I2P / The Invisible Internet Project

Iran: Proposed Cyber Bill Gives Authorities Sweeping New Powers to Block and Punish Online Content If Approved, Law Could Criminalize Any Content the Authorities Consider “False” July 29, 2025—A sweeping new bill currently under fast-track review by Iran’s parliament would grant the government—and ...

Iran: Proposed Cyber Bill Gives Authorities Sweeping New Powers to Block and Punish Online Content

iranhumanrights.org/2025/07/iran...

From the i2p community on Reddit Explore this post and more from the i2p community

I2P asks to setup HTTP proxy on the web browser, but are there reasons to use SOCKS instead ?

www.reddit.com/r/i2p/commen...

All traffic on the I2P network is encrypted. An observer cannot see message contents, source, or destination. All traffic you route as a participant is internal to the I2P network, you are not an exit node.

I2P FAQ:
I Can See My IP Address!

Your IP address must be known to establish connections within a distributed P2P network.

However, you cannot see if a user behind an IP address is sharing files, hosting a website, or just running a node to contribute bandwidth to the I2P network. 🔒

An Improved BGP Internet Graph for Optimizing Refraction
Proxy Placement
petsymposium.org/foci/2025/fo...

On Precisely Detecting Censorship Circumvention in
Real-World Networks www.robgjansen.com/publications...

Mapping Russia’s Internet blackouts The Russian authorities keep shutting down mobile Internet. Here’s where it happens most, and how the outages are spreading. — Meduza As of summer 2025, mobile Internet shutdowns have become a routine part of life in Russia. Users are also reporting more frequent disruptions to home Internet and even cell service. The number and sca...

Mapping Russia’s Internet blackouts The Russian authorities keep shutting down mobile Internet. Here’s where it happens most, and how the outages are spreading.

meduza.io/en/feature/2...

Research using AI algorithms found that passive attacks were not effective in breaking I2P network anonymity.

Read more:

www.diva.exchange/en/privacy/r...

From the i2p community on Reddit Explore this post and more from the i2p community

❓ Does the new i2p java update herald the ability to defend against attacks from quantum computers?

✅ It is being rolled out incrementally.

www.reddit.com/r/i2p/commen...

I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship www.petsymposium.org/foci/2025/fo...

Wallbleed: A Memory Disclosure Vulnerability in the Great Firewall of China We present Wallbleed, a buffer over-read vulnerability that existed in the DNS injection subsystem of the Great Firewall of China. Wallbleed caused certain nation-wide censorship middleboxes to reveal...

Wallbleed: A Memory Disclosure Vulnerability in the Great Firewall of China gfw.report/publications...

Tunnel Vision: Anti-censorship Tools, End-to-End Encryption and the Fight for a Free and Open Internet Governments around the world are increasingly exerting control over the technology that people depend on to access the free and open internet.

Tunnel Vision: Anti-censorship Tools, End-to-End Encryption and the Fight for a Free and Open Internet freedomhouse.org/report/speci...

Pass the SALT Conference livestream is available here:
mastodon.social/@passthesalt...

Norway’s IGF: Crossroads or continuity? - Internet Governance Project No one will complain about the operation of the 2025 Internet Governance Forum. The Norwegians did everything right. Even their controversial decision to offer a rather small number of workshop rooms ...

Norway’s IGF: Crossroads or continuity? www.internetgovernance.org/2025/06/30/n...
#IGF

Supported by @opentechfund.bsky.social: @chinafile.bsky.social’s Jessica Batke & @whiskeyocelot.bsky.social explain that Chinese censorship isn’t simply a “firewall, but a “locknet” – a multi-level system of socio-technical controls. (1/4)
locknet.chinafile.com/the-locknet/...

Iran-Israel war: What tools are used to censor reporting? – DW – 06/23/2025 Accessing independent information is impossible in Iran at the moment. In Israel, videos showing military targets and destruction are censored, but observers warn that broader conflict reporting is al...

Iran-Israel war: What tools are used to censor reporting? www.dw.com/en/iran-isra...

I2P 2.9.0-4 target release is September. As always we ask for people who can to test dev builds during the release cycle.
zzz.i2p/topics/3694-...

We're going to need a bigger EuroStack.

I have been watching the metrics daily and observing this collapse as well. Thank you for adding more context and for maintaining this valuable resource. - Sadie

4/
Raw ASN-level data from I2P Metrics shows this collapse clearly — even the largest providers like AS197207 and AS58224 went dark.

Note: I2P Metrics hides or put together ASNs with <20 I2P routers to preserve privacy.

📊 Table from router snapshots below ⬇️

3/
This wasn’t a gradual decline. Iran’s I2P router count fell off a cliff:

🗓️ June 13: 1,496 routers
🗓️ June 18: 209 routers
🗓️ June 19–20: 0 routers

This aligns with a coordinated disruption across multiple Iranian networks. Prior to these days, 🇮🇷 ranked 2nd (only after🇺🇸)

2/
We observed a sharp drop in I2P router presence in Iran beginning June 13, 2025.

On that day, there were 1,496 active routers.
By June 18, this fell to just 209.
And by June 19–20, there were no routers visible from Iran.

🧵1/
Interesting observations about @geti2p.bsky.social access disruptions in Iran — I’d like to add to this based on measurements from i2p-metrics.np-tokumei.net, a system I built several years ago to collect I2P Metrics, supported by @opentechfund.bsky.social

Here’s what the 🇮🇷 Iran data shows:
📉👇

[Prop 160] UDP Tracker review is scheduled for Tuesday June 24, 7 PM UTC, IRC2P #ls2
geti2p.net/spec/proposa... #I2P

The I2P Network database router statistics map lets you see your router tunnels and peers. Available with the latest I2P update.

Iran is experiencing a near Internet blackout today, starting at ~5:00 PM local time. We see significant drops across networks. Some networks, including MCCI and Rightel appear to be responsive.

Follow connectivity in Iran in near realtime:
ioda.inetintel.cc.gatech.edu/country/IR?f...

Is Custom Congestion Control a Bad Idea for Circumvention
Tools? www.petsymposium.org/foci/2025/fo...

Railroad is an I2P network based blogging platform: github.com/eyedeekay/ra...

Much of Iran's internet service is down as of 14:00 UTC (5:30pm local).

Between 13:45-14:00 UTC traffic levels for the largest networks in Iran began plummeting.

Learning from Censored Experiences: Social Media Discussions around Censorship Circumvention Technologies www.computer.org/csdl/proceed...