Morgan Ricks's Avatar

Morgan Ricks

@morganricks1.bsky.social

Vanderbilt law professor. Formerly U.S. Treasury (crisis team), Citadel (merger arbitrage), Merrill Lynch (financial institutions investment banking), Wachtell (M&A).

2,970 Followers  |  179 Following  |  49 Posts  |  Joined: 13.10.2023  |  1.8849

Latest posts by morganricks1.bsky.social on Bluesky

Preview
Enterprise Organizations: Law, Theory, and Practice Enterprise Organizations: Law, Theory, and Practice [Ricks, Morgan] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Enterprise Organizations: Law, Theory, and Practice

Available at fine bookstores everywhere. Actually just Amazon: amazon.com/dp/B0FGQFW18W

09.07.2025 19:14 β€” πŸ‘ 2    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0

I have aimed to make it modern, accessible, practical, and affordable. It's priced at $85. A statutes & rules supplement is available for $25.

The book includes up-to-date treatment of corporate law, which has changed quite a bit lately.

09.07.2025 19:14 β€” πŸ‘ 1    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 1    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

I published a new business organizations casebook.

09.07.2025 19:14 β€” πŸ‘ 2    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 1    πŸ“Œ 0

There is no need to be maximalist anti-tariff, which can be a useful tool to allow infant industries to thrive. That's especially true when praising an industrial policy that used tariffs!

14.04.2025 13:10 β€” πŸ‘ 26    πŸ” 2    πŸ’¬ 2    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

"We spent the last 30 years coming to a new understanding as a country about what we need to do. And sometimes that means tariffs." -- Buttigieg

11.04.2025 11:51 β€” πŸ‘ 3    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 1

me this morning www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/o...

09.04.2025 13:16 β€” πŸ‘ 10015    πŸ” 2705    πŸ’¬ 399    πŸ“Œ 244

Yep. The system is completely indefensible.

09.04.2025 10:13 β€” πŸ‘ 4    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0

What @jomichell.bsky.social says.

09.04.2025 09:49 β€” πŸ‘ 12    πŸ” 2    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0
Consider the turmoil, in late 2019, in the US repo market, wherefinancial firms borrow and lend cash against securities, pledged as col-lateral. A major cause of this turmoil was liquidity demand from hedgeand private equity funds. These funds are typically levered β€” in ordermaximize their returns, they borrow large sums in the shadow bankingsystem, often pledging the assets they acquire as collateral. In order tostabilize the repo market, the Federal Reserve increased its balance sheetby 10 percent, or USD 400 billion, between September 2019 and Janu-ary 2020. The question β€œWhat is the social value of levered hedge fundsand private equity buyouts?” was not asked.The same pattern recurred β€” on a much larger scale β€” in the wakeof the COVID outbreak in early 2020. In order to prevent the economicshock caused by the pandemic from leading to another systemic financialcrisis, central banks across the world chose to backstop not only banksbut also the broader shadow banking system. The most audacious meas-ures β€” in both size and scope β€” have been implemented by the Fed-eral Reserve. By purchasing so-called β€œjunk bonds” β€” bonds issued bycorporate debtors with lower credit ratings β€” the Federal Reserve againbackstopped private equity funds, which routinely transfer debt to theirbuyout targets, forcing the latter to issue junk bonds. By backstopping

Consider the turmoil, in late 2019, in the US repo market, wherefinancial firms borrow and lend cash against securities, pledged as col-lateral. A major cause of this turmoil was liquidity demand from hedgeand private equity funds. These funds are typically levered β€” in ordermaximize their returns, they borrow large sums in the shadow bankingsystem, often pledging the assets they acquire as collateral. In order tostabilize the repo market, the Federal Reserve increased its balance sheetby 10 percent, or USD 400 billion, between September 2019 and Janu-ary 2020. The question β€œWhat is the social value of levered hedge fundsand private equity buyouts?” was not asked.The same pattern recurred β€” on a much larger scale β€” in the wakeof the COVID outbreak in early 2020. In order to prevent the economicshock caused by the pandemic from leading to another systemic financialcrisis, central banks across the world chose to backstop not only banksbut also the broader shadow banking system. The most audacious meas-ures β€” in both size and scope β€” have been implemented by the Fed-eral Reserve. By purchasing so-called β€œjunk bonds” β€” bonds issued bycorporate debtors with lower credit ratings β€” the Federal Reserve againbackstopped private equity funds, which routinely transfer debt to theirbuyout targets, forcing the latter to issue junk bonds. By backstopping

both the money market and the (high-risk) capital market, the FederalReserve effectively protects both the liability side and the asset side oflevered investors’ balance sheets.In other words, the Federal Reserve ensures that the arsenal of themost predatory actors in the financial system is fully stocked and readyto be deployed β€” for further financializing currently distressed sectorsof the economy, such as elderly care. Shareholders understand β€” thestock price of firms such as Blackstone and Apollo bounced back spec-tacularly after the Federal Reserve announced its measures. Unless gov-ernments take swift and decisive action to curb the ability of hedge andprivate equity funds to gobble up assets, COVID will become a majormilestone in the long history of central bank-facilitated financialization.The upshot is that while central bank planning already exists, it iscurrently geared toward propping up a system in which the planning ofinvestment is in private hands. This system is both unfair and inefficient.Central banks have become the lenders of last resort for a manifestly un-sustainable status quo (Fontan, Claveau, and Dietsch 2016; Jacobs andKing 2016; Streeck 2014).

both the money market and the (high-risk) capital market, the FederalReserve effectively protects both the liability side and the asset side oflevered investors’ balance sheets.In other words, the Federal Reserve ensures that the arsenal of themost predatory actors in the financial system is fully stocked and readyto be deployed β€” for further financializing currently distressed sectorsof the economy, such as elderly care. Shareholders understand β€” thestock price of firms such as Blackstone and Apollo bounced back spec-tacularly after the Federal Reserve announced its measures. Unless gov-ernments take swift and decisive action to curb the ability of hedge andprivate equity funds to gobble up assets, COVID will become a majormilestone in the long history of central bank-facilitated financialization.The upshot is that while central bank planning already exists, it iscurrently geared toward propping up a system in which the planning ofinvestment is in private hands. This system is both unfair and inefficient.Central banks have become the lenders of last resort for a manifestly un-sustainable status quo (Fontan, Claveau, and Dietsch 2016; Jacobs andKing 2016; Streeck 2014).

Time really is a circle. Leveraged hedge funds make billions; bets blow up; dash for cash; the Fed steps in; repeat. Here's what I wrote four years ago about central banks as guarantors of this unjust and inefficient (some might say: stupid) system.
benjaminbraun.org/assets/pubs/...

09.04.2025 08:11 β€” πŸ‘ 90    πŸ” 35    πŸ’¬ 6    πŸ“Œ 2
Preview
Private Equity Vultures Descend on Care Facilities for the Disabled A new report chronicles ten years of consolidation.

You may see care for the intellectually and developmentally disabled as a moral imperative. Private equity has been consolidating the field for the last decade because, well, because of money. Dan Boguslaw reports on a new study of PE's lucrative rollup, and the consequences:

18.03.2025 14:15 β€” πŸ‘ 93    πŸ” 47    πŸ’¬ 6    πŸ“Œ 2
Rebuilding Banking Law: Banks as Public Utilities Under the New Deal framework for money and payments β€” which had its roots in the National Bank Act of 1864 β€” banks in the United States were governed in many respects as public utilities. Charters wer...

Anyway here's how to do it
scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scho...

21.01.2025 13:53 β€” πŸ‘ 2    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

. @matt-levine.bsky.social unwittingly making the case for rate regulation in banking.

21.01.2025 13:53 β€” πŸ‘ 3    πŸ” 2    πŸ’¬ 1    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

3/3:

20.01.2025 15:47 β€” πŸ‘ 2    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

2/3:

20.01.2025 15:47 β€” πŸ‘ 1    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 1    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

Austrian business cycle theory (1/3):

20.01.2025 15:47 β€” πŸ‘ 0    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 1    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

Interesting

20.01.2025 15:47 β€” πŸ‘ 3    πŸ” 1    πŸ’¬ 2    πŸ“Œ 0

This should have been the central organizing question during the post-2008 financial reform process, but it wasn't. No real theory of the case.

17.01.2025 16:52 β€” πŸ‘ 3    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

.@matt-levine.bsky.social on Eurodollars.

The most fundamental question in all of finance is -- and for hundreds of years has been -- "who gets to issue money [dollars in this case] and subject to what constraints."

17.01.2025 16:52 β€” πŸ‘ 7    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 2    πŸ“Œ 0
Preview
The Hidden History of Eurodollars, Part 2: Defending the Dollar System Podcast Episode Β· Odd Lots Β· 01/15/2025 Β· 43m

I haven't listened to part 3 yet but you absolutely cannot miss parts 1 and 2 of this podcast. Incredible stuff.
podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/t...

16.01.2025 18:16 β€” πŸ‘ 2    πŸ” 2    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

OK, I'm already hooked.

15.01.2025 19:45 β€” πŸ‘ 8    πŸ” 3    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

Just arrived, excited to read this. @mkonings.bsky.social

15.01.2025 19:44 β€” πŸ‘ 12    πŸ” 1    πŸ’¬ 2    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

My grandfather's 100th birthday!

29.12.2024 00:04 β€” πŸ‘ 10    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 1    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

Musk's apparent flouting of Exchange Act Β§ 13(d) in 2022 without any legal repercussions tells you a lot about elite impunity in America.

(clip from recent @matt-levine.bsky.social newsletter)

17.12.2024 18:55 β€” πŸ‘ 8    πŸ” 6    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0

Up next, @stefeich.bsky.social's contribution.

13.12.2024 23:25 β€” πŸ‘ 0    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0

Konings's introductory essay here is deep and has given me a lot to think about. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in finance and economic policy. Parts of it relate to what Lev Menand and I have called "the monetary-financial complex."

13.12.2024 23:25 β€” πŸ‘ 15    πŸ” 5    πŸ’¬ 2    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

If we're going to be overhauling bank regulatory structure then may I humbly suggest:

13.12.2024 19:56 β€” πŸ‘ 14    πŸ” 6    πŸ’¬ 1    πŸ“Œ 0
https://youtube.com/shorts/dFK_u8pDV3Q?si=hgvrU0jyVDMhAok0

It's amazing that the mainstream retail payment system is controlled by a duopoly, basically free from meaningful economic regulation.

It would be nice to see some leadership from the Fed in this area.

t.co/2qGESBLwBy

13.12.2024 17:22 β€” πŸ‘ 2    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 1    πŸ“Œ 0

I'm looking for readings re: whether changes in US equity market structure from ~1997 to 2005 (order handling rules, regulation ATS, regulation NMS, etc.) contributed to the near-demise of the IPO market -- would be very grateful for any suggestions.

12.12.2024 20:04 β€” πŸ‘ 4    πŸ” 2    πŸ’¬ 1    πŸ“Œ 0
Post image

Great event here last month with Jonathan Kanter.

10.12.2024 16:33 β€” πŸ‘ 6    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0
Preview
As Cash Fades, Small Retailers Embrace Efforts to Rein In Swipe Fees Business owners say card transaction fees are a growing monthly expense, one often passed to consumers. They’re cheering efforts to lower them.

Link to the story: www.nytimes.com/2024/11/30/b...

05.12.2024 19:24 β€” πŸ‘ 2    πŸ” 0    πŸ’¬ 0    πŸ“Œ 0

@morganricks1 is following 19 prominent accounts