Aurel Sari

War and Law in a Digital World As technological innovation continues to change the realities of war, the lack of agreement about how pre-digital rules apply to the digitalized battlespace risk turning legal arguments in an extensio...

Take a look @aurelsari.com's new article, exploring a provocative topic:

As tech innovation changes the realities of war, do the old rules still apply?

Part of @carnegieendowment.org series edited by @warmatters.bsky.social and myself!

👇👇

carnegieendowment.org/research/202...

War and Law in a Digital World As technological innovation continues to change the realities of war, the lack of agreement about how pre-digital rules apply to the digitalized battlespace risk turning legal arguments in an extensio...

🆕| As technological innovation continues to change the realities of war, the lack of agreement about how pre-digital rules apply to the digitalized battlespace risk turning legal arguments into an extension of conflicts.

@aurelsari.com's latest for @carnegieendowment.org👇

to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, to be very precise.

who are liable to attack, but they too are not subject to proportionality in these circumstances (Art 51(3) API). This is pretty fundamental. The correct way to put it is to say that an attack may not be expected to cause incidental civilian harm that is disproportionate, or excessive in relation

As Juliette says. The issue is this: with one exception, civilians may not be made the object of attack (Art 51(2) API). If they are, this is an outright violation of the principle of distinction, not subject to proportionality. The one exception is civilians directly participating in hostilities,

this bit

It probably is poor phrasing, but makes me wonder whether the author asked an expert to double-check the text before publication... Anyway, that apart, it's a good read and inspiration for some reflection.

I bookmarked it for incoming PIL students to read, but it does say that civilians may not be attacked if the collateral harm is disproportionate. I didn’t notice any other howlers.

“Rechtlich gilt der Einsatz solcher Störsender als Waffengebrauch.”

???

War Reloaded: The Erosion of Norms and the Urgency of Prevention - Lieber Institute West Point The IHL in Focus Report reveals a resurgence of IACs and emphasizes that such developments are a clarion call for conflict prevention.

The @geneva-academy.ch’s #IHL in Focus Report (2025) reveals a resurgence of international armed conflicts. Erica Harper emphasizes that these developments must be understood as a clarion call for #conflict #prevention. lieber.westpoint.edu/war-reloaded...

PhD students in War Studies The Department of War Studies conducts research and education in the subject of War Studies. The department consists of about 160 employees and has about 1000 students and participants in commissioned

Come do a PhD at @forsvarshogskolan.bsky.social. You could be supervised by some of my fantastic colleagues while working in a vibrant, pluralistic & highly engaged research environment.

These positions are fully salaried & come with a research budget of 30k SEK a year fhs.varbi.com/en/what:job/...

standards (see point (a))?

interested in this angle, ethical) standards apply to this process (b) in the case of the IDF use of AI DSS for targeting, what is fact and what is fiction and (c) does that quality control have to be human or do we just need the process to comply with the applicable legal (and ethical)

That is a lot of fancy words to basically say that the machine generation of targets at high volume and speed is a concern if those targets are then prosecuted without intervening quality control by humans. Point taken and I agree. But the questions are (a) what legal (and for those

Reminds me of the NATO bombing of Radio Television Serbia in 1999.

Someone involved in the targeting for that strike told me the attack was conducted despite concerns that the RTS facility was not a lawful military objective—an issue later scrutinized by the ICTY.
www.icty.org/en/press/fin...

UK ‘woefully’ unprepared for Chinese and Russian undersea cable sabotage, says report CSRI finds China and Russia may be coordinating ‘grey zone’ tactics against vulnerable western infrastructure

More like @theguardian.com woefully misunderstands the relevant law: the 1884 Cable Convention most definitely does not govern “much of the law of the sea in relation to these highly sophisticated cables carrying hi-tech data”

www.theguardian.com/politics/202...

“Almost Genocide”

As attention has shifted to Iran, killing in Gaza proceeds in a steady pace, with people seeking food targeted daily.

In “Almost Genocide” I try to refocus legal thinking on Gaza, and to contribute to a broader discussion of state intent.

verfassungsblog.de/almost-genoc...

It shouldn't be very hard for politicians and journalists to grasp that should one country interfere with the exercise of lawful self-defence by another, it potentially opens itself up to acts of lawful self-defence.

Revealed: Thousands of UK university students caught cheating using AI Guardian investigation finds almost 7,000 proven cases of cheating – and experts says these are tip of the iceberg

Assuming this moves in the direction of student-AI teaming, where students adapt material generated by AI rather than simply copy-paste it, and assuming universities are not okay with that, then it is difficult to see any other solution but in person assessment.
www.theguardian.com/education/20...

this is how it’s done. go army

yep

www.ejiltalk.org/is-israels-u...

(a la Bush doctrine - fringe at best); and preventive (beyond the pale).

The position in international law is slightly more nuanced. There is “an armed attack has occurred” self-defence (Art 51 UN Charter); interceptive (a la Dinstein - not aware of any objections); anticipatory (based on Caroline criteria - has some, but far from universal, support); pre-emptive

Why get hung up on minor detail?

funny how you can spot some folks from a mile away, eg British officers and Russians

I mean, why not?

this bit

Military AI as Sociotechnical Systems - Lieber Institute West Point Conceptualizing weapons as sociotechnical systems enables us to focus on risks arising with any incorporation of AI into the use of a weapon.

A #sociotechnicalsystems approach has been applied to the use of #AI in various settings, but can be especially valuable in the #military context, argues Mitt Regan. lieber.westpoint.edu/military-ai-...

Fascinating and worrying in equal measure - do read this by Nita Farahany. I wonder what drives this behaviour: some survival instinct or prioritising the initial tasks the system has been set? Both raise serious questions for military AI.