Scott R. Anderson

The Washington Post—for which I wrote editorials for nearly a decade—has closed its Kyiv bureau.

@lawfaremedia.org has not—and we will not.

We now employ more people in Kyiv than the Washington Post.

Let me tell you about what we have done in Ukraine over the past year and why we are not leaving

Now up on @lawfaremedia.org: my extraordinarily deep dive with @alexzerden.bsky.social into how the Trump administration is handling Venezuela's oil revenue.

Long story short, the scheme they've set-up—and the short-term fix they pursued through Qatar—both make more sense than they might seem.

Unpacking the Trump Administration’s Plans for Venezuela’s Oil Revenue There’s more logic to it than meets the eye.

After removing dictator Nicolas Maduro from power, President Trump issued an executive order setting up a mechanism for managing Venezuelan oil revenue. @sranderson.bsky.social and @alexzerden.bsky.social explore why the administration is channeling the revenue from the first oil deal through Qatar.

A classic! Braulio also makes for a great shakerato, with a pinch of salt and/or a lemon twist.

And if you do it gently, you can fold the shakerato into the Palpable Apathy, which makes it a bit sweeter and lighter.

Article explaining this forthcoming shortly! Less sketchy than it seems at first blush.

Should be this one!

Glocusent Book Light, 3-Color &... www.amazon.com/dp/B07WNRN9W...

It would be abdicating one of the few tools senators have left to force the Senate to weigh in on major matters of war and peace over the objections of leadership.

It’s a mistake for Hawley to be open to it. Hopefully Young, Collins, Paul, and Murkowski know better.

Rs in Senate can just vote not to move forward on this resolution if they oppose it.

This proposal is trying to remove the mechanism that allows senators opposed to military action to bring it in the first place, both in regard to Venezuela and other contexts.

This could also make it impossible for the Senate to resurrect this resolution later if the Trump administration’s assurances prove false, until after the admin initiates a “second wave” of military action.

Re: Venezuela resolution, this could set a precedent that would generally limit the availability of WPR expedited procedures outside ongoing hostilities.

Resolutions like those Congress passed in 2019-2020 re: Yemen and Iran could no longer be eligible.

www.politico.com/live-updates...

Hah! I've been considering inviting the other Scott Anderson on a podcast to have a Scott Anderson off. Maybe it's time...

Policy Roundtable: The War Powers Resolution - Texas National Security Review We gathered together a group of legal scholars and practitioners to discuss the War Powers Resolution and what should, or should not, be done to improve it.

You know it, buddy. Wrote this back in 2019 about the Yemen resolutions, but it all still applies.

tnsr.org/roundtable/p...

What Maduro's ouster means for global security | Brookings Join Brookings for a discussion on the global implications of U.S. strikes on Venezuela and the ouster of Nicolás Maduro.

Then this live panel discussion just now with @suzannemaloney.bsky.social, Vanda Felbab-Brown, @marcelaescobari.bsky.social, and @tomjwright.bsky.social, moderated by the always insightful @verambergen.bsky.social of @wsj.com.

www.brookings.edu/events/what-...

What did the US achieve in the Venezuela operation? | Brookings Scott Anderson and Caitlin Talmadge discuss the legal, tactical, and strategic angles of the recent U.S. military operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife. Anderson, a fel...

A busy day at @brookings.edu talking Venezuela.

First, this phenomenal podcast conversation with @proftalmadge.bsky.social for The Current (recorded yesterday but just published):

www.brookings.edu/articles/wha...

Role of a lifetime.

As for why the self-defense arguments are themselves problematic, see these earlier pieces:

www.lawfaremedia.org/article/did-...

www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-...

I also had a longer piece on this ready to go for @lawfaremedia.org post-holidays, which will now need to be a bit…retooled.

Here’s a brief excerpt on the Panama precedent I recently wrote on the topic as part of a broader symposium on recognition for @ajil.bsky.social.

Note the quote from the then-legal adviser on why consent wouldn’t have been sufficient absent effective control.

www.cambridge.org/core/journal...

This is why I suspect the Trump admin will keep relying on its (very problematic) drug-related self-defense arguments from its maritime strikes, even as it also claims to have consent from the opposition.

But if they emphasize the latter, that would be a departure from past U.S. practice.

In the Panama context, this is why the U.S. didn’t actually rely on consent from the recognized government-in-exile as international legal justification for deposing Noriega (though it cited it as a source of political legitimacy).

Other cases I’m aware of took a similar approach.

But as the National Assembly isn’t in effective control of Venezuela at all, it’s not the regime that would have that status under international law (i.e., the de facto government). And relying on it for consent to take actions that would otherwise violate international law raises big questions.

It’s true that the U.S. (like many other countries) has more or less recognized the 2015 National Assembly as Venezuela’s de jure government since 2019.

This lets it exercise various state functions contingent on the U.S. domestic legal system, like control of Venezuelan state assets.

A note on today’s announcement on Maduro’s capture: insofar as the Trump admin is relying on the consent of Venezuela’s opposition (and U.S.-recognized gov’t) as an international legal justification, that would be new — not even clearly supported by the Panama precedent.

Lots to discuss this week, to say the least!

Yes! I have a different edition that came in a box set, but that’s the right one.

Platforms, Sanctions, and Unrecognized Regimes A novel strategy for social media platforms dealing with local de facto authorities like the Taliban.

In a recent Lawfare Research Report, @sranderson.bsky.social outlines a strategy—called the “de facto authorities rule”—for addressing scenarios where sanctioned terrorist groups take control of government social media accounts and act as local de facto authorities.

Last chance to get these in (as I'm assembling the list for tomorrow's recording)! Get them in ASAP to rationalsecurity@lawfaremedia.org (or just DM me)!

Rubio is correct that that was his position when he was in the Senate! But it was wrong then too...

From a piece I wrote for @washingtonpost.com in 2020: www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/five...

... and then a two-piece true deep dive, of the sort that only @lawfaremedia.org can deliver.

www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-...

www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-...

Why the Iraq War AUMF Is Still Dangerous Legislation authorizing the 2003 war is still on the books—and alarmingly open-ended.

If you want an explanation as to why the 2002 Iraq AUMF in particular was a problem, here are some pieces I've written on the topic over the years...

Most recently, for @foreignpolicy.com ...

foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/28/i...