Ramon Zarate

SpaceX Details Starlink’s Existing and Potential PNT Capabilities in Response to FCC Inquiry Update: Comments on SpaceX's FCC response on using Starlink for PNT from Todd E. Humphreys, Professor of Aerospace Engineering and Director of the Wireless Netw

‘Starlink can obviously offer far more robust positioning than GPS, as it will have ~1000X more satellites over time. Not all will have line of sight to users, but still >10X GPS & far stronger signal. Just not today’s problem.’

I have also read articles on using existing Starlink for authenticated positioning. I think we will see developments in this area

… And maybe a strategic secret switch, turn off gps, enable the secret starlink 🤔…

This will absolutely work. There are many ways to sanity check data and enhance quality. The gnss research stations does this. Data centers and many other services relies on gps time for precise sync. More costly, yes

Jag var på besök hos Icon Medialab. De hade en kaffemaskin som täckte en hel vägg. De var noga att förklara att den övervakades över internet av servicetekniker i Schweiz

När jag skrev på för mitt första jobb blev jag bjuden på en dykresa till Röda Havet. Dykarcert blev vi såklart bjudna på innan resan

I believe the spoofers (but no proof yet) also transmit fake ephemerides in the data packages. But the stations seem to discard them. If they are precise receivers, they may sanity check the data. So my hunt is not over yet

Also the trajectory (ephemeris) is essential, a detailed known position of the satellites, as well as distances. With a number of known distances to satellites, the receiver can solve for a position. The more satellites the better the least square solution is

A recap. Satellite transmits a clock code and trajectory, based on detailed measurements on the difference vs a local clock, distances to satellites can be calculated. There are much more to this to get a precise measurement, adjustment for difference in speed of light through iono and troposphere,

Data is published in RINEX format, essentially containing the time codes for signals, measured signal strength, doppler shift, this can then be analyzed in many ways. Here we see signal strength vs angle over horizon. Should normally follow fairly well

These are scientific stations, capturing raw gnss data, used for capturing mapping, continental drift etc. What's good is that raw satellite signals are captured and made publicly available.

But why are we not solving for Kaliningrad, as all AIS data consistently is doing? We are missing one piece in the puzzle, the broadcast navigation data. I am using global known satellite trajectories. If the spoofer also transmits fake ephemerides (trajectories), we may solve for other locations

This is Hoburgen data. Signal strength is OK, satellites supposedly over horizon. Code residuals are very consistent for a solution

The shooting lines happens when solved for the satellites marked below. Plotted are "code residuals", ie difference from calculated time distance vs calculated distance based on satellite trajectory and known position of station. It should stay at zero, but time signal is shooting off

I revisited June 14, known noisy day, with new take on resolvers. These are Rinex data from stations Hoburgen, Bornholm, Gdansk and Braniewo. Note the shooting lines, these are valid solutions, but diverging from station

Ryktet om det bemannade spetsflygets död verkar betydligt överdriven

Vi betackar oss för en allians av Quislingar, de skall behandlas därefter

It is a border patrol coat, with border patrol markings and badge

What we see here is signal strength per satellite over time as it is panning over the sky. The disruption is when the spoofer takes over, we do not see the characteristic increase/decrease when satellite passes, the spoof signal is irregular

My aim is to be able to see valid pseudorange residuals as well as ephemeris data that can resolve to spoofed locations. This would give insights to understand the mode of the spoofers, for me there are still some unknowns in the actual functionality

Stor stigning i antallet af GPS-forstyrrelser omkring Bornholm På de første 10 måneder af 2025 er der registreret flere tilfælde af GPS-jamming på målestationen i Tejn, end der blev hele sidste år, erfarer medie.

Article on increased #GPS #GNSS #Jamming at #Bornholm #BalticSea

@auonsson.bsky.social
@signalseta.bsky.social
@oldsun.bsky.social

www.tv2bornholm.dk/bornholm/sto...

This is really interresting, rinex station capture (here C/N0). I have been looking at quite a few rinex stations but have not been able to see actual data capture of the data frames and almost gave up. Maybe time to do some digging again

Geolocation challenge

den här var heller inte så dum
russiaoilpowermap.com

Ja, inte orimligt

Maybe people simply put their own private jammers on the balconies. Could be that simple

And this is what the additional air defense ordered out on the streets looks like

I guess something ought to be around there

Did not spend very much time over the maps and cannot decide on what possible feature NW Kremlin. I am pretty sure it is not Lukoil Arena, but suppose something around there they want to protect

I was having a look at traffic gps data for central Moscow. It is really crazy, wherever you go, you will be teleported. But here are some highlighted hotspots. Red means high jam ratio

I tell you, she is not joking bsky.app/profile/sude...

Analysis to come soon