Nicole Grajewski

Iranian nuclear experts held second covert meeting with Russian weapons institute US claims meeting is part of an effort by Tehran to acquire sensitive military technologies from Moscow

Iranian nuclear experts held second covert meeting with Russian weapons institute— @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social a fellow in the nuclear policy programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the meetings… www.ft.com/content/1312... @maxseddon.bsky.social @financialtimes.com

Ahahaha good idea actually might look into that

My partner had the brilliant idea of taking them from the HKS library when they were giving it away and they have been a burden ever since

Would be a good idea if I had a car ahah

Anyone know the best way to ship books from the US to Europe? Or any good storage places in DC? All the google results look like spam.

Alternatively if anyone in DC wants the public papers of Clinton and Reagan, let me know.

First post in the rebrand of my Substack from the very bland title of Russia and Iran to Axes and Atoms —a nod to every axis that Russia and Iran have been cast into, and a space to examine the military and nuclear dynamics that shape both countries. axesandatoms.substack.com/p/the-questi...

New post on the history of Soviet and Russian hydronuclear tests axesandatoms.substack.com/p/the-questi...

It's not worth your time.

Just the system bsky.app/profile/nico...

You basically just have to look at the design bureaus to identify which projects were revived. Peresvet is a clearer example than Burevestnik IMO. Burevestnik seems more of the result of few different designs between NPO Mash and Novator/nuclear-powered aviation/SLVs.

We know little about Poseidon beyond the leaked presentation aired on Russian television. Yet, given previous Soviet interest, Poseidon represents less a technical revolution than a persistence of concept. IMO it also has the most interesting history out of the novel weapons.

Soviet research institutes modeled such detonations in Lake Ladoga and later on Novaya Zemlya. The studies showed that continental shelves absorb most of the energy — massive waves dissipate rapidly, making large-scale coastal destruction physically unrealistic.

One scientist proposed that a tsunami-type wave from a 100-megaton underwater explosion could devastate portions of the U.S. coastline. Khrushchev ordered a study on its potential.

The Tsar Bomba test (1961) revived Khrushchev’s interest in ultra-high-yield systems and unconventional delivery methods. Political enthusiasm for “superweapons” spurred renewed exploration of underwater thermonuclear effects.

When the Navy finally reviewed it, naval engineers concluded that to launch the T-15, a submarine would have to approach within 40 km of defended coasts, surface for orientation, and expose itself to immediate destruction. The concept was dropped.

The T-15 concept was paired with the USSR’s first nuclear-powered submarine, Project 627. The torpedo measured roughly 23m in length, used an electric motor with an approx 30 km range, and carried a multi-megaton warhead. The project advanced without the Navy’s knowledge.

The first major attempt was Project T-15 (1949–53), initiated under Sredmash. With no submarine-launched ballistic missiles available, Soviet designers envisioned a very large thermonuclear torpedo capable of striking coastal targets.

Poseidon belongs to a long Soviet lineage of experimenting with high-yield undersea delivery systems. These projects explored how ocean depth, pressure, and shock-wave propagation could be harnessed to shape or amplify nuclear effects. 🧵

Naturally, there are contradictory reports on it but it doesn't seem like its going to be 100-300 megatons like some western reports suggested. This one suggests 2 megatons tass.ru/armiya-i-opk...

From a 2015 report: a long horizontal cutaway of the Poseidon shows 1) acoustic/sonar/navigation sensors; 2) combat/warhead module; 3) instrumentation/control electronics; 4) compact nuclear reactor; 5) steam-turbine

Putin claims Russia successfully tested the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater drone: we managed not only to launch it from the carrier submarine using its booster engine, but also to start the nuclear power unit, on which the vehicle operated for a certain period of time. t.co/3dQupIKRKW

I was hoping I'd get around to doing a full review in the next month or so, once the vessels had gone home - but anyway, just to highlight something: there were, since August, something like 6 or 7 other potential test windows, based on vessel/aircraft movements. Below just shows since September.

Vessels appear to be beginning their migration from Matochkin Shar, northwards to monitoring positions, either side of the north island.

Current Burevestnik related NOTAMs cover out to 22 OCT.

Joint letter from Russia, China, and Iran claims that the “termination” of UNSCR 2231’s provisions “marks the end of the Security Council’s consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue”

Iran’s leadership seems to recognize the limits of threshold status. It may mean a reluctance to leverage ambiguity via visible weaponization-related activities or a search for covert, less visible pathways. The direction remains unclear, perhaps even to Iran’s own leadership.

Iran’s threshold status or latent deterrent, meanwhile, lacked credibility. It was devoid of a survivable retaliatory capability to impose tangible costs on its opponent. It was merely a signal of potential, not a capability to be actualized in the midst of war.

For Iran, the central challenge lay in attempting to deter an adversary largely impervious to being deterred. Israel had a higher appetite for risk and a growing sense confidence after Iran’s performance in April and October.

Operation Rising Lion and the 12 day war ultimately showed the hollowness of such a strategy. It was a clear case that challenged existing assumptions about the value of latency/threshold status/non-weaponized deterrence etc, esp when facing a conventionally superior adversary.

With the deterioration of the Axis of Resistance and the demonstrated limits of direct strikes on Israel, Iranian debates increasingly emphasized the value of sustaining a nuclear capability short of weaponization— intended to create uncertainty and deter more Israeli attacks.

The logic was that nuclear program with progress in discrete areas (fissile material, weaponization, delivery vehicles, command-and-control) could serve as a form of non-weaponized deterrence.