Philosophy

And since what comes after an event is part of the event itself, later information reorganizes the evidence as if it were its original premises; hence, memory does not tell us what happened, but what we need to have happened for our self-model to remain coherent.

Thus, the problem is not that memory errs, but that it errs from the position of certainty—trust is a psychological variable, while accuracy is an epistemic one. Collective memory is not the sum of individual memories, but an identity criterion that selects what preserves the community’s self-image.

Lived testimony presents an occurrence without justification, whereas history is an inferential construction subjected to rational testing grounded in independent evidence.

Accordingly, the standard of logic is internally grounded: its court of appeal is the laws of truth themselves, not the deliverances of psychology nor any externally imposed epistemic constraints.

If such reduction is unavailable, and the rule is not basic, logical inquiry halts at that boundary and does not feign what its nature does not license.

Frege maintains that the normative authority of the laws of logic is not hostage to anything extrinsic. A logical rule is warranted only by reducing it to a higher-order law within the system, or by establishing that it belongs among the system’s basic laws on which proofs themselves are erected.

There is no outside to it: to imagine a life without ideology is to posit an existence stripped of structure and bereft of any horizon of sense—in short, a non-life.

For Althusser, ideology is neither false consciousness nor a matter of elective belief; it is the structural condition of social existence itself. It is the interpellative mechanism that produces subjects within webs of meaning, making relations sustainable and intelligible.

Hegelian idealism ruled late-Victorian Britain; by 1898 Moore and Russell broke with it, and with Frege’s logic cleared the ground for Analytic Philosophy. Ironically, their revolt did not erase Hegel’s presence—it exposed how even his critics moved in his shadow.

Hegel probed the horizons of being until the radiance of vision itself was spent; his intellectual eye left nothing perceptible unabsorbed by his understanding.

In an age when ideologies dominate people’s minds, speaking the truth becomes a revolutionary act.

What would this imply about the nature of mathematical knowledge and the requirements for understanding in mathematics?

In other words, if an advanced AI system discovers and proves new mathematical theorems that human mathematicians cannot fully comprehend, does the AI know these theorems in any meaningful sense?

Can a non-conscious AI genuinely possess mathematical knowledge or understanding, or is mathematical knowledge inherently tied to human cognition?

If a person speaks about the meanings of reason before knowing the nature of reason, his speech on it is like that of one who raves.

-Averroes

The ceaseless deluge of events paralyzes the mind’s capacity to process them, manifesting not as mere successive surges but as densely interlocked strata, thereby imposing the crushing weight of concurrent cognition.

If it is impossible, what justifies our confidence in science as a tool of knowledge? And if it is possible, how do we avoid sliding into idealism or relativism?

Is it possible for scientific theories to attain any form of “objective truth” in light of the challenges of underdetermination, the theory-ladenness of observation, radical paradigm shifts (à la Thomas Kuhn), and pessimistic meta-induction?

All human civilizations have been on the banks of rivers, except for Greece, which was on the banks of Heraclitus.

Philosophy is not an entity separate from human action, but rather the infrastructure of knowledge that constitutes the condition of possibility for any perceived existence.