Marc A. Moffett

I'm reasonably confident that nobody will agree with much in this book -- on either side of intuitions debate! Thanks for the post!

The Indispensability of Intuitions Cambridge Core - Philosophy: General Interest - The Indispensability of Intuitions

Very pleased that my Cambridge Element, The Indispensability of Intuitions, is now available. Free to download for the next two weeks. Check it out!

doi.org/10.1017/9781...

#philosophy #epistemology #philosophyofmind

How Academic Freedom in Universities Generates the Greatest Value for Society Academic freedom is at the foundation of one of the most powerful and fundamental ideas about universities. Learn about how academic freedom has contributed to broad benefits in society and UC Davis f...

“If we aren't free to pursue research and teaching based on wherever the knowledge leads us, we are not truly working in the service of the public.”

— Rana Jaleel, associate professor at UC Davis & Chair of the AAUP’s Committee A on Academic Freedom & Tenure

I agree that logical or metaphysical necessity is not sufficient for a property to be essential. This seems to me to be a conceptual matter settled by intuition. I do see the worry here, about my stipulation -- but will have to think about it when I have more time

I think it is true in the way Kripke suggests: Nec(if x exists, then x is true)

I do think they serve as truth-makers; they are in the "extensions" of propositions. So, the view ends up being similar to the one defended by Baylis (1948).

Well, I am partial to the idea that states-of-affairs are abstract when they don't obtain and concrete when they do (when they are facts). Similar to Linsky-Zalta on the contingently, non-concrete.

Here I intended it to be stipulated that truths are essentially true. (In the case of facts, I think this comes from our ordinary concept and is not stipulated.)

and they have the property of obtaining essentially. The identity theorist, IMO, would do better to identify facts with truths, rather than true propositions. I still think this is a category mistake, but not so egregious. (What is the truth value of the fact that p?)

In this case, the correct relation is closer to something like composition -- truths have propositions in their analyses.

I read facts this way. It just sounds wrong to say "The fact that Hilary Clinton won in 2016 exists, but isn't a fact". I take facts to be states-of-affairs that obtain, (more)

It is not identity. Truths don't exist in worlds where the proposition is false, but the proposition does exist in those worlds. Since being true is an essential property of truths, it would be wrong to say that they exist in that world but just aren't true (more)

Let me introduce the slightly awkward notion of a truth as in, "It's a truth that JC was pres in 1979". Truths, I will suppose, have the property of being true necessarily. What is the relation between the proposition that p and the truth that p? (more)

This is just a little more explicitly the argument I was suggesting.

the fact that Carter was president in 1979 would not have existed had Carter not been president in 1979, but the true proposition that Carter was president in 1979 would have existed had Carter not been president then; it merely would not have been true.

By the way, just came across this in T. Parson's paper: Frege's thoughts are the referents of that-clauses in non-factive contexts, and so they are my propositions. Are the true ones facts? I think not. One reason is familiar from metaphysical considerations: as philosophers construe facts, (more)

Well, that is far better put than I could have managed!

is a contingent feature. So, the proposition exists when false. If facts = true propositions, then the truth wouldn't be a contingent feature. So, whatever a fact is, it isn't just a true proposition. (I'm sick, so maybe I'm not spelling this out carefully or just missing something.)

Not knowing the full context, this blurb only argues that facts and propositions are distinct; not that facts and true propositions are distinct. Though the former is, of course, a weird view. But, TBH, even then I don't think the argument is that bad. The truth-value of (many) propositions (more)

I don’t condone murder. But I am far more sad about the kids in Evergreen than that Charlie guy people seem worried about

highly recommend

It is important to remember that these cuts affect more than science. The arts and humanities are huge drivers of creativity, innovation, and insight and have been just as devastated by Trump's cuts.

A major danger of LLMs is that humans are SO predisposed to attribute knowledge to any entity that uses natural language fluently. We cannot imagine that a machine that outputs natural-seeming speech/text doesn't have cognition. Brilliantly articulated by @emilymbender.bsky.social et al. (2021).

“I’ve studied McCarthyism’s impact on higher education for 50 years. What’s happening now is worse.” -Ellen Schrecker, historian

Academic freedom in the United States has found itself periodically under siege, but the current attacks from the federal government raise a new level of alarm. nyer.cm/u405qvQ

The tenure situation in Texas is clearly deteriorating — aided and abetted by administrators willing to put self-advancement over principle. Sound familiar?

Interesting case. I see. I concede.

Same. I agree that there can be such cases. I take it that the general case you suggested is understood by default to have the following characteristics: (1) it is one off, (2) no independent confirmation. In this sort of minimal case, it seems to me that the defeat runs pretty clearly one way

On confidence. Pretty much the same point. If I think my skill at identifying swans is hit or miss, then seeming to see a swan won’t give me good reason to think i see a swan. (But maybe this is better described as a case where it isn’t clear that I seem to see a swan (nonfactive)?)

Sure. Perceptual conditions will matter. But at the extreme end, I won’t be justified in believing there is a swan independent of my belief about the presence of swans. Adding in a justified belief about lack of swans will just push that line further into clearer perceptual conditions.

I get the second one as a defeated more than the first. If I am pretty confident in my swan-identifying abilities, then seeing a swan would make me think I was wrong about the lack of swans. But if I have reason to doubt that ability, then I can see why I’d be inclined to resist believing