Samuel Delorme

b. williams, in "philosophy as a humanistic discipline, repeatedly characterizes philosophy as the exercise of 'making sense' of ourselves and our activities. many, including me, are sympathetic to this thought.

only, what does it mean to make sense of oneself and one's activities?

only works if the outhouse discourse is shit

fav passage from mill's utilitarianism

Really anticipated the flock of nietzschean dudebros who love Rome a little too much

ive been playing fallout new vegas for weeks, i didnt realize until you posted about it that they made a show for we the gamers

My favourite part about Dante's Comedia is the only moderate amount of imperialism

i see the large red circle as the nearest, and the small red circle as the farthest.

what amor fati, in nietzche's expression of it, seems to preclude, is the decrying of injustice. can be seen here in his new years resolution. and that is a problem.

finding an honest way to look at the past and affirming it is a source of resilience, identity, and gratitude. it's a great good to be invulnerable in one's love of life.

theres a concern that one will care less about shaping the future. yet courage to try can come from the confidence to fail.

je ne suis jamais d'accord avec elle, pourtant c'est dommage (et inquiétant) qu'exprimer autre chose que du mépris pour les articles de callard demande un certain courage ces jours-ci

small is not so bad -- imo for social networks there is certainly such a thing as too big, most networks far exceed the optimal size.

Acts for Aristotle are not good unless they emerge out of and/or contribute to the development of virtuous
dispositions.

But the dispositions are no good if they are not enacted. Suppressed virtue is no good either. The virtuous comatose agent is not leading a good life.

i am also a lover--might you perchance name some of your favourite essays?

thats quite different from the philosophical accounts of internality presented by, say, frankfurt and jaworksa. there its all about the agent's subjective states. on their views, the appraiser's conception of the good is totally beside the point. not so here, tho. thanks for sharing.

the 'good true self' stuff is cool. the fact that we are disposed to attribute those actions *we* deem good as internal to the agent, and the bad ones as external, suggests that when we assess internality we do so with reference to a conception of the good and the good life.

can be tough to tell who fades through and through and who will rise again once they fit the styles, values, and concerns of the day. anecdotally, i hear much more affection for bergson than the others. strikes me that many care for him, but it isn't so easy to square him into contemporary debates.

maybe three people here know me, let this be an intro

i'm sam. french-canadian, avid reader, lowly sinner.

love homer, camus, thoreau, weil, zhuangzi, gautama, gary watson, bernard williams, and the 19th c russians.

went to ubc for six years, now ucsd. praise the sun☀️

i enjoyed but wasn't stunned by piranesi, but this did indeed make it more sublime to my eyes, ty 🙏

it also transforms people. i see a lot of people who feel pressure to have a take. worried they'll be guilty by omission, that their silence is unjust.

lire albert camus en français 💕

questions for mole and for us:

1. Are Weil/Murdoch+ right that the common exalted region of attention between study ^ morality is vindicated by exclusion? Exclusion of ego/clinging specifically?

2. Is this the right/only strategy for vindicating the moral quality of cultivating attentiveness?

for murdoch the common salience structure between the two is one that is excluded: "the fat relentless ego".

for weil the excluded salience structures are those that demand of, latch onto the world. (quote below)

answer for both lies in what study and moral attentiveness exclude, not share (4/4)

question that follows: what is the common salience structure between studying calculus and the correct moral orientation towards the world, such that exposure to patterns in calculus (tho not necessarily consc. noticing) would make one better at noticing moral patterns? (3/4)

prior exposure to regularities in a 'region' of attention (he calls em 'salience structures') will make new patterns/stimuli in those structures more salient. this is, he proposes, a vindication of the Weil/Mudorch+ emphasis on the value of attention as found in prayer, study of mathematics. (2/4)

thinkin about this piece by chris mole (goated)

from emp. results that show that visual regions with statistical regularities become salient to us, and we become better at recognizing other stimuli and regularities in that region afterwards, he tentatively infers that...(1/4)

desert plays a part in interpersonal and (most importantly, IMO) intrapersonal attitudes/ practices. agreed it is a diversion in criminal justice, but maybe we should refocus our priorities in crim. just. instead of letting go of a basic orientation toward agents that informs all domains of living.

nice to be back on twitter