Alissa Cooper

Reminder that we are hiring a senior technologist on my team -- a high-impact crew sitting at the intersection of research, tech, and policy. Accepting applications until November 7. Come work with us!

Opinion | Google Wins, We Lose

New @nytimes.com: @juliaangwin.com explains how the US v. Google remedies ruling could further entrench Google’s search dominance.

KGI’s @alissacooper.bsky.social notes “[t]he remedies here are unlikely to create the circumstances for competitive entry in search.”
www.nytimes.com/2025/09/26/o...

Very excited to host Jonathan Sallet at Georgetown next week! Come hear directly from a lead litigator in U.S. v. Google search. Free lunch for those joining in person, or live stream for those joining remotely. Registration required.

We're speaking at two #TSRConf sessions today at 11:30am PT. @alissacooper.bsky.social's “Fixing the Feeds: A Policy Road Map to Address Algorithmic Recommender System Harms” will provide insights on how algorithms can be better designed to put user well-being and long term user value first.

Come hang out with us and talk about data access! #tsrconf

Haven't read enough about the Google search antitrust remedies? We have more for you ...

What does the Google antitrust ruling mean for the future of AI? A federal judge's mild ruling in the Justice Department's suit over Google's search engine monopoly has critics worried that the tech giant can now monopolize artificial intelligence.

This week, KGI’s @alissacooper.bsky.social is featured in NPR about what the Google Search antitrust ruling means for the future of AI and why the remedies may be too limited to pave the way for more search competition.

Full story here 👉 www.npr.org/2025/09/18/n...

DCC 2026 -- our annual competition conference bringing together researchers, policy experts and practitioners -- is accepting paper submissions until October 13. Get those fingers typing ...

Thanks to @sumitecon.bsky.social for reminding us that the CMA has done the world a public service through thorough investigation of the search market. Too bad the US court did not consider what the CMA already found about limited search syndication serving as a barrier, not a boost, to competition.

Much more to come as this opinion gets digested ...

The Technical Feasibility of Divesting Google Chrome – Knight-Georgetown Institute

Our own independent analysis has shown that the divestiture is technically feasible. kgi.georgetown.edu/research-and...

Lastly -- to the question of what evidence are we relying on here? -- the opinion seemingly buys into the narrative that Google and its witnesses shared at trial about the technical infeasibility of the Chrome divestiture.

Importantly, while AI companies “may yet prove to be game changers” the court itself has found that “Google is a monopolist” and the hypothetical future does not eliminate the need to resolve the existing present.

The contrast of this adoption of common AI hype narratives by the same court that meticulously analyzed evidence to establish its general search market definition and liability finding is stark.

The opinion relies heavily on testimony from actors whose business interests benefit from the public perception and belief that generative AI is competitive and growing explosively.

The opinion claims that the “GenAI space is highly competitive” even though the basis for this claim falls far short of what would be expected if generative AI were the market that was the subject of the litigation.

After issuing a liability opinion thoroughly supported by findings of harm in the existing search market, the remedy opinion relies on speculation about future competitive benefit in adjacent markets.

Considerations for Effective Search Competition Remedies – Knight-Georgetown Institute

Quite different from what we explored in Considerations for Effective Search Competition Remedies. kgi.georgetown.edu/research-and...

While the opinion includes remedies whose stated purpose is to address both access to distribution and access to data for quality improvement, the hollow approach in both cases is not likely to spur competition.

The court’s opinion pays lip service to the well-supported finding that a package of remedies is required to address the interlocking, mutually reinforcing dynamics of the search market.

The impact of those has been negligible (less than 1% change in Google’s market share) because the OEMs’ total dependence on Android to operate in the market rendered the contractual changes impotent. That dependence is as strong in the US as it is in the EU, so we can expect the same result.

At KGI we think a lot about concrete evidence. Seven years ago, the European Commission instituted contractual prohibitions in its Google Android case that were of a similar nature to those included by the court here.

Despite mentioning five times the finding that the search market is “frozen,” this logic would leave innovation and dynamism in that market suppressed by keeping defaults locked only to the highest bidder.

The court appeared to view potential harm to businesses like Apple, Samsung, and Mozilla that rely on default payments from Google’s monopoly profits as a reason to preserve Google’s payments.

Judicial Remedies To Restore Competition in the Market for General Search"Spring Symposium: Connected-Vehicle Techonology and the Law"

See also "Judicial Remedies to Restore Lost Competition in the Market for General Search" for an economic analysis of entry barriers and a demonstration of how the court could have facilitated a partial payment ban. www.michiganstatelawreview.org/forum2024202... @proffionasm.bsky.social

This happened despite the court receiving multiple proposals for partial payment bans, including from Motorola (to exempt small mobile device vendors) and Mozilla (to exempt independent browsers).

The court viewed the Plaintiffs’ proposed ban on all payments as a binary – take it or leave it – while choosing to pare down other proposed remedies and take a more nuanced approach.

As the opinion itself says, “Due to Google’s massive financial advantage and its superior monetization, distributors will be incentivized to stick with Google because it can pay more,” leaving potential competitors in a doom loop with no way to surpass Google’s distribution advantages.

After issuing a liability decision that relied extensively on claims about both the power of defaults and the size of Google’s revenue share payments, the court’s opinion does nothing to prevent Google from continuing to pay distributors for defaults.

Can’t escape this one without the sense of a potentially huge missed opportunity to deconcentrate one of the essential markets of the information ecosystem.