β¦clearly that process began earlier and was driven by other factors (collapse of JCPOA revival talks?). 6/6
22.12.2025 12:20 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0@ebrewer.bsky.social
Deputy VP at Nuclear Threat Initiative. Previously Director for Counterproliferation at the National Security Council and Deputy National Intelligence Officer for WMD at the National Intelligence Council. Personal account/views my own.
β¦clearly that process began earlier and was driven by other factors (collapse of JCPOA revival talks?). 6/6
22.12.2025 12:20 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 03. This also calls into question the idea that βthe walls closing inβ in late 2024 was a big driver for Iran seeking shortcuts to a bomb. It might have spurred that research again/gave it more urgency, but if this 2023 data point is trueβ¦5/
22.12.2025 12:20 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 1 π 02. Similarly, if you have explicit intelligence Iran is considering making a crude bomb without needing to go to 90+ (which is how this Wapost article reads), this puts Iranian threats to revise its doctrine in 2024 in a different (more credible) light. 4/
22.12.2025 12:20 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 1 π 01. The concern over the buildup of Iranβs 60% stockpile during this time, already warranted, would be even more so if there was explicit intelligence Iran was considering shoving that material into a crude device. 3/
22.12.2025 12:20 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 1 π 0One can imagine a version of events that bridges both of these claims, but if the 2023 data point is true, a few implications. 2/
22.12.2025 12:20 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 1 π 0One of the more interesting bits in this article is the claim that intelligence first emerged in early 2023 that Iran was exploring a faster pathway to a crude nuclear device. Previous reports pegged that development in late 2024/early 2025. 1/
www.washingtonpost.com/national-sec...
Told Francois Murphy that "a strike by the United States could probably cause more damage than an Israeli strike, but in either case you're talking about buying time and there's a real risk that it drives Iran toward rather than away from a bomb.β
www.reuters.com/world/middle...
Lots of focus on what the U.S. end goal should be as part of nuclear talks with Iran. Fair. But Witkoff needs to staff up, and fast. These talks are highly technical and heβs going to need both nuclear and sanctions experts. Doing otherwise is courting disaster.
14.04.2025 20:47 β π 30 π 6 π¬ 3 π 3Sec Wright: βWeβve not reached the details on an agreement, but it certainly looks like there is a pathway to do thatβ¦The issue is control of sensitive technology. Are there solutions to that that involve enrichment here in Saudi Arabia? Yes.β
www.nytimes.com/2025/04/13/w...
βYou can remove centrifuges, but you can't remove that knowledge... Even if you remove those machines and dilute and cap the material, Iran is starting from a much more advanced place today than it was in 2015," says NTI's @ebrewer.bsky.social ‡οΈ
11.04.2025 18:48 β π 1 π 2 π¬ 0 π 0Quoted: βThere is growing doubt among allies and partners about whether the United States will meet its defense commitments when the chips are downβ¦But there are a lot of other systemic factors driving countries to talk about developing nuclear weapons.β
www.politico.com/news/magazin...
bsky.app/profile/ebre...
10.04.2025 22:29 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0As I predicted last week.
www.axios.com/2025/04/10/i...
For example: Bar certain inspectors (which Iran has already done), or bar/any all inspections, which would be a major provocation? Similarly, moving materials to a secure location could be done with IAEA monitoring (not good) or without (really, really bad).
10.04.2025 11:45 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Advisor to the Supreme Leader π
The conditions (βcontinuation of external threats and being in a state of military attackβ) are pretty ambiguous and leave a lot of room for flexibility, as do the threatened consequences.
Sanctioning Iranian entities involved in enrichment ahead of U.S.-Iran talks certainly seems like a signal to Tehran that Washington has no intention of accepting that enrichment program under any agreement.
home.treasury.gov/news/press-r...
A third question: Will maximum pressure continue while diplomacy is underway? I suspect yes, but North Korea under Trump 1.0 offers a counterexample. 3/3
08.04.2025 00:15 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 0 π 0Sticking with the latter would be a recipe for a short negotiation. Another big Q is whether the Trump admin sees this as more of a temperature-taking session or plans to lay out early redlines and/or put something more substantive on the table (my guess is temp-taking). 2/
08.04.2025 00:15 β π 0 π 0 π¬ 1 π 0Far more important than whether US-Iran talks are direct or indirect is how the Trump admin approaches these first meetings. Does it frame its goal as making sure Iran canβt produce a nuclear weapon? Or that Iran needs to dismantle its entire nuclear infrastructure? 1/
08.04.2025 00:15 β π 1 π 0 π¬ 1 π 0So, in order of likelihood, I think we see 3 next, and if that doesnβt work, then back to 2. I think 1 is very unlikely, and remain skeptical or 4. You now have my very public predictions based on current info. Iβll revise as warranted! 12/12
02.04.2025 16:41 β π 32 π 2 π¬ 1 π 0I think this remains a risky option, and is thus unlikely unless Iran determines the US and/or Israel is determined to strike and thereβs no way to prevent it (and even then, I think itβs still more likely Iran weathers the strike and uses it as justification to leave the NPT and weaponize). 11/
02.04.2025 16:41 β π 24 π 1 π¬ 1 π 0Option 4: Cross the nuclear threshold (or come really damn close). The goal would be to establish a reliable deterrent, thus preventing a strike, and strengthen Iranβs negotiation position vis-a-vis the US. Like option 1, this is a βhard exitβ from the current dilemma. 10/
02.04.2025 16:41 β π 29 π 1 π¬ 3 π 0Like #2, itβs unclear whether Israel could talk the US out of it and/or would decide to strike on its own. That said, I think this is probably Iranβs preferred option assuming the status quo canβt last, and the one weβre most likely to see it try in the coming months. 9/
02.04.2025 16:41 β π 28 π 1 π¬ 1 π 0The goal would be to avoid a strike, let snapback expire, retain the key elements of the nuclear program, and keep options open for diplomacy in the future. Iran might also think it can lean on Russia and China (who also donβt want snapback or a strike) to convince the US this is a good option. 8/
02.04.2025 16:41 β π 30 π 1 π¬ 1 π 0Option 3: Try and sell Trump on something short of his maximum demands as a first step (like a JPOA) while promising to continue negotiations to reach a broader/bigger deal. 7/
02.04.2025 16:41 β π 31 π 1 π¬ 1 π 0If/when snapback happens, Iran might moderate its response (eg no 90%) to avoid said strike. The wildcard here is Israel, which Iran will have a much harder time deterring with this strategy. 6/
02.04.2025 16:41 β π 31 π 1 π¬ 1 π 0This is kind of where Iran is at now, though it is exploring Option 3 (below), and I suspect thatβs where it might pivot to next as things heat up. 5/
02.04.2025 16:41 β π 33 π 1 π¬ 1 π 0Option 2: Donβt make a deal, keep the nuclear program more or less on cruise control, and call Trumpβs bluff. This would be betting that Trump cares more about avoiding a war than he does solving the nuclear problem. 4/
02.04.2025 16:41 β π 39 π 1 π¬ 1 π 0I think this is the least likely option, and Khamenei would accept a military strike on Iranβs program over this outcome (and if that happens, use that as justification to leave the NPT and develop weapons). 3/
02.04.2025 16:41 β π 35 π 2 π¬ 1 π 0Option 1: Give in to the maximalist version of Trumpβs demands (abandon the nuclear program, and perhaps other policies of concern) in exchange for significant sanctions relief. 2/
02.04.2025 16:41 β π 31 π 2 π¬ 1 π 0