@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
Assistant Professor at Sciences Po CERI | Nonresident at Carnegie and Associate with Harvard’s Managing the Atom | working on nuclear issues involving Russia and Iran | author of Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine (OUP/Hurst)
New post on Iran’s targets during its initial retaliation on Feb. 28. It examines the targeting logic behind three parallel campaigns: striking U.S. C2/ISR infrastructure, imposing costs on the GCC states, and pressuring Israeli civilian centers. www.axesandatoms.com/p/irans-febr...
"Most of Moscow’s military resources are tied up in Ukraine, while Beijing’s foreign policy prioritizes economic ties and avoids direct conflict." Alexander Gabuev and Temur Umarov explain why neither Russia nor China has offered any tangible support to Iran.
Given Russian-Iranian technical cooperation since 2022, reporting that Moscow is sharing UAV employment lessons from Ukraine suggests that at least some wartime operational learning and possibly incremental technical improvements may now be informing Iranian planning.
Recent Iranian UAV strike packages appear more complex than earlier campaigns, with greater variation in altitude/routing and clearer evidence of layered raid structures. Some approaches to defended areas appear designed to complicate radar coverage and interceptor sequencing.
Whether these operational lessons and upgrades have been systematically transferred back to Tehran is difficult to demonstrate conclusively. But observable changes in Iranian drone employment suggest some degree of adaptation.
The result was incremental but meaningful upgrades: anti-jam antenna arrays (e.g., Kometa), modified navigation receivers, domestically produced variants, and evolving strike packages combining drones and missiles to complicate air defense engagement.
Over time these systems effectively became platforms for continuous operational testing. Russia expanded domestic production, modified subsystems, and employed them in thousands of strikes against a dense and adaptive Ukrainian air defense network.
When Iranian Shaheds first appeared in Russia in 2022 they were relatively simple systems—GPS-dependent, predictable in routing, and vulnerable to jamming and interceptor combinations that Ukrainian forces developed quickly.
The most consequential Russian contribution to Iran’s UAV capabilities over the past two years is likely in the real of operational learning generated through Russia’s large-scale Shahed employment in Ukraine.
The CNN report also notes Russia’s experience launching Shaheds in coordinated waves that alter routes and flight profiles to evade air defenses. If such practices are informing Iranian strikes, the significance lies less in the drone itself than in operational learning.
CNN reports Russia is now providing Iran with more specific operational guidance on UAV employment, including targeting approaches derived from its use of Shahed drones in Ukraine.
This is not very surprising but good to have it confirmed.
🚨 JUST IN: I wrote about Trump's self-induced dilemma of sending US troops to seize or destroy Iran's highly enriched uranium.
#Iran #Isfahan #uranium #Trump #nuclearweapons #nukesky @thebulletin.org
Good piece by @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
www.axesandatoms.com/p/10-days-of...
What are the military risks of U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran?
@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social discusses the strategic implications in an interview with the Malcolm H. Kerr @carnegiemec.bsky.social.
carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/...
Wrote this article yesterday before the news of Russia’s support to Iran was reported www.russiamatters.org/analysis/ira...
For those interested in the evolution of Russia-Iran relations, my book comes out next month.
DM if you’re interested in an advanced copy and I can put you in touch with my publisher. www.hurstpublishers.com/book/russia-...
💭 #Iran at War: The Russian Angle
@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social explains why the Russia–Iran relationship is not an alliance.
It is a partnership shaped by shared interests, regime security concerns, and significant limits rooted in historical mistrust.
Full conversation linked below ⬇️
I don't know anything about India-Middle East relations beyond the most cursory stuff.
The authority on this topic is
@nicoblar.bsky.social . For Iranian foreign policy in general, I follow
@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social .
If you know an expert who is here, please post in the responses.
Thanks,
Le stock de Shahed de l’Iran peut être estimé à “entre 4000 et 6000”(…) Au début de la guerre en 🇺🇦, Téhéran avait pu en livrer plusieurs milliers à son allié russe [mais ils] sont désormais en quasi-totalité fabriqués en 🇷🇺, sous le nom de Geran-2. @nicolastenzer.bsky.social @ilasserre.bsky.social
💭 Iran at War: The Russian Angle
@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social explains how tensions involving #Iran could affect #Russia’s broader interests in the Gulf, where Moscow’s economic ties to GCC states often exceed its ties to Tehran.
Full conversation in the comments ⬇️
@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social argues that New START’s expiration won’t trigger a Cold War–style arms race, but rather a quieter shift toward warhead “uploading,” nonstrategic expansion, and greater nuclear ambiguity in a trilateral U.S.–Russia–China landscape.
theins.ru/en/opinion/n...
Nuclear breakdown: How the end of the New START treaty will affect the arms race between Russia and the U.S.
Nuclear policy expert @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social examines where, how, and at what cost Russia will exploit the treaty’s absence.
In an interview for DW News, @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social argues that Russia’s support for Iran is largely rhetorical, with no mutual defense obligation and limited military reliance on Tehran:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=dyTp...
Last year, @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social and I specifically warned of the risk that the US could become a pawn in the Israel-Iran dynamic. Midnight Hammer came shortly after, and now this. www.bostonglobe.com/2025/06/18/o...
My long-form interview with Richard Walker of Deutsche Welle on the war with Iran youtu.be/zxmP4TAwkOE?...
The Kremlin's calculus on Iran, featuring expertise from @hannanotte.bsky.social and @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social in @newstatesman1913.bsky.social: www.newstatesman.com/internationa...
About to start listening to this really relevant and timely discussion with Michael Kimmage, @hannanotte.bsky.social and @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social on the Russian angle in the war against Iran.
Написала для «The Insider» о том, что означает конец СНВ-3. Это не автоматическая новая гонка вооружений — у России ограничены ресурсы. Но снижение прозрачности и возможное наращивание нестратегических систем повышают риски стратегической нестабильности. theins.ru/opinions/nik...
If you’d like to take a break from Iran, here is an article I wrote for the Insider on Russia and the expiration of New START — it’s based off of my longer term project about Russia and trilateral arms racing. theins.press/en/opinion/n...
