Ned Block

The worst thing was lying about patients’ symptoms

Just do science

I agree that the line of thought I was sketching is hard to test. But I call your attention to the last sentence of the article: "A breakthrough will be needed for progress, and failing to recognize that a breakthrough is needed may not be conducive to nding it."

There are a couple of paragraphs that are supposed to be a reply to this point

I’d be glad to do that

Understanding whether consciousness depends on computational roles, biological realizers, or both, is crucial for assessing the prospects of consciousness in AI and less complex animals. end/

subcomputational biological realizers favors consciousness in simpler animals. Current theories of consciousness are 'meat-neutral', but if specific physical substrates are necessary, AI may never achieve consciousness. 3/

processes, are necessary for consciousness. By contrasting computational roles with their subcomputational biological realizers, I show that there is a systematic tension in our criteria for consciousness: prioritizing computational roles favors consciousness in AI, while prioritizing 2/

Computational functionalism claims that executing certain computations is sufcient for consciousness, regardless of the physical mechanisms implementing those computations. This view neglects a compelling alternative: that subcomputational biological mechanisms, which realize computational 1/

Can Only Meat Machines be Conscious? New paper in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, free download until November 26 with this URL: authors.elsevier.com/a/1luwh4sIRv...

Hmmm…my reply is somewhat similar drive.google.com/file/d/1cIUk...

See tiny red line of link to today's actual news

Hilarious!

I’m shocked my book is on this list. But, cool! Great company.

Consciousness before birth? Imaging studies explore the possibility Fetal and infant brains offer clues to when human experience begins

Consciousness before birth? Imaging studies explore the possibility | Science | AAAS www.science.org/content/arti...

Goodby global workspace and higher order theories

First order theories of consciousness win again

EEG Decoding of Conscious versus Unconscious Representations during Binocular Rivalry Abstract. Theories of visual awareness often fall into two general categories, those assuming that awareness arises rapidly within visual cortex and those assuming that awareness arises more slowly as...

direct.mit.edu/jocn/article...

❤️

Yes and the opposite makes much more sense. To get a conscious state you need a carefully orchestrated group of events but if any one of them goes wrong you fail to get consciousness. Many of those misfires will be unconscious so that is why there are more ways of having an unconscious state

YouTube video by Robinson Erhardt Ned Block: Consciousness, Artificial Intelligence, and the Philosophy of Mind

Excellent interview of @neddo.bsky.social (www.youtube.com/watch?v=wM1f...)

They don’t mention the dorsal visual system which is adapted to fast motor responses

authors.elsevier.com/a/1kHSZ4sIRv...

in this short letter in TICS, @matthiasmichel.bsky.social & @jorge-morales.bsky.social argue against the episodic memory deficit interpretation of aphantasia proposed by @andreablomkvist.bsky.social.

a lack of imagery awareness may be all there is

1/2

since @neddo.bsky.social & i so rarely agree on anything other than restaurant choices, this is possibly legit

2/2

I should add that even though we do offer a possible alternative reading of the data to the one offered by @andreablomkvist.bsky.social, her work on aphantasia remains some of the best on the subject. If you’re interested in the topic, you should read her work. bsky.app/profile/hakw...

Aphantasia as imagery blindsight In a recent article in TiCS [1], Zeman provided a masterful and balanced review of aphantasia. However, in doing so, he might have been too generous to some accounts. Specifically, unlike Zeman, we consider the view that aphantasia involves nonconscious imagistic representations [2] to be clearly superior to other views. Here, we argue against these other views as they were described by Zeman. In addition, we address some additional arguments that have been raised to counter the idea that aphantasia involves nonconscious imagistic representations [3], which were not addressed by Zeman in his review.

Short letter in TiCS where we (@matthiasmichel.bsky.social, @hakwan.bsky.social & @neddo.bsky.social) explore the possibility that aphantasia is unconscious mental imagery. Given aphantasics’ high performance, we propose thinking about it as blindsight of the mind’s eye. www.cell.com/trends/cogni...

Very poor fake. You are there in the first frame only

Subcortical pathways do not get input from the short wave cones, hence better sensitivity to long waves, I.e. red. That explains it