Nicole Grajewski

Wrote this article yesterday before the news of Russia’s support to Iran was reported www.russiamatters.org/analysis/ira...

For those interested in the evolution of Russia-Iran relations, my book comes out next month.

DM if you’re interested in an advanced copy and I can put you in touch with my publisher. www.hurstpublishers.com/book/russia-...

💭 #Iran at War: The Russian Angle

@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social explains why the Russia–Iran relationship is not an alliance.

It is a partnership shaped by shared interests, regime security concerns, and significant limits rooted in historical mistrust.

Full conversation linked below ⬇️

I don't know anything about India-Middle East relations beyond the most cursory stuff.

The authority on this topic is
@nicoblar.bsky.social . For Iranian foreign policy in general, I follow
@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social .

If you know an expert who is here, please post in the responses.

Thanks,

Les voisins de l’Iran, confrontés aux attaques de drones, découvrent leur vulnérabilité Dénués d’expérience en matière de lutte contre les engins kamikazes, notamment les Shahed, les pays du Golfe sont apparus désemparés face à la menace posée par la République islamique, déterminée de s...

Le stock de Shahed de l’Iran peut être estimé à “entre 4000 et 6000”(…) Au début de la guerre en 🇺🇦, Téhéran avait pu en livrer plusieurs milliers à son allié russe [mais ils] sont désormais en quasi-totalité fabriqués en 🇷🇺, sous le nom de Geran-2. @nicolastenzer.bsky.social @ilasserre.bsky.social

💭 Iran at War: The Russian Angle

@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social explains how tensions involving #Iran could affect #Russia’s broader interests in the Gulf, where Moscow’s economic ties to GCC states often exceed its ties to Tehran.

Full conversation in the comments ⬇️

Nuclear breakdown: How the end of the New START treaty will affect the arms race between Russia and the U.S. In early February, the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States and Russia (better known as New START) expired, and no new agreement has been reached to take its place. However, a Cold War-style arms race appears unlikely, as Russia does not have the necessary resources for the mass production of new strategic weapons, argues nuclear policy expert Nicole Grajewski, an assistant professor at the Center for International Studies (CERI) at Sciences Po in Paris. In her view, a more likely future scenario involves Russia increasing the number of warheads on systems already in its arsenal while expanding production of nonstrategic weapons. The end of mutual inspections provided for under New START creates new opportunities to pursue such projects, even if Russia's coffers have been depleted by the war in Ukraine. China, however, does have the resources, and its nuclear program offers new causes for concern.

@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social argues that New START’s expiration won’t trigger a Cold War–style arms race, but rather a quieter shift toward warhead “uploading,” nonstrategic expansion, and greater nuclear ambiguity in a trilateral U.S.–Russia–China landscape.
theins.ru/en/opinion/n...

Nuclear breakdown: How the end of the New START treaty will affect the arms race between Russia and the U.S. In early February, the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States and Russia (better known as New START) expired, and no new agre...

Nuclear breakdown: How the end of the New START treaty will affect the arms race between Russia and the U.S.

Nuclear policy expert @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social examines where, how, and at what cost Russia will exploit the treaty’s absence.

YouTube video by DW News Is Moscow planning to help their longtime ally Iran in this crisis? | DW News

In an interview for DW News, @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social argues that Russia’s support for Iran is largely rhetorical, with no mutual defense obligation and limited military reliance on Tehran:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=dyTp...

US should not become a pawn in the Israel-Iran war - The Boston Globe Trump should pivot to coercive mediation: making any additional military or intelligence support conditional on Israeli restraint.

Last year, @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social and I specifically warned of the risk that the US could become a pawn in the Israel-Iran dynamic. Midnight Hammer came shortly after, and now this. www.bostonglobe.com/2025/06/18/o...

YouTube video by DW News Iran, US, Israel: Analyzing their goals & limitations | DW News

My long-form interview with Richard Walker of Deutsche Welle on the war with Iran youtu.be/zxmP4TAwkOE?...

How Putin is backing Iran's war effort A prolonged conflict in the Middle East would serve Russia’s interests

The Kremlin's calculus on Iran, featuring expertise from @hannanotte.bsky.social and @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social in @newstatesman1913.bsky.social: www.newstatesman.com/internationa...

About to start listening to this really relevant and timely discussion with Michael Kimmage, @hannanotte.bsky.social and @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social on the Russian angle in the war against Iran.

Ядерный срыв: как конец договора СНВ-3 повлияет на гонку вооружений между Россией и США В начале февраля истек срок действия Договора о мерах по дальнейшему сокращению и ограничению стратегических наступательных вооружений между США и Россией (СНВ-3), причем нового соглашения заключено н...

Написала для «The Insider» о том, что означает конец СНВ-3. Это не автоматическая новая гонка вооружений — у России ограничены ресурсы. Но снижение прозрачности и возможное наращивание нестратегических систем повышают риски стратегической нестабильности. theins.ru/opinions/nik...

Nuclear breakdown: How the end of the New START treaty will affect the arms race between Russia and the U.S. In early February, the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States and Russia (better known as New START) expired, and no new agre...

If you’d like to take a break from Iran, here is an article I wrote for the Insider on Russia and the expiration of New START — it’s based off of my longer term project about Russia and trilateral arms racing. theins.press/en/opinion/n...

It is unclear what all of this means for Iran’s future nuclear trajectory but I’d be cautious about arguments that suggest a rapid dash to a nuclear weapon or a complete abandonment of nuclear ambitions after the war. It is too early to tell.

The fate of the Islamic Republic as we know it and, by extension, its nuclear program is unknown. But after the war, regime survival and internal power consolidation will matter far more than any past policies or any inherited fatwa — regardless of who assumes power.

With Khamenei gone, Tehran lacks a clear successor and the system is entering uncharted territory. His centralized grip over nuclear policy leaves a vacuum that could spur institutional jockeying.

The idea of so-called “heroic flexibility” (نرمش قهرمانانه) fits the same pattern. It did not mean rapprochement with Washington. It meant tactical maneuvering to preserve the regime while relieving pressure, essentially negotiation without ideological concession.

While many attribute Iran’s abstention from building nuclear weapons to Khamenei’s fatwa, it reflected political calculation and, to some extent, indecision. It served regime interests in crisis management, not a firm internal prohibition on weaponization.

The fatwa’s political function arguably outweighs its jurisprudential weight. It was showcased repeatedly in international forums to reassure interlocutors that Iran will not weaponize. It was more directed to international audiences than an unbreakable internal constraint.

Khamenei’s oft-cited fatwa against nuclear weapons exists, but its strength and scope are contested. At times, he forbade development, stockpiling, and use. Other times, he spoke more narrowly about use, not production — leaving space for reinterpretation.

Khamenei had ultimate authority on whether Iran engaged internationally, how it advanced enrichment, and how it dealt with the U.S. and nuclear diplomacy. He also had authority over Iran’s past covert efforts at weaponization.

Iran’s nuclear program under Ayatollah Khamenei was never just a technical initiative — it was political, ideological, and tightly controlled by the Supreme Leader. 🧵

💭 Iran at War: The Russian Angle

A major war against #Iran raises urgent questions about Russia’s role in the Middle East.

@hannanotte.bsky.social and @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social
assess the broader implications.

Register:
zoom.us/webinar/regi...

Israel and the US strike Iran. It is a tragedy of Tehran's own making Iran's strategy rested on the critical assumption that the US administration preferred a deal to a war. That proved fatal on Saturday.

In a new opinion piece, @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social argues that Iran's nuclear strategy rested on the critical assumption that the US administration preferred a deal to a war.

Israel and the US strike Iran. It is a tragedy of Tehran's own making Iran's strategy rested on the critical assumption that the US administration preferred a deal to a war. That proved fatal on Saturday.

Fantastic analysis by @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social!

thebulletin.org/2026/02/isra...

If you have time to read only one thing on today’s strikes, make it @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social ‘s analysis in @thebulletin.org .

U.S. Aims in Iran Extend Beyond Nuclear Issues Because of this, the costs and risks of an attack merit far more public scrutiny than they are receiving.

U.S. Aims in Iran Extend Beyond Nuclear Issues

Because of this, the costs and risks of an attack merit far more public scrutiny than they are receiving.
@nicolegrajewski.bsky.social

carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/...

MTA Associate @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social delivers a sharp analysis showing why U.S. strikes on Iran have not resolved the core nuclear challenge Read her article here: carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/...