Nicole Grajewski

Navigating the New Nuclear Map - Texas National Security Review The global nuclear order is undergoing rapid and complex transformations, driven by the expansion of arsenals, evolving doctrines, and the interplay of domestic and international politics. This roundt...

Our latest roundtable examines the rapidly evolving global nuclear order. From North Korea to NATO, China to Latin America, this collection of essays explores the domestic and international forces reshaping nuclear security.

Full roundtable: tnsr.org/roundtable/n...

"MENA at the Threshold? Proliferation Risks and Great Power Competition" by Nicole Grajewski and Jane Darby Menton This article situates the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in the global nuclear order, emphasizing how the region has both challenged and spurred adaptations in international nuclear governance for decades. It then examines two pressing contemporary issues: the uncertain trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program after Israeli and US military strikes in June 2025, and the anticipated expansion of nuclear energy across MENA, which could also result in more countries with capabilities that would be conducive to pursuing the bomb. Both developments underscore the difficulties of managing nuclear latency in a conflict-prone region, where tensions among local actors inflect nuclear decision-making. While there are opportunities to mitigate these challenges, and principles that policymakers should follow in addressing them, nuclear aspirations are likely to remain a prominent feature of MENA’s security landscape so long as underlying tensions between regional actors remain unresolved.

From Iran’s nuclear ambitions to great power competition over energy, this essay by @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social and Jane Darby Menton examines the complex nuclear dynamics shaping the Middle East and North Africa.

📖 Read here: tnsr.org/roundtable/n...

Navigating the New Nuclear Map - Texas National Security Review The global nuclear order is undergoing rapid and complex transformations, driven by the expansion of arsenals, evolving doctrines, and the interplay of domestic and international politics. This roundt...

Read @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social and @jdmenton.bsky.social piece, "MENA at the Threshold? Proliferation Risks and Great Power Competition", in a series of essays by @tnsr.org on the shifting global nuclear order. Check it out here: tnsr.org/roundtable/n...

How far can Moscow and Tehran really take their uneasy cooperation? @osto.bsky.social and @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social discuss.

Listen here: warontherocks.com/ep...

Iranian entities under UNSC sanctions

Opinion | Snapback Sanctions Hit Iran Actually enforcing them will require hard work by Western politicians, diplomats and experts.

Re-upping this too: www.wsj.com/opinion/snap...

Oh totally agree. It is also unprecedented for the UNSC because they could just veto a resolution that they opposed.

No respect for the use of their very own innovation in the JCPOA

More context

Russian UNSC statement: There has been no snapback, and there will be no snapback. Any moves to resuscitate anti-Iranian Security Council resolutions that were in effect prior to 2015 are null and void.

Snapback and Its Discontents: Russia's Legal Rebuttal to Sanctions on Iran Why Moscow refuses to recognize the return of UN sanctions on Iran and how it is using procedure to blunt enforcement

All pre-JCPOA UN sanctions on Iran will be reinstated tomorrow at 00:00 GMT. Read about it & how Russia might respond to the reinstatement of sanctions here: russiairan.substack.com/p/snapback-a...

The main sanctions that will be reimposed on Iran will be:
UNSCR 1696 (2006)
UNSCR 1737 (2006)
UNSCR 1747 (2007)
UNSCR 1803 (2008)
UNSCR 1929 (2010)

Vote on UNSCR 2231 extension:
4 in favor
9 against
2 abstentions

Snapback is happening. All pre-JCPOA UN sanctions on Iran will be reinstated at 00:00 GMT tomorrow.

Washington’s Ironclad Commitments Are Rusting in the Indo-Pacific The recent wave of meetings between U.S. officials and allies in the Indo-Pacific have been studies in the duality of American diplomacy under President

Washington’s Ironclad Commitments Are Rusting in the Indo-Pacific | Gregory H. Winger, Miguel Alberto Gomez, and Lauren Sukin for War on the Rocks warontherocks.com/2025/09/wash...

Snapback and Its Discontents: Russia's Legal Rebuttal to Sanctions on Iran Why Moscow refuses to recognize the return of UN sanctions on Iran and how it is using procedure to blunt enforcement

New post on Russia's position on snapback sanctions on Iran and how Moscow might try to legitimize its noncompliance once sanctions go into effect russiairan.substack.com/p/snapback-a...

A very quick and crudely drawn map in QGIS, just to illustrate the clearest contrails and their locations.
Also, a current map showing current vessel locations around Novaya Zemlya.
Of note, Teriberka left Pankovo in the last few hours.

US-UK Nuclear Pact to Precede Tech, Whisky Deals on Trump Visit The US and Britain will sign an agreement to make it quicker for companies in both countries to build nuclear power stations when President Donald Trump visits this week, according to the UK government.

The US and Britain will sign an agreement to make it quicker for companies in both countries to build nuclear power stations when Trump visits this week, according to the UK government

Iran’s Plan for a Post-War Military Revamp: Financing Gaps, Similar Mistakes, and Sanctions Risks Iran’s parliament is moving forward with a Plan to Strengthen the Armed Forces, presenting it as a path to rebuild after the 12-day war.

Wrote a Substack post about Iran's lackluster plan to rebuild its military after the 12-day war with Israel russiairan.substack.com/p/irans-plan...

To conclude, Iran’s ongoing efforts to rebuild after the 12 day war shouldn’t be detached from the looming restoration of snapback sanctions or its endemic economic issues. The adaptations so far still have not addressed the deeper structural issues the plagued Iran’s defenses.

Given their opposition to snapback, it is unlikely that Russia or China would fully abide by such a reinstated embargo. However, the real question is whether either would be willing to provide Iran with arms. That’s an issue for another thread.

These resolutions did not explicitly prohibit air defense systems. But they cover nearly all major offensive conventional systems, meaning that a snapback would freeze Iran’s ability to acquire tanks, aircraft, ships, artillery, and missile systems abroad.

UNSCR 1929 (2010) strengthened this by prohibiting the direct or indirect supply of those same categories to Iran, and extended the prohibition to spare parts, related materiel, technical training, financial resources, maintenance, and associated services.

UNSCR 1747 (2007) called on states to exercise restraint in transfers to Iran of any systems covered by the UN Register of Conventional Arms: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles.

Arms acquisitions from abroad will be directly impacted if snapback sanctions are reimposed. A return to the pre-JCPOA UN sanctions would bar Iran from legally importing many major weapons systems.

So far there is nothing on passive defense and no details on which specific systems might be funded. Interestingly, very little discussion on self-sufficiency which may indicate a realization that foreign procurement of arms would be more optimal.

Air defense receives only $50–70M annually from transit fees. That is a tiny sum given Iran’s vulnerabilities during the 12-day war. Even basic procurement would require far larger and more sustained investment. Time matters here.

More initiatives may be announced, but Iran’s economic limitations mean these are unlikely to close the gap. The plan appears to fund repairs and procurement but does not deviate dramatically from Iran’s pre-12 day war military strategy or planning.

The plan rests on assumptions about funds that may come from volatile sources (oil revenues, frozen assets, or reallocated budget items) which could be affected by sanctions or economic disruptions.

The Planning & Budget Organization must also cover the annual share from the Supreme National Security Council’s resolutions on defense strengthening, using either savings in public expenditures or revenues from oil sales. So this leaves potential room for more defense spending.

~$1.5B allocated from the Ministry of Oil transferred directly to the General Staff of the Armed Forces to support defense-related activities

~$50–70M annually (30% of air transit revenues) directed to the Army to strengthen air defense systems