Matt Weiner

Note the use of passive voice in the headline and that the sources aren’t even placed (in the administration or Harvard) in the NYT article. The journalists shouldn’t be trusted moving forward until they demonstrate higher standards. This reporting may have influenced Brown and Cornell’s agreements.

it feels like this line of thought takes a bunch of facts about strength of evidence--even after you have enough evidence to settle the question, you can still get more evidence--and rephrasing them as about degrees of iterated knowledge, because that's the only way knowledge-first can handle them.

How does this response extend examples of non-inductive knowl- edge, like checking a train timetable? Williamson (2000) has argued that if knowledge is subject to a margin-for-error constraint, then an agent may know something via perception which they fail to know-to-the-ω. Yet if that is right, then our response can also explain why further evidence gathering is permitted in these cases, on the assumption that non-inductive knowledge is also transparent. Glancing again at the train timetable can help to settle what you know, what you know you know, and so on.

though to be fair they're pointing out the difference between "can stop" and "must stop."

Getting back to being unfair, this account of someone who's checked a train schedule and looks at a departure board seems unconvincing. Why would that tip her over into knowing that she knows?

this echoes the genuinely weird kind of dogmatism of Kripke's paradox--if you know that p, you know that all evidence against p is misleading, so you should ignore it--but the novel dogmatism doesn't seem that weird to me! once you've settled the question you can stop inquiring!

my paraphrase (and they are arguing against this): since the goal of inquiry is knowledge, once you have obtained knowledge about the question, you have to stop inquiring [insofar as that inquiry is the only thing you care about]

that's true in general, but surely in this case Jutel was citing Blumenthal's work as credible? (btw, do you have one x-y pair flipped in the last sentence?)

Our response depended, crucially, on the assumption that you could acquire higher-order knowledge of the number of red balls by making additional draws. This might seem mysterious. How can drawing balls put an agent in a position to know something about their own epistemic state? We take up this question in this subsection.

the strange thing is that two paragraphs before they stated my exact objection, and then it seems like their response is... maybe it isn't mysterious?

from Carter & Hawthorne, Dogmatism and Inquiry, doi.org/10.1093/mind...

An appealing hypothesis is that higher-order knowledge does not require evidence of a different kind from first-order knowledge. For any n, agents can come to known that they know p by gathering the sort of evidence by which they can come to know p (Evans 1982; Dretske 1994; cf. Paul 2014). This hypothesis fits well with a picture on which the level of higher-order knowledge of p an agent possesses depends on the strength of her evidence for p. Where n > k, someone who can know to the power n p and someone who can (merely) know to the power k p may differ only in the strength of evidence each possesses for p.

Is it odd that I don't find this hypothesis appealing? it seems like in order to know that you know something you need evidence about your epistemic state, not just more of the same kind of evidence that gave you knowledge?
=

Jazz haters suck

YouTube video by Rudi Records Hear in Now - Spiderwoman (Bolognesi)

16. Hear In Now, Spiderwoman (2012)

Mazz Swift--violin
Tomeka Reid--cello
Silvia Bolognesi--bass, composition
youtu.be/4nBJ013Jvc8?...

unless... Democrats should get a trifecta in VA in November and that's a 6-5 delegation in a Harris +6/Biden +10 state.

yeah I think that's where we get 'em

I think, if it's a free-for-all, Republicans face more constraints in their states--we already know they can only get five seats out of TX (and I'm treating that as baked in), GA and NH both have to have some blue districts. but they have more seats to play with

yeah that's the issue. trifecta/veto-proof states with more than one rep of the opposing party:
D CA 9, CO 4, IL 3, NJ 3, NY 7, WA 2
R AL 2, FL 8, GA 5, IN 2, LA 2, MO 2, NH 2, OH 5, TX 13 [plus NC 4 if a Democratic state rep goes quisling on a veto override]

Yeah this is the thing. These people have decided to end democracy. They are no longer adversaries, they are enemies. They have written themselves out of the democratic order, and should be suppressed by whatever means necessary.

weelll eyeballing it, it probably mostly comes down to New York and to whether Florida could do a gerrymander as effective as the proposed new Texas one. less meat on the bone in California and Illinois than I thought, losing the Minnesota trifecta hurts a lot here

maybe not in absolute terms but I bet we could get better than where we are, and definitely better than where we are + new Texas/Missouri gerrymander.

haven't checked the numbers yet

YouTube video by Alien Ads 801 American Eagle commercial Sydney Sweeney Has Great Jeans Biology

oh I misunderstood your "where" question as not being literal. it's this one. (was the first one I saw when I looked)

also I misremembered it as "good jeans" rather than "great jeans," not that it makes a difference

youtu.be/YzVYyDehMUY?...

"this ad participates in a pernicious discourse" is nothing to cancel anyone about
otoh "eugenics" literally means good + root word that gave rise to "gene"
yelling more at people who are overreacting than underreacting leads to systemic underreaction

ok, my position:
it's ok to be icked out by talk of "good genes"
the ad is meant to invoke that
it's overstated to call it explicit Nazi shit
idk if there were Nazis involved. used to be I would think that absurd but young conservatives are all Nazis now so who knows

I mean, that's the one we're talking about, right?

I mean you can argue it's harmless, but they are definitely using the word "genes" some of the time

also seen people say "you have good genes" is a normal compliment--I wouldn't ever say it but idk

it kind of seems like you're saying that they didn't say "genes" but used a pun on "jeans," which would work if she had just said "jeans are passed down from parents to children," but "include hair color and eye color" makes no sense unless it's "genes"

Your brain probably is a computer, whatever that means | Aeon Essays We’re certainly on to something when we say the brain is a computer – even if we don’t yet know what exactly we’re on to

I feel like it starts off by saying "the brain is a computer--that's not a metaphor" and then explains that of course the brain isn't literally a computer in the sense we use that word but it is like a computer in these important ways and, ok, that's a metaphor?

aeon.co/essays/your-...

In 2023 the true crime author Mark Dapin published a biography of Karlson titled Carnage: A Succulent Chinese Meal, Mr. Rent-a-Kill and the Australian Manson Murders that also explores his connections to other criminals. The book also revealed that Karlson was an admirer of Adolf Hitler and Nazism, and that on at least one occasion he threw a party at his home to celebrate Hitler's birthday.

unsurprising but extremely painful milkshake duck

(I will now probably forget it again)

the third one is literally my view on how we should determine priors. we're way better at figuring out what our current body of evidence supports and rewinding it to the priors than vice versa

also you should bring the succulent Chinese meal avatar over here

FOUND IT!!!

Canon

xkcd.com/3123/

highlighted sentence in the following passage: But it is nearly impossible to ever say in a complete and literally true way what it is that someone is trying to convey with a literally false metaphor. I expect that most who have heard the claim ‘the brain is a computer’ assume it is a metaphor. The mind is a computer just as the world is an oyster, love is a battlefield, and this shit is bananas (which has a metaphor inside a metaphor). Typically, metaphors are literally false. The world isn’t – as a matter of hard, humourless, scientific fact – an oyster. We don’t value metaphors because they are true; we value them, roughly, because they provide very suggestive ways of looking at things. Metaphors bring certain things to your attention (bring them ‘to light’), they encourage certain associations (‘trains of thought’), and they can help coordinate and unify people (they are ‘rallying cries’). But it is nearly impossible to ever say in a complete and literally true way what it is that someone is trying to convey with a literally false metaphor. To what, exactly, is the metaphor supposed to turn our attention? What associations is the metaphor supposed to encourage? What are we all agreeing on when we all embrace a metaphor?

I'm neither here nor there about the computational theory of mind, but he just said in a complete and literally true way what three metaphors mean

(and two of the three metaphors at the beginning of the paragraph are also easy to explicitate)

"the brain is a computer" is a metaphor, chill out

theoretically datacenter demand could keep going up at this rate longer than office demand, because there are only so many human beings to fill the offices

but I'd expect it to level off

(also this is just me talking on first principles with no specific knowledge)

yeah what I meant was more like, *right now* it's not surprising if we're building datacenters faster than office buildings, because we have been spending a long time building enough office buildings for the office workers and a lot of datacenter demand is coming along at once