Felix Lehmann

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Everything for the fans: Party responsiveness across the EU over time | European Journal of Political Research | Cambridge Core Everything for the fans: Party responsiveness across the EU over time

Who do parties really listen to? 🎧

@felixlehmann.bsky.social finds that EU-wide evidence shows parties mostly respond to their own supporters, not the public at large, holding across issues, regions, party types, and over time.

Hauries de llegir el segon!

Abstract of "When does accommodation fail? The electoral consequences of intra-party divisions and mainstream party strategies" by Felix Lehmann, published in West European Politics.

The marginal effect of Δ EU position on mainstream party vote over increasing levels of EU intra-party divisions (N = 393). The histogram plots the distri- bution of EU intra-party divisions.

The Marginal effect of Δ immigration position on dyadic mainstream party voter gains over increasing levels of immigration intra-party divisions (N=134). The histogram plots the distribution of immigration intra-party divisions.

🎉 Online first:

Can shifting to the Eurosceptic right backfire?

@felixlehmann.bsky.social points to an overlooked reason for why accommodation may fail: intra-party division. When the party disagrees, policy shifts become less credible and can cost votes.

🔗 doi.org/10.1080/0140...

Thanks, Joe! Would love to hear more about what is happening to L actually.

Extra: Recent experimental evidence from Dominik Duell,
@dielea.bsky.social, @sopro.bsky.social, Jonathan B. Slapin & @chriswratil.bsky.social similarly shows the negative effects that intra-party divisions can have for parties responding to new challengers. A great read: doi.org/10.1017/S147...

I want to thank the editorial team @wepsocial.bsky.social for the great guidance throughout the process. I also want to highlight the unseen work of the peer reviewers who took the time to provide extremely thoughtful and detailed feedback on the two revisions that this paper went through.
13/13

It is worth emphasizing that intra-party divisions are very likely not the only reason why voters do not reward mainstream accommodation. Instead, many different factors may make it difficult for parties to credibly shift on issues, such as immigration and the EU.
12/13

I find some tentative evidence that valence considerations, such as credibility and competence, are driving the results. Divided mainstream parties suffer from a depreciated valence image when they accommodate. Highly united parties instead improve their likability using the same strategy.
11/13

The findings highlight the inefficacy of accommodative shifts in achieving their intended outcome of halting the rise of politically extreme parties. Rather than convincing voters lost to Eurosceptic rivals, Eurosceptic shifts are mainly associated with voter flows between mainstream parties.
10/13

Preliminary analyses suggest that similar dynamics may be at play on the issue of immigration, but data limitations prevent the paper from presenting conclusive tests.
9/13

Accommodating on the EU overall does not seem to induce strong voter flows between mainstream and Eurosceptic parties, irrespective of the division level. Instead, united accommodators gain voters from other non-Eurosceptic rivals. Divided accommodators mostly lose voters to these rivals.
8/13

Second, I analyze voter flows between mainstream parties and Eurosceptic/non-Eurosceptic rivals in 70 national elections. I find very similar patterns as on the election level. Highly united parties experience minor gains when accommodating, while divided parties lose voters.
7/13

The results suggest that Eurosceptic shifts tend to yield little benefit for mainstream parties. United accommodators experience no significant changes in their vote share, whereas accommodation for parties with medium to high levels of divisions on the EU is associated with vote losses.
6/13

I test this expectation on the key niche issue of European integration on two different levels. First, I examine how the interplay of divisions and party strategies shapes mainstream party vote shares in 136 national elections in 13 Western European countries between 1988 and 2025.
5/13

I argue that divided parties lack the needed credibility, competency, and persuasiveness to successfully accommodate niche rivals. I thus expect that internally divided parties perform electorally worse when accommodating than their united counterparts.
4/13

Despite this mainstream eagerness to accommodate, most studies show that the strategy frequently backfires electorally. I argue that one important reason for this is that many mainstream parties are deeply internally divided on the issues they are accommodating on.
3/13

Mainstream parties often respond to the emergence of far-right and far-left challengers by shifting closer to the positions of these parties on their core issues. A recent example is Labor’s harsh-on-immigration shift under the Starmer government, aimed at combating the rise of Reform UK.
2/13

Why does mainstream accommodation of far-right and Eurosceptic parties often electorally backfire? In my 3rd dissertation paper, just published in @wepsocial.bsky.social, I argue that voters specifically punish internally divided parties for accommodation: doi.org/10.1080/0140...
1/13 🧵

New publication in @politicsgenderj.bsky.social!

Who perceives feminism as a threat, and why do a lot of women perceive feminism as threatening?

With @evaanduiza.bsky.social, we explore these questions in the context of Spain.

We find: ⬇️
doi.org/10.1017/S174...

NEW PUBLICATION
“How the Media Cordon Sanitaire Crumbles: Lessons from Germany” now out in @prxjournal.bsky.social
🔓 doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2026.2621808
I’m very happy that this paper is out – this project is particularly important to me.

Attitude Manipulation and Voting Intentions - Political Behavior A large body of research documents the substantial effects of persuasive communication on political attitudes. However, opinion manipulation often represents merely an intermediate goal in a greater e...

Now in print (and open access):

What happens when voters learn their party disagrees with them?

I ran a pre-registered experiment with a representative sample of ~3,000 German voters to find out.

link.springer.com/article/10.1...

🧵

Rallied by thy neighbor: how minority spatial concentration increases voter turnout | The Journal of Politics: Vol 0, No ja

New paper out in the @thejop.bsky.social with @rafaelahlskog.bsky.social & @grahn.bsky.social

Your neighbours shape your politics — but can living near people like *cause* higher turnout?

We studied 20,000+ queer individuals across the entire Swedish population to find out

doi.org/10.1086/740816

In the increasingly multidimensional European political space, I encourage future studies to shift attention to issue-based representation. We still lack an understanding of the issue-level drivers of responsiveness
doi.org/10.1017/S147...
12/12

The economic and cultural dimensions of unequal policy representation Abstract. Many scholars have argued that policymaking in Western democracies is biased toward high-income citizens, thereby violating fundamental ideals of

Some important caveats: I only look at party positions; what policies parties actually supply in government is a different question (see, for example: doi.org/10.1093/ser/...). The note also offers no insights into whether voters actually perceive and reward party responsiveness.
11/12

While parties appear to prioritize supporters, their shifts are largely compatible with the preferences of the broader electorate. The reason for this is that the issue preferences of party supporters often overlap with those of the average voter.
10/12

I interpret these findings as mostly good news for proponents of delegate-style representation. The evidence indicates a robust connection between changing public preferences and the issue positions supplied by parties.
9/12

These patterns of responsiveness even persist across mainstream/niche parties, Western/Central and Eastern Europe, and time. They are further supported across a wide range of robustness checks and additional analyses.
8/12

I find evidence of party responsiveness to both the average voter and partisan supporter. However, when choosing, parties have a strong tendency to prioritize their supporters. This finding is supported within both responsiveness frameworks and across all six issues + left-right dimension.
7/12

I utilize CHES expert data to measure party positions and data from the EES to capture citizens’ preferences on six different issues and the left-right dimension. The analysis covers a maximum of all 27 EU members + the UK between 1999 and 2024.
6/12