Joshua Tallis

They all said Hormuz closure would be brief. What if they were wrong? On day six of the Middle East war, hope of a swift reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is fading. There does not seem to be a quick fix. A material return of transits in the future will require shipowners to be convinced that the route is safe for their crew and vessel assets 

“The US Navy “spends very little time at a strategic level understanding the pressures and demands of the commercial maritime economy”, said Joshua Tallis…at the Hellenic American-Norwegian American Chambers of Commerce conference on February 10.” www.lloydslist.com/LL1156532/Th...

“But from a narrower standpoint — is there a backup plan in the wings similar to the 1980s tanker wars? To me, that is a much less central part of how the navy thinks of its primary mission, which is: in the event of a war, to win the war, not protect the [shipping] folks in this room.”

They all said Hormuz closure would be brief. What if they were wrong? On day six of the Middle East war, hope of a swift reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is fading. There does not seem to be a quick fix. A material return of transits in the future will require shipowners to be convinced that the route is safe for their crew and vessel assets 

“Three weeks before the Middle East war broke out, Tallis said, “With scenarios like Iran, the navy understands, at the top line, that the Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint for the movement of oil.”

www.lloydslist.com/LL1156532/Th...

Military briefing: how Iran could wage a new ‘tanker war’ Attacks in the Strait of Hormuz echo the 1980s conflict. Here are the weapons Tehran can use against commercial shipping

“One aim of Iran’s strategy to disrupt tankers was to “try to provoke outrage in allied and partner capitals to try to bring diplomatic pressure on the US”, said Tallis.” www.ft.com/content/e006...

“Trump’s insurance backing idea is “novel”, said Tallis, but “it remains to be seen how quickly and effectively the US can create comprehensive and reliable war risk insurance”. There are no details yet on who would qualify, and which flag states and companies would want it.”

“The “arrows in Iran’s quiver” for other attacks include fast inshore attack craft, speedboats armed with rockets and small missiles, said Tallis…

Tallis said Tehran could place [mines] using dhows — double-bowed merchant vessels that are common in the region.“

“Joshua Tallis, at [CNA], said it was “unlikely” that the US Navy would be able to defend commercial vessels “over the next seven to 10 days”. Escorts would come “only after the initial phase of major hostilities”, he added, and when more Iranian anti-ship capabilities had been destroyed.”

“Naval warfare experts said the destroyers and jets needed for the escorts would not be available immediately, given their role in the attacks on Iran.”

Military briefing: how Iran could wage a new ‘tanker war’ Attacks in the Strait of Hormuz echo the 1980s conflict. Here are the weapons Tehran can use against commercial shipping

“President Donald Trump on Tuesday said that “if necessary”, the US Navy would escort tankers through the strait “as soon as possible”. The US Development Finance Corporation would also provide risk insurance and guarantees for tankers travelling in the Gulf “at a very reasonable price”.

Seafarer killed after explosion and fire hit tanker in the Middle East Crewman is the first known seafaring casualty of the Middle East conflict

First known mariner casualty of the war. www.tradewindsnews.com/tankers/seaf...

Navy Can't Guarantee Ship Safety in Persian Gulf After Iran Strikes The U.S. Navy admitted it cannot guarantee merchant ship safety across the Persian Gulf after U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran triggered immediate retaliation. Oil majors have suspended shipments through ...

As i was saying… gcaptain.com/navy-maritim...

Effect of geopolitics on shipping poised to escalate, so ‘buckle up’ There are so many geopolitical ‘black swans’ in shipping that they might as well be white. Disruption is now the rule, not the exception. Speakers at the HACC-NACC conference in New York laid out the risks ahead

Thoughtful writeup by @lloydslistdaily.bsky.social on my recent remarks on global instability in the maritime domain as a commercial shipping conference this week.

www.lloydslist.com/LL1156326/Ef...

It’s been a real pleasure helping bring this strategy to life, I’m extremely excited to see CNO34 push the cause as his tenure progresses. www.navy.mil/Leadership/C...

The centerpiece is the Hedge Strategy, a theory of adaptive readiness, tailored force packages, and innovative offsets designed to cost-effectively manage asymmetric threats. www.navy.mil/Leadership/C...

It’s live!

The U.S. Navy Fighting Instructions are ADM Caudle’s thesis on how the Navy adapts to dynamic adversaries. They are how the Navy builds a repeatable process to organize, train, and equip a force that is capable of deterring a fight and ending one.

NATO's Maritime Vigilance: Optimizing the Standing Naval Force For The Future Winter, 1968. A multinational force of American, British, Dutch, and Norwegian ships sails the North Atlantic, defending NATO’s shores under a shared flag

There's more to say on this—I wrote a few years ago that NATO's Mine Countermeasure Groups might be well suited for adaptation to CUI defense—but we must start from these two observations: (1) this is a constabulary issue, and (2) cost-effective surveillance is a main material obstacle.

This cost asymmetry has defined some European reactions, prompting more expansive (but not inherently more effective) surveillance via crewed platforms. More innovative approaches are being tested: Nordic Warden is experimenting with AI, Denmark is investing in lower-cost MDA assets like Saildrone.

(2) While interdiction is often a focus, effective surveillance is the real short pole in the tent. The "surface area" exposed to CUI sabotage is enormous, putting an attacker in a position of asymmetric privilege. It is less costly to stage an attack and more costly to detect or interdict one.

Yet sabotage must be investigated by law enforcement, bringing all the demands of a legal proceeding: burden of proof, chain of evidence, due process. Creating effective defense and deterrence for CUI starts with understanding the issue as a predominantly constabulary mission when short of war.

(1) Short of war, CUI is a law enforcement issue more than a military matter. Navies often have the range and endurance to operate persistently far from shore, and so naval assets are a necessary and visible feature of CUI security.

Latvia finds no link between ship and Baltic cable breach, probe goes on Latvian police have found no evidence linking a ship docked in the port of Liepaja to damage to an underwater telecoms cable running in the Baltic Sea from Latvia to Lithuania, but are investigating t...

"Latvia finds no link between ship and Baltic cable breach, probe goes on."

This is a helpful reminder of two defining features of the critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) challenge.

Chicken Versus Bumper Cars in Conflict Escalation Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles at Israel last April — and the attack might have been designed to fail. The strike was a show of force built

What does it mean when an attack is designed to be intercepted?

The task ahead is therefore not only to prevent damage from drone and missile attacks, but to deny adversaries the ability to weaponize restraint itself in the aftermath of performative aggression.

This new kind of conflict—limited-damage strikes that capitalize on defender’s air defenses—presents challenges to traditional U.S. strategies of deterrence. Fighting performatively is a unique dilemma, with implications for the kinds of responses policymakers deem proportionate to the provocation.

In bumper cars, neither player expects any significant damage, and thus at least one may be inclined to test limits. Bumper cars has lower potential gain—symbolic wins, face-saving off-ramps—but lower downside (like less risk of provocation, assuming defenses hold).

In chicken, both players understand they are at risk, and the winner is the player with the superior risk appetite. There is high potential gain—prestige, intra-war deterrence, escalation dominance, control of the conflict tempo—but high downside (like runaway escalation).

April 13, 2024. Iran launches hundreds of drones and missiles against Israel. Almost none hits. No one is killed. No critical infrastructure is destroyed. It was not a failure. As I argue, this is performative aggression, a game of bumper cars in a world long defined by games of chicken.

My latest in War on the Rocks

As a US administration once again looks towards hemispheric security issues, many of the challenges I anticipated are coming to the fore. As I argued in 2019, there is a path to success here, but it is narrow and at times counterintuitive.

Military tactics, however, may not be the ideal mechanisms for challenges that are often closer to crime than war. Leveraging the Navy’s capabilities, without overly militarizing maritime security, is a complicated problem that requires a strategic and partner-oriented approach to the challenge.