László Szerencsés

Informative quick briefing on why Hungary is such an important piece of the Turkey-Russia-EU gas pipeline puzzle, by László Szerencsés for the Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies.

www.su.se/institute-fo...

@szerlasz.bsky.social

Hungary hosted the informal summit of the Organisation of Turkic States on 20-21 May in Budapest. In his speech, Viktor Orbán emphasized the organisation’s role in Hungary’s energy diversification efforts. See my earlier report for the background.

Orban making overtures to Simion made sense from one perspective only: to gain an illiberal ally in the EU Council. Orban chose to make this incredibly costly gamble, essentially betraying the Transylvanian voters his party spent decades cultivating. And he lost. This is likely consequential.

Hungary's "inoagent" law is here
Increasingly trailing behind in the polls and facing a fiscal meltdown, this looks like part of a hail-mary attempt to eviscerate and intimidate critical media, NGOs, shut down public debate, and, likely, to prepare the disqualification of opposition candidates.

This seems like an existential threat to Hungary's independent sector. Besides practically forbidding any criticism of Hungary's "democracy" if an organization or media outlet receives foreign funding (including EU money), it would make receiving domestic funding difficult as well.

Notably, Turkey and Hungary are #3 and #7 on the chart.

@szerlasz.bsky.social wrote a timely analysis about that and EU policy (maps included): www.su.se/institute-fo...

Thanks, @diegocupolo.bsky.social FYI @paultlevin.bsky.social

1/🚨 Publication alert 🚨- My report on Turkey-Hungary relations is out! What started as an economic diversification strategy turned into a symbolic alliance after Turkey's failed 2016 coup attempt, and Hungary's isolation inside the EU in the same period. ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/Content/Imag...

As the EU is about to propose banning Russian gas imports by the end of 2027, see my brief on how Turkey and Hungary have challenged these efforts. www.su.se/institute-fo...

As the EU is about to propose banning Russian gas imports by the end of 2027, see my brief on how Turkey and Hungary have challenged these efforts. www.su.se/institute-fo...

As the EU is about to propose banning Russian gas imports by the end of 2027, see my brief on how Turkey and Hungary have challenged these efforts. www.su.se/institute-fo...

Thanks for sharing, Paul!

The latest SUITS Policy Brief by Hungarian Turkey expert @szerlasz.bsky.social is an absolute must-read. Cooperation between Turkey and Hungary on gas exports seriously complicates the EU’s efforts to diversify from its over-reliance on Russian gas.

This isn’t just about energy - it’s about preventing them from aligning with the Trump administration’s policy on Ukraine and improving their troubled relations with the EU. Can the EU step up against Russian influence in member states and candidate countries? Read my full analysis below. 5/5

To counter this, the EU must rethink its approach. Offering strategic incentives to Turkey and Hungary, such as brokers in alternative gas deals with Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan and competitive gas alternatives, could shift Ankara’s and Budapest’s calculations, reducing their reliance on Russia. 4/5

Hungary, heavily reliant on Russian energy, reinforces this setup. Rather than diversifying, it aligns with Turkey’s approach, further weakening the EU’s ability to reduce dependence on Moscow. 3/5

Turkey seeks to position itself as a key energy hub, but instead of supporting EU diversification, it prioritizes its own energy security and economic interests - keeping Russian gas flowing into Europe via the Turk Stream. 2/5

The EU’s gas diversification efforts are being challenged. My latest SUITS Brief explores how Turkey’s energy hub ambitions and Hungary’s energy policies undermine the EU’s efforts, and offers a way to move forward. 🧵👇1/5

Indeed. It was clear already in Munich that Merz was against Trump when he referred to Vance’s words as interference in European affairs. He may still be Atlanticist but it takes two to tango.

He does but he is still quite popular. Plus, this is popular vote. Due to the electoral system's disproportionate nature, TISZA may need more than that to get a majority in the Parliament.

Nevertheless, between November 2023 and November 2024, Turkey made significant progress in being seen as an ally among Western partners. This is due to the relatively lower level of confrontation with Western partners since the May 2023 elections. 3/3

Turkey's trust in multilateral initiatives is rather low compared to that of its Western allies. Yet, when asked about feelings, the respondents in Turkey were divided between hopes (43%) and concerns (40%) with only a slight tipping towards hopes. 2/3

The @munsecconf.bsky.social (MSC) report on multipolarity has some interesting findings on Turkey. A greater share of respondents in the BRICS countries without RU see Turkey as a "great power" than in the West. This is a result of Turkey's diplomatic focus on the developing world. 1/3

Viel Glück!

6/ This report is the result of months of research, including interviews in Budapest, Istanbul and Ankara as part of my Mercator-IPC Fellowship. If you’re interested in the foreign policy of semi-authoritarian states in general, or Hungary-Turkey relations in particular, give it a read!

5/ 🏛️ In NATO and the EU, Budapest has become Ankara’s advocate, and HU supports Turkey’s EU integration agenda despite TR's misalignment with EU conditionality. Although the EU itself has also turned transactional, HU's behavior does not facilitate the return to the rules-based conduct of affairs.

4/ ⚡ Hungary supports Turkey’s energy hub ambitions, but this also prolongs its own dependence on Russian gas. More importantly, using the TurkStream to import Russian gas hurts other EU member states' attempts to weaken Russia by voluntarily diversifying away from Moscow's gas sales.

3/ 🌏 Hungary revived myths around its “Turkic” identity, and even joined the Organization of Turkic States as an observer in 2018. Beyond the potential economic benefits of this connection, the Hungarian government has used its "Easternness" to justify its increasing non-alignment with EU norms.

2/ 🤝 The Hungary-Turkey cooperation is rooted in shared anti-Western rhetoric, the revival of Hungary's Turkic identity and political isolation in the West. It manifests in promoting Turkey's energy-hub ambitions and cooperation in international organizations such as NATO and the EU.

1/🚨 Publication alert 🚨- My report on Turkey-Hungary relations is out! What started as an economic diversification strategy turned into a symbolic alliance after Turkey's failed 2016 coup attempt, and Hungary's isolation inside the EU in the same period. ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/Content/Imag...