Economists typically measure inequality by looking at income. But what happens when you factor in the dollar value of unpaid housework?
A new study suggests that accounting reduces the amount of inequality in America – but still shows inequality growing.
theconversation.com/when-unpaid-...
When unpaid cooking, cleaning and child care get a dollar value, US income inequality shrinks – but the gap has grown since 1965. Leila Gautham & Nancy Folbre in the JPubE report that declining household production implies inequality in living standards has expanded more than standard data suggest!
theconversation.com/when-unpaid-...
@leilagautham.bsky.social
Also, inflation bites harder now than in the past--a larger share of total household consumption of goods and services is purchased in the market. No wonder people are feeling broke!
We also wrote a more accessible summary for The Conversation here: theconversation.com/when-unpaid-cooking-cleaning-and-child-care-get-a-dollar-value-income-inequality-in-the-us-shrinks-but-the-gap-has-grown-since-1965-275499
Extended income at the bottom (the 10th percentile) actually↓ slightly, despite the 29 percent ↑ registered for market income.
Unlike market measures, extended measures imply non-trivial ↑ in bottom-half inequality (50-10 ratio).
Extended income and consumption are always more equal than their market counterparts. But the equalizing buffer has eroded over time.
The 90-10 log differential ↑ 33 log points for market income, but 51 log points for extended income (4 vs 17 log points for market and extended consumption).
We construct "extended income" and "extended consumption" by adding the replacement-cost value of household production (valued at housekeeper wages) to standard market measures, combining AHTUS, CPS ASEC, and CEX data over five decades.
Women's unpaid work ↓ from 37 to 24 hours/week between 1965 and 2018. Men's rose from 12 to 15. Overall 25% ↓ in value of household production between 1965-2018
New paper out in the Journal of Public Economics @jpube.bsky.social w @nancyfolbre.bsky.social! 🧵
What happens to U.S. inequality trends when you add the imputed $ value of household production to market income and consumption?
Open access: sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272726000186
New working paper!⏰
“Not All Leisure Is Created Equal: Income-Induced Constraints on the Enjoyment of Leisure”
✍️ @leilagautham.bsky.social Clemens Hetschko & Peter Howley
The paper demonstrates that higher income enhances the enjoyment individuals derive from leisure.
🔗 www.ifo.de/en/cesifo/pu...
The private cost of children in the U.S. is at least twice as high as conventional estimates suggest.
#feministeconomics
www.dollarsandsense.org/the-underest...
🆕 The gender pay gap in South Africa: Firms, formality and churn
Today on VoxDev, Ihsaan Bassier (@uniofsurrey.bsky.social) & @leilagautham.bsky.social (@universityofleeds.bsky.social) discuss the dynamics of the gender pay gap in South Africa: voxdev.org/topic/labour...
Policy: To close the pay gap, don’t *just* focus on types of jobs — focus on *firms*.
Support women’s access to high-paying firms, expand childcare & learn from the public sector.
Otherwise, the gap keeps rebuilding itself, one job move at a time.
Paper: shorturl.at/bFPas
Why is firm sorting so important in SA? We think poorer countries have a smaller formal sector, wider dispersion in firm premia, and a bigger firm-pay gender gap. We show correlations from regional SA data.
Importantly, women who are continuously employed (ie "stayers") switch firms just as often as men — but don’t move *up* as much.
In their 40s and 50s, that changes: once care burdens ease, women start making *more* upward moves than men, once these constraints are released.
Interestingly, churn (moving in and out of employment) is common — but men and women do it at similar rates. Women just land in lower-paying sectors such as education, retail, or personal care, and in lower-paying firms *within* sectors.
The gap isn’t mainly about occupations or even bargaining within firms — it’s about women being firms that pay *all* workers less.
Using tax data on the full formal workforce, we find the gender gap in "firm pay” grows rapidly during women’s 30s — child-rearing years — then narrows later.