Felix Kopecky

To us this motivates reflection of what we can reasonably expect from expert groups in exceptional situations. It seems that permissive evidence and diverse opinions can make consistent advice remarkably hard to come by on a short notice.

In our agent-based model, we find that maintaining consistency in group opinions aggregated through majority voting is particularly difficult for highly diverse groups – even if all members have individually consistent views.

Felix Kopecky & Gregor Betz, Inconsistent belief aggregation in diverse and polarised groups - PhilPapers How do opinion diversity and belief polarisation affect epistemic group decision-making, particularly if decisions must be made without delay and on the basis of permissive evidence? In an agent-based...

Now accepted @philscijournal.bsky.social 🥳: Gregor Betz and I look into the effects of opinion diversity and belief polarisation in epistemic group decision-making, particularly under condition of uncertainty and limited time for deliberation: philpapers.org/rec/KOPIBA