David M. Sip

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The political cost of these groups outweighs their military usefulness and in my article I make the case that they should be interpreted as pressure proxies that are used by sponsor countries to either deter an attack or pressure target states into more compliant foreign policy.

From the Indian Special-Frontier-Force, made-up of Tibetans, to the Iranian proxies of the Husayniyoun, that is made-up of Azeris, and the Islamic Movement in Nigeria in addition I covered the Chechen Dzhokhar Dudayev Battalion serving in Ukrainian Service (2014-2022).

I am grateful to the team at the Georgetown Security Studies Review for publishing my article: Pressure Proxies: A Model for State Support of Non-Traditional Proxy Groups Abroad and Their Use as Deterrence. It covers diverse case studies of the use of proxies for pressure and deterrence. /1

A better comparison would be the H-3 strike by Iran in 1981 during the Iran-Iraq War

Das Ende der Pax Americana ist der Beginn des Hobbschen Krieges aller gegen alle.

The role of ideology in explaining the strength of Iran’s proxy relationships Despite recent setbacks Iran maintains an expansive network of loyal proxies. This article will argue that Iran’s proxies are especially loyal when they only adhere to Khomeinism without any other ...

32/ The article can be read here: doi.org/10.1080/0959... for access to the article drop me a DM.

31/ The framework applied here thus might lend itself to the analysis of Turkish proxy warfare. Beyond that the lack of states that have an exportable ideology means that this framework has limited applicability beyond the Islamic Republic and its proxies.

30/ Of the two, Turkey might offer another case where it might make sense to use ideological exclusivity as an explainer of proxy loyalty. Turkey has been relying on pan-Turkish nationalist Turkmen militias in Syria against Kurdish forces.

29/ Both countries have less clearly defined ideologies than Iran with Khomeinism and their ideologies are very nationalism-centered, making them less useful for use abroad.

28/ Some states that engage in proxy warfare like the United Arab Emirates do not have an ideology comparable to Khomeinism; their proxy relationship is transactional framed by expert and reward power. This leaves Turkey and Russia as two major proxy war actors.

27/ For the findings to apply to other cases, they need to feature proxies and sponsors with ideology.

26/ The IMN is also insightful since its not an armed proxy, but has the potential for one, it is not dependent on Iran for material support but Iran supports the group politically pressuring Nigeria to ease the persecution of the group.

25/ It shows on the one hand how the ideology Khomeinism can be appealing even to non-Shias, but also that Khomeinism and Shia Islam are closely intertwined.

24/ The last case study was the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN) a group that is not really a proxy of Iran, but an Islamic movement that was inspired by the Islamic Revolution, before becoming Shia in later years.

23/ Hezbollah meanwhile has remained a loyal Iranian proxy for more than forty years, it has paid for this loyalty in blood, but despite the high price it has paid it has never wavered in its commitment to the Islamic Republic.

22/ Iraqiness thus became a major rallying cry for the Tishreen protests that also targeted Iran’s proxies in Iraq.

21/ The loyalty of Iran’s committed proxies such as Ka’taib cause even more problems since their lack of credible Iraqi nationalism and their corruption and violence makes them unpopular.

20/ This shows that while Shias might be leaning towards conservative interpretations of Islam, does not automatically make them align with Iran.

19/ While the former is fiercely loyal to the IRI and committed to Khomeinism, the Madhi army – later rebranded the Peace Brigades – is the armed force of the Sadrist movement and while Islamist in leaning fiercely Iraqi nationalist rejecting Iranian dominance over Iraq.

18/ It also shows the level of loyalty ideological exclusivity causes, even after a truce with Saudi-Arabia the Houthis remain loyal to the Islamic Republic despite not needing it as much as before anymore. The next case study was Ka’taib Hezbollah and the Mahdi army.

17/ The Houthis meanwhile were Zaydi Shias and aligned themselves with Iran. They recognized the leadership of Khamenei and aligned ideologically with Iran. Which shows that Khomeinism is an ideology, since the Houthis are Zaydi Shias which is distinct from the Twelver Shias.

16/ In Yemen meanwhile the IRI initially had contacts with the Houthis and the Southern separatists, but the Southern separatists were nationalist Sunnis who wanted an independent South Yemen and aligned themselves with the UAE.

15/ The Sabireen Movement meanwhile was a short-lived group of Palestinians who had converted to 12er Shia Islam and were exclusively committed to Khomeinism.

14/ Hamas supported the Syrian revolution, while the Islamic Republic supported Assad and PIJ was neutral towards the Saudi intervention in Yemen against the Iran-supported Houthis.

13/ The argument for this framework is made through several case studies. The first are Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Sabireen Movement. Hamas and PIJ both had a falling out with the Islamic Republic in the past over foreign policy.

12/ My model of ideologically committed proxies meanwhile is based on legitimate power. This highlights the difference between ideology and culture, and subsequently how power/proxy relationships based on the two aspects differ.

11/ Namely that Contractual proxies are based on reward power; Coercive proxies based on coercive power; Transactional proxies are based on reward and expert power and the Cultural proxies that are based on referent power.