Nicole Grajewski

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Later this year from @mitpress.bsky.social in @belfercenter.bsky.social's Studies in International Security book series-- Atomic Backfires: When Nuclear Policies Fail.

This is a sobering edited volume on how efforts to reduce nuclear weapons dangers may sometimes wind up exacerbating them.

Iran expert @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social explains that perhaps the key change as a result of the “12 Days War” is in Iranian domestic politics — with broad agreement among Iranian officials now that Iran needs not just nuclear latency but an actual weapon.

carnegieendowment.org/emissary/202...

Me on Iran and the IAEA a few days ago carnegieendowment.org/emissary/202...

One of the clearest takeaways during the Iran–Israel war was Tehran’s aggressive framing of the IAEA as complicit in foreign aggression. Iranian officials accused the Agency of leaking sensitive information that enabled Israeli targeting of nuclear facilities.

Iran After the Battle The country’s political and military establishment is still debating how to interpret the recent war’s outcome.

Here’s the article carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/...

These paths aren’t mutually exclusive, and elements of several may emerge in parallel. What’s unfolding is early, uneven, and subject to change. Iran’s future posture may reflect a mix of impulses. Some of this might be improvised, others might be deliberate.

5. Perhaps the most consequential turn would be a move toward the nuclear option. Some in Tehran may now see a covert weapons program, pursued under the guise of civilian enrichment, as necessary—reflecting the view that conventional defenses no longer ensure survival.

4. A more unlikely path would involve recalibrating national defense around economic revitalization and political legitimacy. This view holds that security depends not only on capabilities but on restoring public trust and aligning the defense industry with domestic needs.

3. An inward military focus could easily bleed into a third trajectory: intensified domestic militarization. In this path, the IRGC’s internal role expands, surveillance deepens, and dissent is curtailed—justified under the banner of wartime vigilance and regime preservation.

2. Iran could shift inward by focusing on homeland defense eg protecting leadership sites, nuclear infrastructure, and command continuity. This would involve greater investment in what Iran calls “passive defense.” Here, the priority becomes survival over projection.

1. Iran could opt for continuity. That means doubling down: expanding the defense industry, rebuilding its missile force, and rearming proxies. But this is costly and has proven to deliver diminishing returns. There’s also the Q of whether the Axis of Resistance can be restored.

Based on the current discussions in Iran, I offer five possible directions that might take shape. Some of the options are cross-cutting and we may see elements of each being embraced in the future if the regime adapts rather than retrenches.

Yet across the spectrum, there is a nascent consensus: future threats won’t be managed through its current force posture alone and that any durable defense must reckon with its vulnerabilities—whether in the defense industry or social institutions—and threats from abroad.

More “centrist” voices have emphasized the need for long-term stabilization. Their focus is on rebuilding social trust, economic resilience, and institutional capacity as a means of improving military readiness.

Hardliners quickly moved to frame the outcome as a show of resilience. They frame the war as a test Iran withstood—and now argue for bolstering defense production, upgrading military capabilities, and preparing for the next round, however and whenever it comes.

Iran emerged from the fighting not only with physical damage, but with a shaken outlook. Its missile force was degraded. The nuclear program suffered setbacks. And intelligence breaches raised questions about the state’s ability to safeguard and maintain its repressive apparatus.

Even before the war, Iran’s forward defense model was eroding—especially after the unraveling of the Axis of Resistance post-Oct 7. The war then laid bare what remained: a missile force far less effective than claimed, collapsed C2, and a leadership caught off guard.

In my latest for @carnegieendowment.org’s Diwan, I examine how Iran is reassessing its national security policy and defense priorities after the Israel-Iran war and U.S. strikes on its nuclear program. 🧵

My latest for @rollingstone.com, on how the U.S. strikes on Iran may not have had the intended effect regardless of what happened at Fordow. With analysis from @nicolegrajewski.bsky.social, @alivaez.bsky.social, @warmatters.bsky.social, and Farzan Sabet

Iran After the Battle The country’s political and military establishment is still debating how to interpret the recent war’s outcome.

Me in @carnegieendowment.org’s Diwan: The end of open hostilities has not brought clarity to Iran’s strategic direction. Instead, it has exposed an ongoing effort within the political and military establishment over how to interpret the war’s outcome. carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/...

Congratulations to us as Syrians, and to all of Syria, on the occasion of President Donald Trump signing the historic executive order to lift U.S. sanctions—set to go into effect starting tomorrow.

Why We Won’t Know for Some Time Whether U.S. Strikes in Iran Worked An Iranian nuclear expert on the fog of war in Iran and why intermittent Israeli strikes there could become the “new normal.”

As Iran, Israel, and the U.S. game out their next steps, we spoke with Iranian nuclear expert Nicole Grajewski, a fellow at the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace about what could happen next in this unclear war: nymag.com/intelligence...

Iran attack could be the death knell for nuclear non-proliferation More countries will seek atomic weapons unless Europe and its allies defend a flawed but vital treaty

In today's @financialtimes.com, I reflect on the implications of the joint Israeli-US attacks on Iran for a fragile and bruised nonproliferation regime on.ft.com/45Jehd3

This is great, Ankit !

Iran may still pursue nuclear weapons but assumptions need to be grounded in what we don’t know, not fantasies of what we’d like to warn about. That means cutting through noise, resisting alarmist simplifications, and asking better questions.

What does this mean? You can’t cleanly plug suspected post-12 day war capabilities into a linear model and declare Iran will have a bomb X weeks. Weaponization is a political, bureaucratic, and technical process, one that would be unfolding under suboptimal conditions.

Add to that the regime in crisis. The Islamic Republic is more paranoid about intelligence penetration than ever before. Key facilities are inoperable and any activity at those that remain could invite more strikes. Everything is now viewed through a lens of potential sabotage.

Be cautious of assessments that hinge on best-case weaponization timelines. Iran today is not a frictionless actor. There are real bottlenecks: endemic corruption, procurement disruptions, and coordination challenges across military and nuclear institutions etc.

The reality is that we simply don’t know enough right now. We don’t know 1) where Iran’s HEU stockpile is; 2) the extent of damage underground or inside the tunnels; 3) what centrifuge parts were salvaged or where they went; 4) if material or equipment was moved. Among others.

A lot of technical assessments of Iran’s nuclear program feel rushed. There’s an overreliance on fuel cycle basics and projections built on major unknowns while overlooking domestic factors eg institutional disruption, procurement challenges, and acute paranoia.