situation (high salience), most leaders claim credit

Importantly, Europe DOES receive credit from national leaders. Many leaders are to the right of the dotted line in this figure, meaning they actually share credit with the EU more than they claim it for themselves.

What do we observe descriptively? i) Blame shifting by governments is rare; ii) the response to increased Euroscepticism + EU politicization in crisis years seems to be an increase in credit claiming rather than blame.

My original data captures press conference of heads of gov after #EUCO summits (2005-2018). Each paragraph is handcoded for credit claiming, credit sharing, or blame. As each leader is in essence presenting the same stimulus (EUCO conclusions), this provides a neat ‘within-case’ comparison.

How do governments solve this dilemma? Through CREDIT CLAIMING. I also argue that issue salience is key: for issues that matter to electorates, govs wil claim credit; for issues of low salience, govs are happy to share credit with the EU.

Governments facing high levels of Euroscepticism therefore face a RHETORICAL DILEMMA: on the one hand, the need to signal responsiveness to a more skeptical electorate; on the other, a reluctance to explicitly blame the EU.

I argue that far from being costless, scapegoating the EU can be a risky strategy for governments: it risks antagonising voters that are supportive of the EU, damages reputation with other member states, and can be a sign of negotiation failure on the international stage.

Credit Claiming in the European Union | The Journal of Politics: Vol 87, No 3 Incumbents in multilevel systems are assumed to exploit uncertainty of responsibility by claiming credit and shifting blame, yet little is known about when and how they engage in these rhetorical stra...

🚨 New(ish) Publication Alert! Delighted to see my article Credit Claiming in the EU @thejop.bsky.social I explore a classic question for accountability in Europe: when and why do govs claim credit for the work of the EU and shift blame onto Brussels to avoid responsibility? doi.org/10.1086/732970

Excited to be on a great panel on Politicization and Party Strategies in the EU @ecpr.bsky.social. Featuring @heinkelmann-wild.bsky.social , @kovarek.bsky.social , @duarteamaro.bsky.social, @saorhan.bsky.social among others. Come on down to the Polytechnic School (B 5.39)at 13:30 tomorrow (29 Aug)!

Learning from precedent: how the British Brexit experience shapes nationalist rhetoric outside the UK The liberal international order has recently come under increasing nationalist pressure, evidenced by a rise in nationalist demands to withdraw from international institutions. A growing literature...

(5/5) This supports findings from this other great @jeppjournal.bsky.social article by Marco Martini and @stefwalter.bsky.social on how Brexit shapes nationalist rhetoric in media coverage outside the UK. doi.org/10.1080/1350...

(4/5) Mainstream pro-European parties also got a bolder in their #Brexit statements after the vote - increasing the pro-Europeanism in their rhetoric and using it as an opportunity to attack #populists at home and abroad.

(3/5)The descriptive figures show it all: whilst talk of following in the UK’s footsteps was popular pre-referendum vote (June 2016), this almost disappears completely post-vote. I also find that EUsceptics aim to avoid #Brexit in their parliamentary comms.

(2/5) I find that it is very much the latter, as the UK’s negative experience post-referendum revealed new information about the desirability of #EU membership. Data comes from 2,223 Brexit statements between 2013 and 2018 in five legislatures (AT, DE, DK, NL, SE )

(1/5) My article Disintegration and Party Competition is out in the latest issue of @jeppjournal.bsky.social ! I ask how parties in other member states reacted to #Brexit. Do #Eurosceptic challengers frame it as an example to follow? Or do they instead row back on ‘hard’ demands to #leave the EU?

(3/3) I also look forward to acting as a discussant on the panel 'International Law and compliance' (Friday 27 June, 11:20 - 13:00, Room 1A.11) chaired by Niheer Dasandi. Vamos!

(2/3)On Friday 27 June (13:10 - 14:50, Room 1A.11) I present joint work with @ta-huikuri.bsky.social on Women in International negotiations as part of the panel 'Gender Representation: rhetoric and parliamentary speeches' chaired by @clint0475.bsky.social

(1/3) I am excited to be on 2 great panels at #EPSA in Madrid! On Thursday 26 June (09:30 - 11:10, Room 0A.06) I present joint work with @stefwalter.bsky.social on Parties and IOs on the panel ‘Text analysis in the Study of IR’ chaired by @andduer.bsky.social

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DISINTEGRATION publication #7 @giorgiomalet.bsky.social shows that French rejection of the EU constitution in the 2005 referendum increased public opposition to the Constitution abroad, an example of cross-national social influence. journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...

Important paper from @stefwalter.bsky.social and the @disintegrationerc.bsky.social project: the backlash against globalisation is less about large shifts in public opinion, more about political entrepreneurs mobilising the issue.

International organizations in national parliamentary debates - The Review of International Organizations This data article introduces IOParlspeech, an original dataset of over 600,000 statements on international organizations (IOs) in parliamentary debates in six countries between 1990 and 2018. We expla...

(1/8) Just published in @the-peio.bsky.social by @tommccraehunter.bsky.social and @stefwalter.bsky.social : We introduces IOParlspeech, a dataset of over 600,000 statements on 75 IOs in parliamentary debates (six countries: AT, CAN, DE, UK, USA, NZL) between 1990 and 2018. doi.org/10.1007/s115...