Tuomas Pernu

My point exactly.

bsky.app/profile/tuom...

Third, and related to the previous: I don’t think the issue about consciousness is fundamentally about qualities at all. That is, a moment’s reflection should make it clear that physical properties, quantities etc. are qualities too. The problem with consciousness is about something else. What?

Second, the quality/quantity distinction is problematic. Is mathematics either? Which? Most importantly: the two are not mutually exclusive, and it’s clear that there’s a lot of mathematics about qualities.

First, mathematics = abstract, but physical = concrete. That’s why “mathematical physics” has been a problematic notion (downright an oxymoron) from the get-go (for physicists/philosophers of nature). There’s many who would say that mathematics belongs to the mental realm.

It’s of course not at all clear what “physicalism” is supposed to amount to. You jump to speaking in terms of “mathematical physics”. This is fine, but I’m not totally sure that the physicalism vs mental issue in philosophy is an issue about mathematical physics vs mental. A number of things here:

Your answer to my first question leads into much more interesting waters. I don’t know Galileo’s stuff as well as I should – maybe you know “a book” that gives a nice rundown of the things you mention? (If I dare to ask.)

From these I conclude that *if there’s ever going to be some satisfactory explanation of consciousness (i.e. first person experiences), it’ll be in terms of physicalism. That’s what my tweet above was about: if I’d need to bet, it’d bet on physicalism.

Second, I’m fine with leaving that stuff without explanation, and I’m not even sure what/how we are supposed give an explanation here – and how e.g. panpsychism could provide such.

Two points. First, there’s much more to explain than first person experiences – even when we confine ourselves to psychology. And physicalism has done pretty damn well in many cases.

Alrighty. Bunch of things here. Let’s start with the easy one, the second question. You say:

“we haven't managed to explain how physical processes could produce first person experience”

I agree with this. Most people in science/philosophy do. But it’s wrong to bin physicalism because of this.

En tiedä, missä ryhmävalintakeskustelu menee yleisemminkään nykyään (siis biologiassa). Odottelen tässä opiskelijaesseetä aiheesta; toivottavasti sivistyn. Mutta peruspointsi se, että sukulaisvalinta ja resiprokismi ovat fundamentaalisti eri selityksiä (jälkimmäinen ei edellytä sukulaisuussuhdetta).

"The third support act after a sitar player and John Peel reading his letters was David Bowie doing a strange Marcel Marceau-type mime act to recorded sound effects. It was pretty rubbish and I knew he’d never make it."

Does anybody know what happened to this guy?

"The third support act after a sitar player and John Peel reading his letters was David Bowie doing a strange Marcel Marceau-type mime act to recorded sound effects. It was pretty rubbish and I knew he’d never make it."

Does anybody know what happened to this guy?

Noh, itse käsitän resiprookkisuuden "fitness interdependence" -ilmiöksi. Historiallisestihan tässä on se tausta, että ryhmävalintaa (minkälaiseen terminologiaan pop-keskustelussa edelleen törmää) pidettiin epäpätevänä. Sukulaistavalinta & resiprookkisuus selittävät altruismin yksilö/geenivalinnalla.

En itse niin tätä psykologista keskustelua tunne. Mutta esim. hoivan biologinen perusta on helppo ymmärtää. Ihmisten kohdalla puhumme kuitenkin yleensä altruismityypistä, joka ei selity sukulaisvalinnalla, vaan resiprookkisuudella. Selkeyttää keskustelua, kun tämä ero on kirkkaana mielessä.

Tässä pitää olla tarkkana. Sukulaisvalinnan teorialla on hyvin vähän tekemistä psykologian/kulttuurin kanssa ("itsekäs geeni" tietty huono termi). Teoria selittää, miksi on lisääntymiskyvyttömiä eliöitä yms. Resiprookkinen altruismi on sitten toinen juttu (josta on myös solidia teoriaa/evidenssiä).

It’s so funny to think about the fact that there’s people out there deferring every life decision to this

Hienoa. Ei tarvitse Irwinin kääntyillä haudassa.

Missä näin kuuma meno?

Two questions:

(1) How, exactly, did Galileo take consciousness outside of "the scientific domain of science"?

(2) Physicalism has never been cashed?

Oh, I want to wait for Esko too!

Abstraktit ja posterit - PSY - Suomen Psykiatriyhdistys Kevätkouluun valitaan tutkijoita harjoittelemaan tieteellisen suullisen esityksen tai posterin pitämistä.

Hei kaikki psykiatrit ja psykiatrinmieliset! Psykiatripäivät tulee taas (11.03.-13.13., Paasitorni). Myös yours-truly on luennoimassa otsikolla:

Onko näyttöön perustuva psykiatria mahdollista?

Erityisesti tutkijan kevätkouluun kutsutaan mukaan osallistujia.
Tavoitteena on monitieteinen tilaisuus.

Two questions:

(1) How, exactly, did Galileo take consciousness outside of "the scientific domain of science"? (An off-hand reference to a book won't qualify as an answer.)

(2) Physicalism has never been cashed?

I think Marie Curie is still the only person who has been awarded two Nobel Prizes in two separate sciences.

Okay. Well, it's difficult for me to say what this really amounts to. And I'm sure it'll be impossible to find a 100% clean candidate. He's looking good from a distance.

I see. Observing from a distance, he is looking exactly the type of a guy the Dems (or any credible opposition to Trump) would need. (I don't know what he thinks, and I don't know if anybody's been suggesting that he should run.)

Curious: what do you (or people in general) think about Mark Kelly? (I don't know much about these people myself, and I definitely don't have an inside view of the politics over there, thankfully.)

But there's an intuitive feeling that only one of these projects is at least in principle worth pursuing - as only one of them would seem to be in line with what we've been doing in science for the past 400 yrs or so.

Since people are so curious: ruohonen (Fin) = grassling (Eng).

What do you mean by "natural objects"? (I'm fine with the Kantian stuff. I might even agree. But I'm not sure it amounts to a substantial epistemic/ontic distinction.)