mja

Go Leo!!!

he’d borderline consider it, I guess

Someone has a nice paper roughly in this area on slurs and use-mention. Maybe Christopher Peacock? Mentioning slurs can sometimes be as bad as using them.

yes. the first does not expressly restrict the enrollment of non-freshman.

The scope doesn’t seem to matter here. Only F’s may enroll and F’s only may enroll both entail that no one who is a non-freshman may enroll. It’s worse if you read it as F’s may only enroll!

nice messages. be a real shame if they were deleted

yeah, Priest notes that some are 3-valued. He also notes that some have inconsistent classes of logical truths. hard to see how it could be worth the tradeoff. but I haven’t looked at them closely.

how many values?

what could be the motivation for a contradictory theorem? Priest works very hard just to show that some contradictions are sometimes true. btw how many inference rules are invalidated: raa, hs, mp, mt, ds, explosion...

are there logics with contradictions in their theorems? contingent contradictions are difficult enough.

To the extent that this is discussed at all among actualists (or the ones I know) the preference is for some fine-grained approach to individuation of soas. But I’ve only seen informal discussions.

I wasn’t presenting an argument. They do argue however, especially the actualists, that every state of affairs exists in every world. So every state of affairs is an actual object. And so every possible world actually exists. Though only one obtains. That’s enough, I think.

Yeah, I think that’s the idea. You can find the same states of affairs obtaining in many worlds.

If propositions turn out to be Fregean thoughts, I think we get the same result.

My approach to the problem stipulated that facts were SOAs and both propositions and SOAs, taken at face value, are abstract objects. Of course, lots of assumptions again. But if something like this is right, then the existence argument for diversity fails. Both sorts of objects necessarily exist.

I’m using the terminology of the argument which includes ‘facts’ and ‘propositions’ and argues for their diversity. The argument in broad outline is that they are diverse since propositions exist in worlds where their corresponding facts do not. So, all sorts of assumptions here.

Fregean thoughts are pretty much unstructured propositions, and so the question is whether facts are abstract states of affairs. I know that Chisholm at least seemed to identify SOAs and props, understood in this way.

I’ve found gg in general worse than cgpt. I do enjoy seeing their responses to strong criticism. “You were right to call me out…” I’ve noticed that they are very concessive even when my criticism has no basis at all. Basically I’m just saying stuff and they just agree.

oops, everyone else is shaved.

This version entails that the barber does not fail to shave himself (same for everyone else). False, but not so paradoxical.

If facts are structured objects or something or propositions are sets of worlds then everything’s more complicated, but I see no hint of that in the argument.

I’m not sure how facts are being thought of here, but suppose they’re states of affairs. Why is it true that a false proposition exists, but it’s corresponding non-obtaining state of affairs does not? In this context they seem both to be non-reductive abstract objects. So, both exist.1/2

I see everything as left handed...?

bees die quickly anyway (other than the Q). a matter of weeks. does that make time more or less important, I don’t know

so do lots of philosophers, fwiw. i had a colleague who would reject any paper with an argument that questioned animal rights. his convictions (read: feelings) made him sure the argument could not be any good. but, then, pick your favorite commitment among philos: they reason the same. alas

yikes, can medical training be far behind?

the precise problem with meticulous providence

what if p is a contradiction? it’s at least classically true, A& ~A |- ~(A&~A)

The consequent of line (2) is an instance of an S2 axiom (I think). So, it looks right even if the justification is not quite right.

What a surprise