László Szerencsés

YouTube video by Prof James Ker-Lindsay Are Serbia-Turkey Relations Collapsing?

Honored to see my Balkan Insight op-ed 📝 cited by @jameskerlindsay.bsky.social as a ‘straightforward explanation’ (9:31) of Turkey–Serbia dynamics in his latest video 🎥. It’s encouraging to see this topic gaining wider attention beyond policy circles. youtu.be/0-t7V0EtB5k?...

Thanks a lot, and what a great video!

Turkey’s Drone Sales to Kosovo Test its Friendship with Serbia A shipment of Turkish-made military drones to Kosovo reignited old tensions between Ankara and Belgrade. But after initially accusing Turkey of imperial ambitions, Serbia’s president backtracked, high...

He also raises an important question about the fragility of the relationship. This is a development I have been observing as well and plan to explore further in my upcoming work. More on this soon. Stay tuned. Link to the article: balkaninsight.com/2025/10/10/t...

YouTube video by Prof James Ker-Lindsay Are Serbia-Turkey Relations Collapsing?

Honored to see my Balkan Insight op-ed 📝 cited by @jameskerlindsay.bsky.social as a ‘straightforward explanation’ (9:31) of Turkey–Serbia dynamics in his latest video 🎥. It’s encouraging to see this topic gaining wider attention beyond policy circles. youtu.be/0-t7V0EtB5k?...

Trump–Putin meeting in Budapest = Orbán’s dream scenario.
Two disruptors of the liberal order on home soil just months before the 2026 election. First invited to Egypt as the only Eastern European leader, he now hosts the illiberal axis. Orbán gains legitimacy without offering a single concession.

"Vucic’s outburst is best understood as an attempt to distract voters from the protests threatening his rule. His quick retraction shows that despite moments of rhetorical tension, neither side wishes to jeopardise this transactional friendship"

@paultlevin.bsky.social @sinemadar.bsky.social @heissenstat.bsky.social @cplaisant.bsky.social @diegocupolo.bsky.social @dimitarbechev.bsky.social @fbieber.bsky.social

Turkey’s Drone Sales to Kosovo Test its Friendship with Serbia A shipment of Turkish-made military drones to Kosovo reignited old tensions between Ankara and Belgrade. But after initially accusing Turkey of imperial ambitions, Serbia’s president backtracked, high...

Outrage one day, admiration the next.

Vučić’s reaction to Turkey's drone sales to Kosovo captures the fragile pragmatism holding Serbia–Turkey relations together.

✍️ My latest in Balkan Insight: balkaninsight.com/2025/10/10/t...

@whitejenny.bsky.social delivering her keynote lecture on „Beyond oppression and resistance: The transformative power of theory“ at the CEST Summer School in Turin.

Hungary’s Foreign Policy Crossroads – and Why It Matters for the EU For the first time in 15 years, Viktor Orban faces the real possibility of losing power as Peter Magyar’s opposition party leads in the polls. The outcome could reshape Hungary’s foreign policy, with ...

Hungary is at a crossroads - my op-ed for BI
⚖️ Orbán’s anti-Western course vs. Magyar’s cautious pro-Western shift
🛑 Vetoes could end, but migration & UA remain red lines
🚪 Silent support, not loud intervention — Berlin and the EU should give Magyar space to win
balkaninsight.com/2025/08/19/h...

💥🤯 Reaction by Hungary’s pro-Kremlin leadership to Russia’s airstrike on Transcarpathia, home to Ukraine’s Hungarian minority: Viktor Orbán’s FM Péter Szijjártó avoids naming Russia or the region. President Sulyok, Orbán’s puppet, mentions “Russian” air strike in his post—but later deletes the word.

By floating the idea first, Magyar pre-empts Orbán and seizes the initiative. It signals to FIDESZ voters: my offer isn’t so different from his.

Péter Magyar: Orbán should invite Putin and Zelensky to Budapest Magyar recalled that as part of the Budapest Memorandum, signed in 1994, Russia recognized Ukraine's territorial sovereignty and independence, so a meeting between the two leaders in the Hungarian cap...

Why does Magyar, Orbán's challenger, want the Putin–Zelensky meeting to be held in Budapest? He’s preparing for the worst. If it takes place in HU, Orbàn would argue that his pro-Russia, anti-Ukraine line has been justified – and that could boost him in the 2026 elections. telex.hu/english/2025...

Hungary’s Foreign Policy Crossroads – and Why It Matters for the EU For the first time in 15 years, Viktor Orban faces the real possibility of losing power as Peter Magyar’s opposition party leads in the polls. The outcome could reshape Hungary’s foreign policy, with ...

Hungary is at a crossroads - my op-ed for BI
⚖️ Orbán’s anti-Western course vs. Magyar’s cautious pro-Western shift
🛑 Vetoes could end, but migration & UA remain red lines
🚪 Silent support, not loud intervention — Berlin and the EU should give Magyar space to win
balkaninsight.com/2025/08/19/h...

Informative quick briefing on why Hungary is such an important piece of the Turkey-Russia-EU gas pipeline puzzle, by László Szerencsés for the Stockholm University Institute for Turkish Studies.

www.su.se/institute-fo...

@szerlasz.bsky.social

Hungary hosted the informal summit of the Organisation of Turkic States on 20-21 May in Budapest. In his speech, Viktor Orbán emphasized the organisation’s role in Hungary’s energy diversification efforts. See my earlier report for the background.

Orban making overtures to Simion made sense from one perspective only: to gain an illiberal ally in the EU Council. Orban chose to make this incredibly costly gamble, essentially betraying the Transylvanian voters his party spent decades cultivating. And he lost. This is likely consequential.

Hungary's "inoagent" law is here
Increasingly trailing behind in the polls and facing a fiscal meltdown, this looks like part of a hail-mary attempt to eviscerate and intimidate critical media, NGOs, shut down public debate, and, likely, to prepare the disqualification of opposition candidates.

This seems like an existential threat to Hungary's independent sector. Besides practically forbidding any criticism of Hungary's "democracy" if an organization or media outlet receives foreign funding (including EU money), it would make receiving domestic funding difficult as well.

Notably, Turkey and Hungary are #3 and #7 on the chart.

@szerlasz.bsky.social wrote a timely analysis about that and EU policy (maps included): www.su.se/institute-fo...

Thanks, @diegocupolo.bsky.social FYI @paultlevin.bsky.social

1/🚨 Publication alert 🚨- My report on Turkey-Hungary relations is out! What started as an economic diversification strategy turned into a symbolic alliance after Turkey's failed 2016 coup attempt, and Hungary's isolation inside the EU in the same period. ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/Content/Imag...

As the EU is about to propose banning Russian gas imports by the end of 2027, see my brief on how Turkey and Hungary have challenged these efforts. www.su.se/institute-fo...

As the EU is about to propose banning Russian gas imports by the end of 2027, see my brief on how Turkey and Hungary have challenged these efforts. www.su.se/institute-fo...

As the EU is about to propose banning Russian gas imports by the end of 2027, see my brief on how Turkey and Hungary have challenged these efforts. www.su.se/institute-fo...

Thanks for sharing, Paul!

The latest SUITS Policy Brief by Hungarian Turkey expert @szerlasz.bsky.social is an absolute must-read. Cooperation between Turkey and Hungary on gas exports seriously complicates the EU’s efforts to diversify from its over-reliance on Russian gas.

This isn’t just about energy - it’s about preventing them from aligning with the Trump administration’s policy on Ukraine and improving their troubled relations with the EU. Can the EU step up against Russian influence in member states and candidate countries? Read my full analysis below. 5/5

To counter this, the EU must rethink its approach. Offering strategic incentives to Turkey and Hungary, such as brokers in alternative gas deals with Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan and competitive gas alternatives, could shift Ankara’s and Budapest’s calculations, reducing their reliance on Russia. 4/5

Hungary, heavily reliant on Russian energy, reinforces this setup. Rather than diversifying, it aligns with Turkey’s approach, further weakening the EU’s ability to reduce dependence on Moscow. 3/5