Frank Kuhn

Ukraine’s high-flying air power plans face turbulence Running fleets of incompatible aircraft creates problems with logistics and pilot training, and Kyiv also faces cash issues.

“If Kyiv succeeds in building a modern air force with more than 200 new Western warplanes, it would wind up operating a mixed fighter jet fleet — something some Western countries are reluctant to do because of the logistical difficulties, as well as issues with training pilots and mechanics.”

YouTube video by PRIF Künstliche Intelligenz, Krieg und Kontrolle – Was ist Hype, was echte Gefahr?

Autonome Waffen, Verifikation & Überwachung – wie verändert #KI die globale Sicherheit? @niklasschoernig.bsky.social, @mgoettsche.bsky.social, Andrea Lübcke @gruene.de & Thorsten Wetzling diskutierten am 6.11. mit @erzsewa.bsky.social bei der @berlinscienceweek.bsky.social

Drones and Mass Salvo Attacks: Lessons Learned from the American Defense of Israel - Foreign Policy Research Institute On a cool night in April 2024, the Iranian military surprised American and coalition war planners. It launched a massive salvo of drones, cruise missiles, and

“The lack of AESA radar in other European fighters means that the F-35 is the best option for regional drone defense, at least until those other fighters receive the proper radar upgrades.”

Annotated: the full text of Donald Trump’s 28-point Ukraine-Russia peace plan Draft agreement has shocked Europe and is unlikely to satisfy Kyiv or Moscow

“The United States and Russia will agree to extend the validity of treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the START I Treaty.” 🤨

A one-way attack drone revolution? Affordable mass precision in modern conflict When considering drones’ impact on modern conflict, strategic studies scholars typically focus on the most sophisticated systems in states’ arsenals: costly and hard-to-acquire military drones, whi...

doi.org/10.1080/0140...

Looking back to look forward: Autonomous systems, military revolutions, and the importance of cost Autonomous systems are often lauded as revolutionary. However, what makes them revolutionary is still up for debate. We identify assumptions about the revolutionary effect of autonomy and draw on h...

doi.org/10.1080/0140...

Digital Targeting: Artificial Intelligence, Data, and Military Intelligence Abstract. It is widely believed that we are on the brink of another military revolution. Today, states are actively seeking to harness the power of AI for

doi.org/10.1093/jogs...

<i>Raven Sentry</i>: Employing AI for Indications and Warnings in Afghanistan This article examines Raven Sentry, a project that employed artificial intelligence to provide advance warning of insurgent attacks in Afghanistan. During 2019 and 2020, the Resolute Support Deputy Ch...

press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/v...

Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age By Michael S. Gerson, Published on 08/01/09

Source: Michael S. Gerson, "Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age," Parameters 39, no. 3 (2009), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2486.

Third, and finally, the “local” balance of military power—the balance between the conventional forces of the attacker and those of a defender in the area of conflict—often plays a critical role in conventional deterrence, since it is local forces that will impact an aggressor’s calculations regarding a quick victory.27 If US adversaries seek relatively short and inexpensive wars, and if the key to deterring conventional aggression is convincing those adversaries that they will not be able to achieve such an objective, then credible and effective deterrence requires that US forces be in or near the region, or readily able to deploy, for an immediate response. When the local balance favors the adversary, deterrence is more likely to fail because the regime will calculate that it can achieve a rapid success. When the local balance favors the defender, deterrence is more likely to succeed.28 The importance of the local power balance in deterrence calculations suggests that US conventional superiority in and of itself is not as relevant as some analysts have suggested.29 In fact, the available evidence suggests that overall superiority may be insufficient to establish deterrence

“[T]he ‘local’ balance of military power—the balance between the conventional forces of the attacker and those of a defender in the area of conflict—often plays a critical role in conventional deterrence [...] overall superiority may be insufficient to establish deterrence.”

CC @greenpeace.de

Nuclear Scholars Initiative - Nuclear Network The Nuclear Scholars Initiative aims to provide top graduate students and young professionals from around the country with a unique venue to interact and dialogue with senior experts on nuclear weapon...

CLOSING NEXT WEEK: PONI's NSI applications are due on Monday, November 17 - don't forget to submit yours!

Apply here: nuclearnetwork.csis.org/programs/nuc...

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Group of people standing in a courtyard with publications in their hands

Group of people sitting at a long table with microphones

Group of people sitting at a long table with microphones

Last week we presented our new CNTR Monitor “New Realities of AI in Global Security” with stakeholders in political Berlin. Thank you very much to the Federal Foreign Office @diplo.de and the Ministry of Defense, as well as MPs @sarananni.bsky.social and Ralf Stegner for the productive discussions.

Guns and Ammo: The Ukraine War and NATO’s Ammunition Interoperability Problem - Modern War Institute If the war in Ukraine has reinforced one truism of modern warfare, it is that artillery remains the king of battle. Its central role in Ukrainian combat operations has been sustained by the commitment...

Highly insightful piece on interoperability: “Sometimes, even STANAG compliance is insufficient to ensure technical interoperability. [...] Ukrainian forces found that they were unable to set the fuzes from a non-US NATO nation with their US-supplied inductive fuze setters.”

Sicherheit in Zahlen? Ein Beipackzettel für Meinungsumfragen zu Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik - PRIF BLOG In außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Debatten verweisen führende Politikerinnen und Politiker immer wieder auf Umfragen, nicht zuletzt bei Waffenlieferungen an die Ukraine. Doch wer Umfragedaten nutzt...

Very interesting, but also not very surprising. Among other things, citizens rely on elite cues when answering opinion polls. When all the politicians say we have been relying on the US too much, opinion polls are likely to reflect this political debate.

Maybe @niklasschoernig.bsky.social is correct in insisting that we should become proficient in democratic peace theory again.

The belief that the main cause of war is aggressive states is often linked to the claim that aggressiveness is correlated with, if not caused by, domestic repression. Although for years dismissed if not ridiculed by many arms controllers, this argument receives more than a little support from recent events. It is not likely to be an accident that unprecedented progress in arms control occurred at the same time that the Soviet system first liberalized and then disintegrated. Obstacles which were enormous when Leonid Brezhnev and his predecessors were in power have vanished with Mikhail Gorbachev and the subsequent revolution. This is not to say that all dangers have passed, or that nothing would have been possible without extensive changes within the Soviet Union and its successors, but it does appear that the success of arms control has been driven less by technological breakthroughs, intellectual ingenuity, and shifts in the balance of power than by internal changes which reconstructed the Soviet and post-Soviet polity.

“It is not likely to be an accident that unprecedented progress in arms control occurred at the same time that the Soviet system first liberalized and then disintegrated.”

Jervis, Robert. “Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War.” Political Science Quarterly 108, no. 2 (1993): 239–53.

Attack Helicopters Must Hunt the Hunters “Bingo” means the point of no return: the call that fuel is running dry and the mission is over. The same call now threatens the attack helicopter itself.

“Suppression of enemy air defenses should become a core competency for American attack helicopter pilots. [...] Without the capability to conduct their own suppression of enemy air defenses in support of their primary missions, helicopters will watch the next war from the sidelines.”

🚄 Im ICE mit 40 Minuten Verspätung: „Es tut mir leid, Sie heute wieder in diesem Maße herausfordern zu müssen.“

Image shows the cover of the CNTR Monitor 2025 with the title "New Realities of AI in Global Security" and the text: CNTR Monitor 2025 - Focus. How artificial intelligence impacts global security: Geopolitics of chip production. AI 'arms race' talk. AI in the military. AI developments in... Biotechnology, Chemistry, Verification. Published on November 6, 2025.

The new CNTR Monitor is here!
We take a look at technological trends with an impact on peace and security. The first half is dedicated to this year's focus topic, “New Realities of AI in Global Security”.
Read online or download here: monitor.cntrarmscontrol.org/en/2025/
#openaccess

Good Morning Berlin! 🌅

Attack Helicopters Must Hunt the Hunters “Bingo” means the point of no return: the call that fuel is running dry and the mission is over. The same call now threatens the attack helicopter itself.

If American attack helicopters can’t take out enemy air defenses, they won’t fly at all.

Wir müssen KI-Regulierung neu denken Bisherige Ansätze in der Rüstungskontrolle könnten nicht mit dem Innovationstempo von KI mithalten, schreiben die Forscher Kadri Reis und Malte Göttsche. Deshalb empfehlen sie hier und ab Donnerstag i...

KI schafft neue Realitäten in der internationalen Sicherheit. Warum wir deshalb KI-Regulierung neu denken müssen, schreiben @k3kr.bsky.social und @mgoettsche.bsky.social in einem Gastbeitrag für @table.media (€) – und geben dabei einen Ausblick auf den neuen CNTR Monitor, der am 6.11. erscheint.

In rain and mud, French artillery unit shows lessons from Ukraine war The demonstration showed how France’s 35th Parachute Artillery Regiment is trying to adapt to a drone-dominated battlefield.

“A French Army artillery demonstration in pouring rain in the south-east of the country last week showed the limits of modern warfare: When the weather gets miserable, cannons may still fire, but drones stay grounded.”

Reuters: "A military source said a [ground-launched] 9M729 fired by Russia on October 5 flew over 1,200 km to its impact in Ukraine."

Exclusive: Russia uses missile in Ukraine that led Trump to quit nuclear treaty [in 2019], Kyiv says www.reuters.com/business/aer...

A great overview on the use of additive manufacturing in the military technology sector by @liskasuckau.bsky.social. 👇

Why NATO needs a new nuclear strategy Opinion: A modern NATO nuclear strategy does not require reinventing the wheel, writes German defense analyst Karl-Heinz Kamp.

“[N]uclear targeting would focus primarily on Russian territory and probably on Belarus but no longer – as in the Cold War – on NATO terrain.”

At the same time, this makes the risk of rapid escalation even more likely than during the Cold War...

Stack of boxes with some publications stacked on top of it, the publications have a blue and red cover with a photo of a landscape on it and the title "CNTR Monitor 2025"

Fresh off the press: The new CNTR Monitor will be published on November 6. This year we focus on AI and its impacts on global security: how it's used in the military, dual-use risks of AI applications in biotechnology and chemistry, but also opportunities for verification. Stay tuned!

“European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA)” 😬