Kelly Grieco

Opinion | Reimagining the American War Machine The biggest challenge for any peacetime military is preparing for the next war.

In our guest essay for @nytimes.com, Max Bremer and I argue the Pentagon needs to diversify risk. This means developing a wide array of systems, made by many companies in smaller numbers, and then scaling up once it identifies what works.

www.nytimes.com/2025/02/07/o...

Kelly Grieco on Indo-Pacific Reactions to Trump’s Reelection “The Trump administration can have a tough-on-China policy, or it can have a tough-on-allies policy, but it probably cannot have both.”

Thank you to @thediplomat.com for the opportunity to discuss what Trump 2.0 could mean for thr Indo-Pacific.

”The Trump administration can have a tough-on-China policy, or it can have a tough-on-allies policy, but it probably cannot have both.”

thediplomat.com/2024/11/kell...

US military airfields in Indo-Pacific too easily taken out of action, report says Chinese strikes on airfields will stymie U.S. military aircraft in the Indo-Pacific region if there is a conflict, a new study says, recommending that the United States invest in cheap, uncrewed aircraft and runway repair capabilities.

Thanks to @mgerrydoyle.bsky.social for writing this great piece in @reuters.com on my new @StimsonCenter report w/ @hunterslingbaum.bsky.social and Jonathan Walker on Chinese missile threats to US air bases in I-P.

www.reuters.com/world/us-mil...

END/ Again, this type of analysis is meant to be illustrative.

The big takeaway isn’t a single number but rather the seriousness of the threat US air bases.

20/ How should the United States counter the threat?

We recommend:
1) Allies/partners acquire air denial-based capabilities; 2) USAF invest in large numbers of attritable, mobile, and runway-independent platforms;
3) USAF prioritize logistics and sustainment

19/ We also looked at missile defense investments, shortened runway repair times and various Chinese counters (redeployment of brigades, larger DF-26 arsenal, smarter targeting strategy, etc.), plus conducting robustness checks.

Check out the report for more detailed results.

18/ We also looked at the effect of still greater dispersal to Japanese civilian airfields (assuming US received such permission). Marginal benefits, esp. given costs and logistical complications.

Japan: fighters = 3 days; tankers = 9 days
Guam: 3.7 days

17/ How effective are these various countermeasures?

If US distributes to civilian runways in PIs and JSDF bases (+ support from JSDF PAC-3 batteries), closure times decline by ~ 70%.
Japan: fighters = 3.7 days; tankers = 9.7 days
Guam: tankers = 3.7 days

16/ USAF is aware of the problem, and to its credit, has taken steps in recent years, incl:
-Agile Combat Employment (greater dispersal)
- Rapid Airfield Damage Recovery (new runway repair methods)
Multi-Capable Airmen (training more personnel in repair)

15/ With such advanced notice, the PLA could wait several hours, luring U.S. fighters into the air and beyond their combat ranges, before shooting down the tanker. The shootdown would result in the loss of the tanker ad also the fighter aircraft dependent on its onboard fuel.

14/ By operating from a small number of operating locations, China would not even need radar—it might only need an operative on the ground with a stopwatch to predict when tankers send forward would rendezvous with fighters launched from bases in Japan.

13/ US can operate tankers from Guam/Pacific by Day 5, but there are 2 problems:

Long distances drive up fuel requirements for tankers, reducing what can offload to fighters and other aircraft and thus increasing number of tankers required to support ops.

a fighter jet is being refueled by an alaska tank ALT: a fighter jet is being refueled by an alaska tank

12/ Those tanker closure times are the big story: Even fighters operating from Okinawa, Japan, would push their operational ranges and not have much loiter time w/out aerial refueling.

11/ Now… for the results… Closure times

US bases in Japan
Fighter ops: 11.7 days
Tankers ops: 33.3 days
Guam/Pacific Islands
Fighter ops: 1.7 days
Tanker ops: 4 days

10/ Some key assumptions
- 8-hr US repair times (all personnel, material available)
-PLARF uses brigade with the shortest-range missile capable of striking target
-China repeats attacks until exhausts missile stockpiles, or no targets left
- US Missile defense (Patriot, THAAD)

9/ We use Monte Carlo simulations to estimate Chinese missile requirements, accounting for various key variables, and a modeling script executes a series of simulations to determine the number of hours that Chinese missile attacks could keep air bases and airfields closed

8/ Now back to runways… We assume PLARF ballistic and cruise missiles armed with runway-penetrating submunitions seek to achieve at least a 90% chance of denying the minimum length/width required for a takeoff or landing, depending on aircraft type.

7/ The US recently gained additional rotational access to bases in the Philippines, but President Marcos has publicly ruled out the US stockpiling weapons or using these bases to conduct “offensive action” against China.

See his comments: t.co/afM8SaDkMR

6/ South Korea seems likely to restrict the use of U.S. bases on its territory out of concern about North Korean aggression and to avoid a rupture with Beijing,

For example, see the then-ROK defense minister’s comments: t.co/T4Zv7bPGSu

5/ Our model simulates attacks on runways/taxiways at U.S. bases in Japan, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Pacific Freely Associated States

Why don’t we include other U.S. bases in 1st/2nd Island Chains? We opted to test the most likely scenario

4/ Our analysis builds on two other great studies: A 2015
@rand.org report by @Eric Heginbotham et al that modeled missile attacks on Kadena Air Base in Japan, and a 2017 @cnas.bsky.social report by @tshugart3
and Javier Gonzalez that modeled attacks on U.S. air bases in Japan.

3/ The model is illustrative and cannot predict with absolute certainty real-world outcomes, given the range of potential unknowns. Instead, it provides a closer look at the problem and helps to identify policy solutions.

2/ Why does it matter? By denying the use of runways and taxiways, China could gain air superiority without ever defeating American aircraft in direct combat.

1/ Our report models repeated Chinese missile attacks on U.S. air bases in Japan, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Pacific Freely Associated States to determine for how long China could keep the runways and taxiways closed to U.S. air operations.

Cratering Effects: Chinese Missile Threats to US Air Bases in the Indo-Pacific • Stimson Center Chinese missiles attacks on air bases could thwart effective U.S. sortie generation at the outset of a military conflict.

I’m excited to share my latest @stimsoncenter.bsky.social
report w/ @hunterslingbaum.bsky.social and Jonathan Walker on why Chinese missile threats U.S. air bases in I-P.

BLUF: USAF could be grounded in theater in the first days and even weeks of a war.

A 🧵
www.stimson.org/2024/crateri...

Kelly Grieco on Indo-Pacific Reactions to Trump’s Reelection “The Trump administration can have a tough-on-China policy, or it can have a tough-on-allies policy, but it probably cannot have both.”

Thank you to @thediplomat.com for the opportunity to discuss what Trump 2.0 could mean for thr Indo-Pacific.

”The Trump administration can have a tough-on-China policy, or it can have a tough-on-allies policy, but it probably cannot have both.”

thediplomat.com/2024/11/kell...

Brandenburg Gate in Berlin tonight

Is this the one?