Joe

Phenomenal consciousness and moral status: taking the moral option Intuitively, there is a close link between moral status and phenomenal consciousness. Taking the link seriously can serve as the basis of a proposal that appears to have a surprising number of theo...

Next, Joseph Gough addresses the relationship between phenomenal #consciousness and moral status in this open access article: doi.org/10.1080/0951... #philsky #philpsy

Mental fictionalism and the dangers of Cartesian apologia Toon (2023) argues that “the mind is a useful fiction.” The mind, for Toon, is essentially an “inner world” or “inner grotto,” which is “private” and which “houses our mental states – our beliefs, ...

I have a new article! Doing a sort of mini-genealogy of the concept of mind in response to Toon's mental fictionalism www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

YouTube video by New Work in Philosophy Joseph Gough (Oxford), "The embodied, relational self: extending or rejecting the mind?"

I made a video for New Work in Philosophy on mind and self, from Descartes to the anti-Cartesians. Thanks @marcusarvan.bsky.social for the invite! youtu.be/tPXbnketu8I

YouTube video by New Work in Philosophy Joseph Gough (Oxford), "The embodied, relational self: extending or rejecting the mind?"

@josephfgough.bsky.social made a very cool, accessible video on the concept of the mind and why it’s less valuable today than it once was. A great teaching tool!! youtu.be/tPXbnketu8I

Thank you!!!

Thanks! I'm not quite sure how much I'd expect fictionalists to agree with my position. I definitely don't think that the mind is a *useful* fiction, which is one of Toon's claims, and I'm sceptical about any one-size-fits-all approach to 'mental' states and representations - I have a draft on this!

Giving bluesky a go! To tell the void that my latest article, '"Mind" and "Mental": Extended, Pluralistic, Eliminated' was just accepted in Synthese, arguing we should get rid of the concept of mind and category mental because they are confused, confusing, and harmful philsci-archive.pitt.edu/24024/