Eric Min

Our article highlights a nuanced form of discrimination that balanced racism with the exigencies of winning a war. In the case of WWI, White commanders—and the society that they reflected—stripped marginalized Americans of a valuable tool to pursue equality.

Dying in combat is awful, yet this type of "heroic" sacrifice has historically been a way that marginalized communities have made political gains in the fight for equality. In WWI, many Black soldiers died in hospitals and after the war had ended—conditions not seen as valorous.

Our theory lays the groundwork for a broader argument (which we hope to develop further) about how identity plays a part in shaping who dies in war, and in what conditions the answer to that question might change. We also show that such discrimination has implications on military effectiveness.

Third, Black units received far worse support than White units. Black soldiers died of non-combat causes at higher rates than White soldiers, even holding fixed levels of combat exposure in a variety of different ways.

Notably, Black combat units' fatality rates only outpaced White combats units' rates once the armistice was signed and returns to combat effectiveness became close to zero. After November 1918, Black combat units suffered 50% more deaths than White combat units.

The Meuse-Argonne offensive in September 1918 illustrates the effects of race on commanders' decision-making. When both White and Black units failed in a shared mission, only the Black unit was assessed as incompetent and taken out of future operations.

Second, White commanders tended to send White units to the frontlines while keeping Black soldiers back. The average White combat unit suffered four times as many causalties as the average Black combat unit.

We hypothesize and find three patterns. First, Black soldiers were disproportionately assigned to support, rather than combat, roles. Black Americans represented 10% of the overall population but only made up 5% of combat positions.

At the same time, the U.S. was mired in bitter racial politics, ranging from lynchings to the surge of "scientific racism" to the Jim Crow legal regime to segregation in the military. This segregation allows us to cleanly see the effects of race on assignments and deaths.

We test this argument using U.S. infantry fatality records from WWI. When the U.S. entered the war on the Western Front, the "modern system" of fighting that had developed over the years required complicated maneuvers that had high returns to combat effectiveness.

In assignments with low returns to combat effectiveness, commanders will be more likely to use—and let die—units perceived to be less capable. When assignments have high returns, commanders will rely on—and expect more deaths from—units with high perceived returns.

Due to both systemic and structural inequality that objectively shortchanged Black citizens' education and health, as well as subjective discriminatory attitudes at the individual level, we expect White commanders to perceive Black soldiers as being low in combat effectiveness.

We lay out a theory that highlights two key factors: commanders' perceptions of soldiers' combat effectiveness, and returns to combat effectiveness (that is, the change in likelihood of success depending on whether the unit involved is high or low in combat effectiveness).

Many anecdotes suggest that soldiers from marginalized groups were used as "cannon fodder" during wars. Yet many other anecdotes suggest that commanders kept those soldiers away from the frontlines. Which is correct?

We argue that both are true, in specific circumstances.

Forthcoming in @apsrjournal.bsky.social with Connor Huff and Robert Schub:

Converting and analyzing over 40,000 U.S. infantry fatalities from World War I, we examine how race and racism influenced who bore the costs of conflict.

www.cambridge.org/core/journal...

Hey #PoliSci folks and @apsa.bsky.social attendees! As placement director, I'm excited to let you know about some of our excellent UCLA job candidates on the market this year. Please take a look and share widley. #psjminfo

Thanks a lot, Jenna!

Thanks a lot, Anton!

Thank you very much!

Thanks so much, Aidan!

I am so happy to say that I have officially been promoted to Associate Professor! I was 13 when I first felt the (admittedly uninformed) desire to be a professor. I sincerely thank each person who played any part in helping me reach this wonderful milestone between then and now.

Words of War by Eric Min | Hardcover | Cornell University Press In Words of War, Eric Min pulls back the curtain on when, why, and how belligerents negotiate while fighting. Of all interstate conflicts across the last two centuries, two-thirds have ended through.....

If you are interested in learning more about the causes and consequences of negotiations during war over the last two centuries, take a look at my book, Words of War: Negotiation as a Tool of Conflict, from @cornellupress.bsky.social.

www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501...

Finally, no deal can overcome one key fact: Imposed peaces tend to collapse. Neither Russia nor Ukraine wants to end the war as things stand, and no deal made now has any long-term promise of being obeyed or enforced.

The Alaska talks are, at best, a major net negative. (9/9)

The Trump-Kim nuclear summits in the first term are a strong reminder of how abrupt top-level meetings are primarily theater, offer parties political legitimacy, and produce vague agreements that parties interpret as they see fit. (8/9)

Even if Trump and Putin announce a settlement, two major issues remain. The first is that the terms would be flimsy. Robust diplomatic agreements are products of intense bottom-up bargaining where leaders meet to finalize a negotiation—not start or produce it. (7/9)

Third, the US's diplomatic reputation will crater further. By inviting Putin to US soil, Trump affords Putin's cause and efforts tremendous legitimacy. By excluding Zelenskyy and European parties, Trump hurts the US's relations with allies far beyond this war. (6/9)

Second, Putin and Trump may get more political cover to further harm Ukraine. By feigning interest in peace, both leaders can claim to be the reasonable party if talks fail, and then justify continuing the war (Putin) or pulling support for Ukraine (Trump). (5/9)

First, fighting may get more intense. Belligerents who are not ready to settle often instead often ramp up hostilities before talks to maximize pressure. They also use the time during talks to regroup themselves for more intense fighting once talks fail. (4/9)

It is much easier for a belligerent to extract side effects when negotiations are led by third parties that are eager to try to end a conflict. This is the exact situation in this Alaska meeting. There are at least three side effects to these talks, none of which are good. (3/9)

We often think negotiations are only defined by whether they create agreements. But talks also have "side effects"—that is, consequences of talking that are unrelated or even harmful to settlement. And realizing those side effects are often the belligerents' main objectives. (2/9)