Maxim Gorbachev

I often meet two types of people: 1) claim epistemological characteristics of phenomenal consciousness are compatible with physicalism and 2) claim phenomenal consciousness doesn’t consist of those characteristics.
I don’t think one can coherently be the former. The latter use “PC”inappropriate.

There are two buttons: blue and red.

If 50% of people press the blue button, everyone will survive.

If you press the red button, you are guaranteed to survive, but those who pressed the blue button will die if the blue button does not reach 50%.

What would you choose?

Mixie is way too good. No chance for the false pretender.

I have seen recently that it is used also for recognizing facsimiles of archival manuscripts. It seems like quite a technical task that one definitely doesn’t want to do by oneself.

Rubber arm illusion in octopus The feeling of a body as belonging to oneself is called the sense of body ownership and the centerpiece of conscious experience. Kawashima and Ikeda investigated the sense of body ownership in an octo...

Evidence that octopuses are subject to the rubber hand illusion -- suggesting, I guess, that they have an integrated sense of self www.cell.com/current-biol...

Or Jennifer North-wind according to her passport.

Another drink?
(This distinguished lady is Margo)

Exactly! Or subjective experience, conscious experience, etc. Any of them are not denied by any theory (but a classic eliminativism with some nuances).

Yes! General illusionist answer is distorting effect of introspection. But it still needs to be specified.

Existence of experience is a common place for all camps, I’d say. The question is what are the properties and nature of it.

2/2 infallibility, directness, etc. Are illusionist doors closed then? No, because subjective evidence (and that’s what is crucial for Humphrey as I see) are the same. Subjectively it seems there are those properties.

1/2 Continuing my work on Humphrey’s “Redder than red” translation. There are at least two strategies to reject phenomenal realism: denying existence of phenomenality or redefining it in physicalist terms. I guess, Nicholas takes the latter. But he still sticks to such properties as privacy…

Other options are not considered? I’m in queue!

One of my favorite artists!

I have a new short paper out today, commenting on Walter Veit's (excellent) 2023 book on animal consciousness. Open access. doi.org/10.1177/1059...

Both in the everyday sense and in a philosophical context, I would say. In the first case it’s a matter of imitative abilities. In the second we potentially can face quite complex functional structure of LLM but not of the sun.

These are not high really. And I see nothing preventing ai to do all these things.

But if we manage to duplicate an identical functional structure, nothing will be left to make ai different. Especially if you don’t think substrate matters and don’t postulate some nonphysical entities.

Humphrey’s claim is no less physicalist I guess.

I don’t think it would. At least by itself.

This sounds doubtful for me too. But I don’t think there is a problem for ai to have a self model and do self modeling. May be your requirements for self model are much more higher.

Am I right thinking you’re not functionalist about consciousness? Sounds like you don’t think substrate doesn’t matter.
To the last sentence: why? Cause similar functions are already realized by other mechanisms or?

I find this opposition as a matter of presentation or image rather than ontology or epistemology of subjective experience.

I’m working on the translation of Nick Humphrey’s paper (below). I recommend this one to those who find illusionism too radical. Humphrey employs a realist language to convey quite similar ideas. If you find surrealism plausible, there’s nothing stopping you from adopting an illusionist perspective.

Ready to swap a couple of them for moussaka)

The more plausible this scenario becomes — the more plausible illusionism is. As we can use such ideas to prove it really seems to people they have qualia (they sometimes deny that making both illusionism and phenomenal realism doubtful)

Yes, any metaphysical statement is hardly totally verifiable but it’s not what we want here.
We can refer to experience — just not in radical realistic sense.

Dave Chalmers and the best argument for dualism #ASSC28

Seems like we need an empirical theory of consciousness to answer this) We don’t even have methodology to check a a human’s disposition btw.