Joshua Tallis

This highlights the importance of transitioning mature UxS out of experimental task forces and into the hands of commanders who need to gain operational familiarity with these systems in order to understand how to best employ them. That is, not coincidentally, a key charge in the 2024 NAVPLAN.

(3) The author assesses that poor target/weapon pairing contributes to some meaningful portion of small UAS failures. Commanders in Ukraine use drones because they have them, regardless of whether they are the most economical or effective tool for a strike.

The Calm Before the Swarm: Drone Warfare at Sea in the Age of the Missile - War on the Rocks We are not yet at a paradigm-shifting moment in the role of autonomous or robotic systems at sea. Nor are we likely to reach a revolutionary precipice

This is consistent with the findings from my own @warontherocks.bsky.social analysis last year, which observed that the operational effectiveness of UAS and USVs in the Black and Red seas were both highly dependent on integration with more conventional cruise and ballistic missiles.

(2) Offensively, a critical observation here is the importance of understanding uncrewed systems as enablers operated in conjunction with other, often legacy systems (“the vast majority of our sorties were against targets that had already been struck successfully by a different weapons system”).

My take on 3 U.S. Navy implications:

(1) Defensively, the author’s findings may prove instructive for Navy’s counter-UAS strategy, given these systems may be less effective and less operationally impactful than initial observations suggest (particularly for precision strike).

The author notes (with regard to UAS) that “[higher end] loitering munitions provide greater precision in day and night, more ease of use, and higher resistance to electronic interference than first-person view drones… The investment in quality seems to justify the greater expense.”

BLUF: “If a member of a NATO military were hypothetically to ask me whether NATO countries should acquire first-person view drone capabilities, based on my experience and given the current state of the technology, I would probably say no.”

I Fought in Ukraine and Here’s Why FPV Drones Kind of Suck - War on the Rocks In 2024 and 2025, I served for six months as an international volunteer on a first-person view attack drone team in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. My team

This @warontherocks.bsky.social article offers a valuable, skeptical assessment of how transformative first-person view (FPV) drones have been on the Ukrainian battlefield—and is a great illustration of why it matters to collect data on the ground.

Tankers Keep Moving Through Strait of Hormuz as Israel-Iran Conflict Escalates Merchant shipping is continuing to pass through the Strait of Hormuz despite Israel's attacks on Iran on Friday, the multinational, U.S.-led Combined Maritime Force said, although some shipowners were...

And while industry is not, so far, pricing in a Hormuz closure, they do seem to expect continued postponement of Red Sea traffic. The former is good for tankers, the latter for containers, though the long term impact on freight rates may not be as large as the Red Sea crisis has been.

Shipping seems to believe that conflict is not bad for business. Asian shipping stocks rose on the news of the strikes. Part of that is a hypothesized boon to crude carriers capitalizing on a potential dip in the number of Iranian tankers available to operate (see above from Lloyd’s List).

Combined Maritime Forces on war footing as Iran promises revenge Israel launched a strike on Iran overnight that targeted nuclear sites and military facilities, and shipping is braced for what comes next

An executive at an international shipping association believes that any “tripwire” for impacts to global shipping in the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea would be the perception of U.S. involvement (so far no evidence of that).

So far, observers are not forecasting major shocks to global distribution. Iran is not yet reporting damage to oil facilities, and the head of the International Energy Agency issued a statement that oil “markets are well supplied.” x.com/fbirol/statu...

Oil transit through Strait of Hormuz unlikely to be disrupted by regional unrest 13 Jun 2025: The Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military facilities on Friday 13th June, followed by Iran’s retaliatory actions, have heightened fears of a broader regional conflict and potent...

The Strait of Hormuz straddles >1/3 global crude shipments. Existing pipelines in the region (in KSA, UAE, Iraq) have limited spare capacity to move much more by land (maybe 4 million barrels a day). A disruption to Hormuz traffic could impact around 11 mbpd, most of which goes to Asia.

Israel Orders Temporary Shutdown of Its Biggest Gas Field Israel shut down production at its biggest natural gas field after it launched airstrikes against Iran, stopping supplies to import-dependent Egypt and raising concerns about fuel shortages there.

Israel has temporarily shut down exploitation of its Leviathan gas field, the major deposit in Israel’s EEZ west of Haifa. The complex supplies gas to Egypt, which may see the cost of LNG rise as Cairo looks to seaborne alternatives. Energy prices are not something you want to see spiking in Egypt.

As the kinetic nature of the Israeli strikes on Iran capture attention, there are also other impacts across the maritime space, particularly looking at energy and commercial SLOCs, worth tracking.

It was a pleasure to rejoin the Sailor Pulse podcast to talk about the good, bad, and indifferent in Navy’s “fight from the MOC” journey. This was an interesting and fun discussion that reflects the underlying aspirations and frustrations in how fleet commanders envision the role of MOCs in war.

Who could have seen that coming…

I’ve rarely seen a command execute thoughtful in-stride campaign analysis. This should be a five alarm concern for CCDRs, the inability to monitor and self-assess operational level progress turns a four star into chief tactician instead of the strategic leader they’ve been selected to be.

Rhymes with my own analysis from prior to Operation Rough Rider as well. warontherocks.com/2025/04/how-...

Next month will mark 10 years of me being CIMSEC’s volunteer… | Dmitry Filipoff Next month will mark 10 years of me being CIMSEC’s volunteer editor-in-chief. It has been an extremely fulfilling experience, and I am beyond grateful to all those I have gotten to work with along the...

CIMSEC IS RECRUITING!

CIMSEC is now welcoming applications for a volunteer Deputy Editor-in-Chief. This person will be responsible for helping lead CIMSEC’s editorial operation.

Please reach out to Content@cimsec.org to apply and for further details.

www.linkedin.com/posts/dmitry...

YouTube video by The Cipher Brief Why the Arctic Matters More Than Ever

It was a pleasure to join @thecipherbrief.bsky.social to talk about the importance of the Arctic to the U.S.. In addition to the usual talking points on national security, I tried to also emphasize economics, trade, and climate here, without which we cannot understand global interest in the region.

My only reclama is that we keep the scale of the two efforts in mind. The US under OPG downed ~400 projectiles prior to the latest round of shooting. Nearest I can tell, EU Naval Forces claim around two dozen, which U.S. and UK forces did on some individual days in the thick of the fighting.

We saw this in the late 2000s with Operation Atalanta to counter Somali piracy. Then, coordination via the SHADE protocol alleviated the divide between US, EU, and NATO missions. Today, the nature and level of mission coordination between Prosperity Guardian and Aspides is not yet clear.

The argument is valid that the EU desire for strategic autonomy had a necessary impact on the nature of the US-led effort. This is not a first. Expeditionary naval activities have historically been a politically favorable means for the EU to (attempt to) flex a military muscle.

This piece on the EU contribution to Red Sea defense is a nice pairing to the War on the Rocks piece I wrote on Operation Prosperity Guardian earlier this month. The author takes the EU perspective well and notes (with fairness) that many analyses (including mine, I'd add) are quite US-focused.

From me in Defense News:

The recent maritime EO mandated 90-day assessment of how allies and trade policy relate to domestic shipbuilding. I have some ideas, and they start with weighing our strengths (innovation, software, tech) against our allies (huge preexisting maritime capital expenditures).

Trying real hard to reach that one guy in N97!

Want to write for War on the Rocks?

How the Biden Administration Won Tactically but Failed Strategically in the Red Sea - War on the Rocks For 15 months, the U.S. Navy fought its fiercest battles since at least the Tanker War. The Navy racked up nearly flawless tactical victories in

You can find my full article on the subject here: warontherocks.com/2025/04/how-...

You can find my full article on the subject here: warontherocks.com/2025/04/how-...