Maxim Gorbachev

Join us in 60 minutes! It'll be *bona* (despite my lack of riah)

Susan Schneider, David Sahner, Robert Lawrence Kuhn, Eric Schwitzgebel & Mark Bailey, Is AI Conscious? A Primer on the Myths and Confusions Driving the Debate - PhilPapers Artificial intelligence is sparking unprecedented claims about machine minds — but are today’s systems really conscious? In this primer, we disentangle the myths, misconceptions, and confusions fuelin...

New in draft with Susan Schneider, David Sahner, Robert Lawrence Kuhn & Mark Bailey - a primer on central ideas and concepts in the AI consciousness debate. If you're looking for a toehold in the sea of jargon, this might help.

philpapers.org/rec/SCHIAC-22

Starting in under an hour! Some preparatory reading here petemandik.substack.com/p/you-dont-k...

What’s your answer to the question “Why do we need to study philosophy?”?
I realized that I rather try to defend philosophy than to explain why it’s important.

AI Detector - AI Checker for text, image, music & video AI or Not is the leading AI detector for all content types: text (ChatGPT, Claude), image (Midjourney, 4o), music (Suno, Udio) & video (Veo, Kling)

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Probably there are much more of them!

The Persuaders. Episode 2: Perceptual content YouTube video by Keith Frankish

The Persuaders, Episode 2. Pete tries to persuade us that all conscious content is conceptual. www.youtube.com/live/S7FjpEH...
@petemandik.bsky.social

This is exactly why sometimes people think Humphrey’s surrealism is a realist approach.

YouTube video by Keith Frankish The Persuaders: Overture

The Persuaders: Overture - YouTube www.youtube.com/watch?v=0T77...

I can’t even confidently match a real object’s purple color to one of these)

Les Miserables came to mind (idk why).

I was told today that it is possible to rationally and simultaneously claim “p” and “I don’t believe p” without changing the meaning of p in one of these. (So, an assumption that I face an illusion of p is not the case).
I have no idea how it could be possible. Does anyone?

I often meet two types of people: 1) claim epistemological characteristics of phenomenal consciousness are compatible with physicalism and 2) claim phenomenal consciousness doesn’t consist of those characteristics.
I don’t think one can coherently be the former. The latter use “PC”inappropriate.

There are two buttons: blue and red.

If 50% of people press the blue button, everyone will survive.

If you press the red button, you are guaranteed to survive, but those who pressed the blue button will die if the blue button does not reach 50%.

What would you choose?

Mixie is way too good. No chance for the false pretender.

I have seen recently that it is used also for recognizing facsimiles of archival manuscripts. It seems like quite a technical task that one definitely doesn’t want to do by oneself.

Rubber arm illusion in octopus The feeling of a body as belonging to oneself is called the sense of body ownership and the centerpiece of conscious experience. Kawashima and Ikeda investigated the sense of body ownership in an octo...

Evidence that octopuses are subject to the rubber hand illusion -- suggesting, I guess, that they have an integrated sense of self www.cell.com/current-biol...

Or Jennifer North-wind according to her passport.

Another drink?
(This distinguished lady is Margo)

Exactly! Or subjective experience, conscious experience, etc. Any of them are not denied by any theory (but a classic eliminativism with some nuances).

Yes! General illusionist answer is distorting effect of introspection. But it still needs to be specified.

Existence of experience is a common place for all camps, I’d say. The question is what are the properties and nature of it.

2/2 infallibility, directness, etc. Are illusionist doors closed then? No, because subjective evidence (and that’s what is crucial for Humphrey as I see) are the same. Subjectively it seems there are those properties.

1/2 Continuing my work on Humphrey’s “Redder than red” translation. There are at least two strategies to reject phenomenal realism: denying existence of phenomenality or redefining it in physicalist terms. I guess, Nicholas takes the latter. But he still sticks to such properties as privacy…

Other options are not considered? I’m in queue!

One of my favorite artists!

I have a new short paper out today, commenting on Walter Veit's (excellent) 2023 book on animal consciousness. Open access. doi.org/10.1177/1059...

Both in the everyday sense and in a philosophical context, I would say. In the first case it’s a matter of imitative abilities. In the second we potentially can face quite complex functional structure of LLM but not of the sun.

These are not high really. And I see nothing preventing ai to do all these things.

But if we manage to duplicate an identical functional structure, nothing will be left to make ai different. Especially if you don’t think substrate matters and don’t postulate some nonphysical entities.