Frank Kuhn

It's FRUS Friday!

NEW: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988 history.state.gov/historicaldo...

*Who

Who should coordinate Europe’s defense buildup? The best candidate, at least for the near term, has granular understanding of existing forces and informal links to suppliers.

Wo should coordinate Europe‘s defense buildup? This article by @sbm33.bsky.social argues that “a leading candidate for this near-term coordination role is U.S. European Command, the U.S. combatant command responsible for the European area of operations.”

Kann bestätigen, dass Paprika gut ist. 😂

Kann ich bestätigen. Und Rinderbrühe.

a man in a black shirt is sitting in a chair and making a funny face . ALT: a man in a black shirt is sitting in a chair and making a funny face .

Es fehlen Stangensellerie, Karotten, Paprika.

Missile Systems in Homeopathic Doses Germany's request for the Typhon missile system reveals continued shortcomings in Europe's missile procurement

Hi all,

I published my latest newsletter post this morning, discussing the German request for the Typhon missile system (not yet a purchase decision).

You can access the post here:

missilematters.substack.com/p/homeopathi...

Short summary below.

1/6

So it‘s the latter.

„Sein Misstrauen galt nicht zuletzt den Deutschen selbst, die er [...] immerhin vierzehn Jahre regierte. Eine nicht unwesentliche Aufgabe der Nachkriegspolitik sah er darin, sie auf Dauer zu domestizieren und ihr erneutes Abdriften in einen chauvinistischen Nationalismus zu verhindern.“

Rather, he wanted to keep it open because he feared that the Federal Republic would otherwise become a third-rate power, whose troops would be sacrificed as “cannon fodder” in a nuclear war fought largely on German soil. 3/3

Thanks to @lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social for sharing this paper.

Why was this the case? The authors argue that skepticism or even fundamental mistrust of his fellow countrymen likely played a role. However, this inner unease was not so dominant that Adenauer categorically ruled out the nuclear option. 2/

Adenauer und die Kernwaffen. Neue Antworten auf alte Probleme Zusammenfassung Die Haltung zur nuklearen Frage wurde in der frühen Bundesrepublik maßgeblich vom ersten Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer geprägt. In der Forschung zu dessen Intentionen stehen sich zwei ...

This essay argues – based on previously unpublished and in part unknown sources from the Adenauer papers in Bad Honnef-Rhöndorf and the Federal Defense Council – that the Chancellor did not (!) pursue a deliberate policy of unilateral nuclear armament. 🧵 1/

My sense is that there often seems to be a misperception that the United States was very forthcoming in terms of its nuclear strategy. But I think the German government would have been deeply disturbed if it had seen what was in the plans. Reassurance only goes so far.

There’s also a whole other dimension to it, which is the extent to which the United States revealed to its allies the capabilities (especially intelligence) and operational plans it actually had.

If we would consider the relationship between the Soviet Union and its satellite states such as the GDR as an extended deterrence relationship, that would be an interesting question for some archival research.

Warum gibt es eigentlich keine Geld-zurück-Garantie für die Bahn? 🤔

Du brauchst ein Deutschlandticket oder den DB Navigator, Ketti.

Join IFSH!
We are seeking a Senior Researcher with broad expertise in dual-use technologies and their impact on deterrence, defense, and arms control policies. The position will not focus on cyber topics.
ifsh.de/en/institute...

U.S. Building Container Vaults To Deploy U.S. Nuclear Bombs To Remote Bases The U.S. relies on bunkers to store nuclear bombs, but new mobile vaults would secure them at locations far from hardened infrastructure.

“Containerized Mobile Vaults would give U.S. military commanders globally more flexibility to forward-deploy nuclear weapons, any other highly sensitive assets, if required.”

The Promises of Prague versus Nuclear Realities: From Bush to Obama Contrasting the nuclear guidance documents and public statements of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations reveals significant differences in American nuclear policy, but also surpris...

Just found this interesting article in @cspjournal.bsky.social:

“In essence, the New START Treaty was not so much a nuclear reductions treaty as it was a verification and confidence-building treaty; a ballistic missile-focused treaty that in essence removed strategic bombers from arms control.”

YouTube video by Center for Strategic & International Studies The Negotiator Files: A Conversation with Franklin Miller

”I knew what I wanted to control on the Soviet side, and I wanted as much as possible to create a situation where they [Soviet nuclear forces] were less threatening to my capabilities than without arms control.”

YouTube video by Center for Strategic & International Studies The Negotiator Files: A Conversation with Franklin Miller

“I must be honest, we have this ongoing joke and debate in the strategic community. Everybody talks about Schelling and Halperin. I never opened Schelling. I did not refer to Schelling once in 20 odd years of dealing with nuclear policy.”

Able Archer 83 (Re)-revisited Reflections on a Complex Non-crisis

“Yet a review of all of the available evidence, including the new documents (some of which were subsequently removed from the online FRUS), on Able Archer 83 leads to the conclusion that the ‘crisis’ was a mirage, albeit one that appeared in a genuinely tense time.”

I agree in principle, but the fact that the Trump administration seems to have greenlighted the deployment of additional B-61s to Europe is also a political signal – or can be interpreted as such.

US nukes deployed to England for first time in over a decade U.S. nuclear weapons have reportedly returned to British soil, with multiple sources indicating that a number of B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bombs were transferred this week to RAF Lakenheath in Suff...

”For the first time since at least 2008, U.S. nuclear weapons have reportedly returned to British soil, with multiple sources indicating that a number of B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bombs were transferred this week to RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk.“

„Bei einem möglichen russischen Angriff auf Litauen würde die Bundeswehr nur mit einem entsprechenden Beschluss des Bundestages eingesetzt – der allerdings bei Gefahr im Verzug auch nachträglich eingeholt werden könnte.”

Taurus, Patriot, Hauptsache Raketen!

Had the privilege to take part in the CSIS PONI Nuclear Scholars Initiative over the past six months – grateful for the insights, connections, and community. Huge thanks to the PONI team for making it all possible!

MBDA pushes new deep-strike missile in time for Europe to arm up The envisioned weapon comes as European nations look to boost their deterrence posture vis-à-vis Russia.

MBDA hat ein entsprechendes System erst kürzlich vorgestellt.

Es verwundert schon etwas, dass 🇩🇪 jetzt Typhon-Launcher und Tomahawk-Marschflugkörper in den USA kaufen möchte. Die 🇪🇺 Verteidigungsindustrie sollte eigentlich in der Lage sein, ein seegestütztes System wie die MBDA MdCN innerhalb vertretbarer Zeit für den landgestützten Einsatz zu adaptieren.