Corey Dethier

FWIW: the *more* substantive issue is that they take "model report" to refer to "a proposition about what the model entails" (p. 46) while I take it to be a proposition about the model's target.

As such, I think their criticisms simply don't land. But it's possible that I'm mistaken about that.

Ultimately, this doesn't matter much to the argument -- the substantive disagreements are more important.

But it's certainly the kind of thing you'd have hoped that the referees would catch!

*That* assertion is pretty clearly wrong. I make *exactly* the same qualification in the paragraph immediately preceding the one they cite.

I then explicitly say that the qualifications are the same in the footnote attached to said sentence!

What's more notable is their assertion that I qualify my claim that models provide evidence in a way that I don't qualify the claim that experiments do (the image is from page 46 of their paper).

Brian McLoone, Steven Orzack, and Elliot Sober have a new paper out in which they argue (among other things) that I'm wrong about robustness.

I think *they're* wrong, of course -- indeed, I think I addressed all their arguments already in the paper they cite. Unsurprisingly, they disagree!

So I asked it to write the intro to an ethics paper in my style, since I've never published anything in ethics.

The thesis it came up with?

All injustice is ultimately epistemic injustice.

So now I know what it is like to be roasted by an LLM. (3/3)

I mention this here because ChatGPT -- without being asked -- described my style using exactly those elements that I *aim* for. That was both flattering and slightly worrying.

It then rewrote the intro to one of my published papers. Boring. (2/3)

Recently, I asked ChatGPT to write the intro to a paper in my style, because I curious how good it would be at imitating an author, and the best way to tell that would be by asking it to imitate the author I know best.

(Don't worry, there's a punchline here. 1/3)

People have strong opinions about which *entirely fictional* characters should date.

I mean, I guess that's not in the news, but just agreeing that there are a lot things that people have strong opinions about that are much ... further from relevant than Zionism.

(For those without access to PoS, you can find a pre-print on my website or on the archive: philsci-archive.pitt.edu/23817/)

Also included in the paper are discussions of the connections between classical statistics and epistemology and contrasting views about the goal of statistical theory -- should statisticians be more like engineers or logicians?

The impression that it does stems from a misapplication of classical statistics -- one ruled out, on principled grounds, by Mayo, Fisher, Neyman & Pearson, and every textbook I looked at.

My article on classical statistics and the base-rate fallacy is now officially out at Philosophy of Science.

The short pitch: classical statistics does not commit the base-rate fallacy, despite what some Bayesian philosophers have suggested.

doi.org/10.1017/psa....

To be clear, you also got roasted by two postdocs in their mid-30s.

*shrugs* sure, I guess?

seeing takes about the aid institutions and their role in imperialism. correct. If someone said "investor-owned hospitals exploit the vulnerable to benefit shareholders" I'd nod. If their followup was "and that's why I'm turning off your mom's dialysis machine" I'd...have some followup questions

Everyone seems to be framing Trump's freeze on federal grants as a Constitutional fight over powers of the purse & whether presidents can disregard Congressional appropriations. It is that. But also at stake is the fundamental validity of government contracts! I see much less discussion on this... 🧵

Corveni, Corvidi, Corvici?

But also I haven't thought about this particular problem, so maybe there's some clever and intractable problem that I'm not seeing.

So we'll get into the various problems associated with higher-order attitudes.

But I don't see that as something inherently wrong with the idea -- it just indicates that there are tough questions about how to do this rationally.

I don't think it would be *odd* to have such concerns. People enjoy surprises!

As for your actual question, if you take your own epistemic states to be in the domain of your utility function, I don't see how you avoid assigning probabilities to your epistemic states.

You want controversial? I'll give you controversial.

"You Make Loving Fun" is the best Fleetwood Mac song.

I had a moment last year where I knew that the paper was accepted and I still could barely bring myself to look at the referee reports where I was like "Oh, this reaction is just anxiety."

I really like that book, but I think all that it took for me to like it was the point in the introduction where you said essentially: "thinking you're right doesn't make it right."

So you could have blueskied it out too.

Interesting! I've been looking for a source of this peculiarity for years, and this seems like the most plausible suggestion.

Of course, I'm also always happy to learn that I'm in agreement with Austin: I think Hart is completely wrong about "obliged." But that's neither here nor there.

I think you're not going to get anywhere searching for a reason; even if there was one once, it's now just a convention.

Similarly: "obligated" when "obliged" is right there.

(FWIW: my impression is that we got the practice from law, but I have no idea why I think that.)

Yes, they can hallucinate papers that don't exist, discuss results that seem to be imaginary, and can be confusing and inconsistent. But talking to tenured professors may still be helpful

Tangential, but my undergrad advisor, on the 1st day of class said something along the lines of: "At some point during this semester, you will begin to wonder whether I wear the same shirt every day or if my closet is full of identical shirts."

He then moved on without answering the question.

It's depressing how many job ads read as: "we expect you to carry a 4/4 load while running the major and doing community outreach; pay is 45k a year and the closest place you can afford to live requires 2 hours of commuting a day in a city with 0 public transit."

My not-so-secret reason for (pretending) to be a formalist is that all you "vibes" people seem to be incapable of correctly evaluating the vibes.

E.g.: surprisingly good vibes:

Modal realism
Meignongianism

Real bad vibes:

Origin essentialism
Reference magnetism