Mykola Bielieskov

Worst moment in UA-US bilateral relations since its inception as 🇺🇦 is waging war for its very existence.

How can we build mutually beneficial relations with US under this administration if 🇺🇦 President is not heard literally&UA rightful interests are disregarded in real time?

Btw what “mutual concessions by UA&RU for peace” as Trump team said mean in case of RU? There is unfortunately no specifics what RU shall cease to ask out of UA - only hints about what UA might be forced to sacrifice.

Geopolitical experiments paid by blood of Ukrainian Nation.

Otherwise RU would just press its relative advantage as far as it can. Hoping in meantime to undermine fully moral inside&outside Ukraine to force its maximalist terms of settlement.

End of thread 🧵

Thus war dynamics&correlation of forces for foreseeable future unfortunately exclude any quick settlement based on mutual compromises as Marco Rubio hints all along. First UA hand needs to be strengthened to force a major strategic reassessment among RU leadership.

In general RU leadership proceed from assumption that RU can sustain current casualty intensive military strategy for at least 1-1,5 years. Which translates into RU maximalist pol demands which equal to UA surrender. RU is so overconfident that it doesn’t hide desire to crush UA.

With exception of UA Kursk offensive RU has possessed overall battlefield initiative since Oct 2023. In 2024 despite staggering loses RU managed to occupy 3,6K square km of UA territory exploiting UA C2&personnel problems, gap in US aid&by some tactical&technological adjustments.

Thus far war&strategic dynamics is far cry from situation when both sides are so exhausted to be ready for compromise deal given no one ability to advance further quickly and in major scale. Quite the opposite - RU operates on the assumption that it can improve its bargaining power.

All recent statements by Secretary of State Marco Rubio regarding UA-RU war are based on the misguided assumption that with this war dynamics situation is ripe for compromises and durable settlement. References to stalemate are best proof of this misguided idea. Thread 🧵

All these commemorations related to WWII end are just meaningless show as there is a war going on for 11th year which a kind of appeasement stretched in time.

As people would reiterate “Never again” mantra there is zero courage&leadership to prevent a catastrophe in making.

After a 1 year pause it seems that it’s a high time to come back to this back up channel of communications.

Escalation management as basis of Biden Admin policy to UA-RU big war is in contradiction with sound mil strategy which is about destroying enemy in defence&offence quicker than he recovers without giving him a chance to regroup&adjust. Sure gen Patton would have said just that.

If RU decides to conduct another major offensive these missiles both in cluster&unitary warheads versions might prove instrumental in easing pressure on frontline UA formations provided proper application.

SRBM ATACMS is surest way for US to sustain UA fighting in short order.

Good calculation

Today 19th missile brigade of UA Defense Forces celebrated day of its establishment.

19th brigade employed SRBM Tochka-U against RU both in 2014-15 and after 24.02.

But before 2007 19th brigade had SRBM SCUD which Ukraine was pressed to scrap under nonproliferation rubric.

Headlines matter

WashPost - "As war frustrations rise, stalemate tests Zelensky and top general Zaluzhny"

NYT - "Zelensky Rebuke of Top General Signals Rift in Ukrainian Leadership"

Wording matters as unwarranted dramatising might do lot of harm related to people' perception.

Russia and Conventional Arms Control in Europe The chapter gives a comprehensive review of Russia’s policy toward conventional arms control in Europe. In particular, the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE Treaty), Open Skies Treaty (O...

Even before 24.02.22 it was obvious that RU is not interested in conventional arms control&confidence building measures as it turned into revisionist state with threat/use of mil force as prime instrument. So days of CFE treaty were numbered.

link.springer.com/chapter/10.1...

That’s things we need to accept and in 2024 campaign plan bring into balance political&military considerations while looking technological&tactical solutions which finally change offensive-defensive balance back in offensive favour as gen Zaluzhniy suggested.

That’s why in June 2023 UA faced a kind of strat zugzwang. As it happened doing a classic offensive people expected out of UA proved to be a challenge. At the same time it’s hard to imagine that UA would dare to say “We are not going to do offensive as we deem it too risky”.

So West basically expected things UA Defense Forces would find it hard to deliver with all the negative consequences for sustaining long term military aid for UA.

There is another problem - trap of West expectations UA got into. As partners finally decided in Jan 2023 to establish offensive specific grouping of forces&provided weaponry RU created defense in depth+obstacles which only reinforced defense-offensive balance in defence favour.

This tension between political&military dimension is one of themes in gen Zaluzhniy piece for The Economist. UA Commander in Chief admitted that politically UA needs to advance. But militarily it’s a challenge with number&sophistication of technology UA Forces currently possess.

But militarily offensive in this war is a challenge with “offensive-defensive balance” favouring defense. It’s much easier to detect&strike opponent concentration of forces than creating such concentration and applying it which is required for successful offensive action.

In 2023 campaign politically UA had to do classic offensive operation to liberate its people&territories. Staying just defensive was no more enough. Cause if it’s only defensive mode it means pressure on UA to freeze frontline with first hints on freezing out of US in Nov 2022.

In 2022 UA campaign there was kind of perfect match between political goals, mil capabilities&combat performance. Politically strat defense with counterattacks was just fine. And for this UA had proper capabilities&combat performance. Front dynamics in 2022 reflected this match.

The major problem for UA mil strategy that in 2023 campaign (unlike in 2022 campaign) political goals, military capabilities and combat performance have not been in balance. Moreover there was a tension between political&military dimension. Let’s see this contrast in detail.

Unfortunately both people inside&outside of UA mostly concentrate on specific personalities analysing war dynamics instead of giving a thought to objective conditions. By this people miss really important things and how they shape limits of possible. Thread 🧵

What is clear by now is that “Prevent RU from winning, prevent UA from losing” favoured by Biden Admin is not sustainable strategy any more.

If UA can leverage demands of some Republicans that Biden Admin has to provide proper strategy of UA victory to complement with another major military aid package it will be a kind of unexpected positive development under really dire conditions.

105 years ago today as A-H empire collapsed UAs seized key administrative buildings in Lviv to declare West Ukrainian People’ Republic.

Ukraine didn’t come out of blue in 1991. Our claim to statehood is based on feats of people who in 1917-18 made clear desire for independence.

Sustained flow along with wise employment of SRBM ATACMS even with cluster munitions warhead is not a silver bullet itself but it might create new dilemmas for RU grouping of forces and new openings for UA Defense Forces to exploit.