Gabriela I. Rosa

@olyaoliker.bsky.social Another question is whether this is truly just a Russia thing or a phenomenon found in most militaries. Ask an E6 and an O6 the same question and you are likely to get different answers.

Arguably, it's more about the maybe rather than the definitive assumption that the US is going to fight for NATO allies. The maybe is still very powerful.

Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future | International Crisis Group What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a chan...

I consider this work to be a companion piece to the work I did with @olyaoliker.bsky.social. Check it out here: www.crisisgroup.org/europe-centr... 11/?

Instead, they emphasize the symbolic importance of U.S. strike assets near Russia and the risk of escalation. At the same time, they are increasingly alarmed by Ukraine’s own offensive capabilities, which they interpret as Ukraine becoming a forward base for Western attacks. 10/?

In addition, Russian military thinkers see Western mil assistance to Ukraine as part of a broader strategy to weaken Russia. They view long-range strike weapons as a sign that the West accepts greater risk of direct confrontation, though they doubt these systems are decisive. 9/?

Secondary concerns include the possible proliferation of US strike capabilities in eastern Europe and Scandinavia, as these capabilities could affect Russia’s military assets in the Leningrad military district. 8/?

The proposed Russian response remains focused on escalation control and decisive action to inflict “unacceptable damage.". “Most advocate for space systems that protect nuclear forces and troops, enable rapid orbital launches, and support ground and naval operations.”
7/?

The development PGS programs also continues to be a concern along with space-based intelligence and denial capabilities. This concern is embedded in the broader scenario of a massed aerospace attack, a staple of Soviet military thinking. 6/?

In response, many argue for sustained investment in offensive strategic systems capable of overcoming or saturating US missile defenses. Others pose that Moscow should bolster its own missile defense capabilities. 5/?

Even though many observers doubt that the project can be implemented as envisioned, for now, military-analytical thinking about Golden Dome remains consistent with previous assumptions about the development of US BMD capabilities. 4/?

Several recurring threats are identified in Russian strategic writing. These include U.S. ballistic missile defense projects such as the envisioned “Golden Dome,” Prompt Global Strike programs, and space-based intelligence and denial capabilities. 3/?

Rather than introducing fundamentally new assessments, military discourse tends to reinterpret established concerns through the lens of ongoing conflict. In effect, Russia's experience in Ukraine has not altered Russia's security anxieties but has instead amplified them. 2/?

In this new @CNA_org report, I analyze how authoritative figures in the Russian mil view threats in the wake of the war in Ukraine. The key insight: Traditional Russian threat perceptions haven't shifted — they've been sharpened. 1/?
www.cna.org/analyses/202...

Stay tuned to this space for more cool work on Russian strategic thinking that will be out in the next two months. 6/fin?

Lastly, Russia’s reliance on the Initial Period of War as a strategic linchpin means that nations must continue to develop advanced systems capable of providing strategic and tactical indications and warning. 5/?

In essence, they argue that their concepts were correct all along and that the failure of the Russian military in Ukraine is due to poor planning and operationalization of valid and long-standing concepts combined with massive and unforeseen Western support for Ukraine. 4/?

Russian military elites have chosen to address emerging military challenges with a peculiar mixture of confirmation bias and technological fetishism. 3/?

Instead, for most Russian military elites, the war appears to confirm prewar conclusions regarding the character of armed conflict, despite the unexpected setbacks incurred by Russian forces during the war. 2/?

Russian Concepts of Future Warfare Based on Lessons from the Ukraine War This paper examines the evolution of military strategy and conventional operations over the Russia-Ukraine War.

In this report, my colleagues, @michaelbpetersen.bsky.social, Paul Schwartz, and I argue that despite its technical-tactical innovation in its war against Ukr, Russia still approaches a potential war w/ NATO with the same operational assumptions it had before 2022. 1/?
www.cna.org/analyses/202...

Come visit us at AMSUS.

If you're at ISA 2025 tomorrow, my partner in crime, @alxgraef from @ifshhamburg.bsky.social will be presenting a rough draft of our paper at a panel from 1:45pm-3:30pm titled "The Karaganov Debate: Experts, the Public Sphere and Nuclear Policymaking in Russia." Go check it out.

We also have them and have access to some virtually not via east view but it is annoying when the physical copies are delayed by 3 months.

Big same. This is what I’ve been telling Dmitry.

Sergey Rogov dedicated a good bit of his life to trying to advance, and more lately save, prospects for arms control, even as his health declined. Always intelligent, often infuriating, and never unwilling to talk. I agree with Andrey--this is a big loss.

Glad to have contribute to this and to have had the opportunity to collaborate with my amazing mentor, @olyaoliker.bsky.social. Interested in European security and what happens next?

Read here:

www.crisisgroup.org/europe-centr...

The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship The Russia-Iran relationship has changed over the past decade, and this report examines the relationship in temporal and thematic dimensions.

Hot off the press. We had to wait a while to get this out but check out the great work of my colleagues:
www.cna.org/reports/2025...

Last week, my colleague @sambendett.bsky.social, @exit266.bsky.social, and I took to twitter spaces to discuss Russian military medicine in Ukraine along with UGV/UAV developments.

Listen to our discussion here: x.com/sambendett/s...

Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears Moscow’s nuclear weapons doctrine is at an inflection point. This report examines the debates in Russia about the ineffectiveness of nuclear weapons threats.

A good day to reiterate our work on Russian domestic debates about the credibility of nuclear threats and potential nuclear employment.

See our work here if you want to read about how the events that took place today are part of an ongoing conversation since early 2022:
www.cna.org/reports/2024...

On the evolution of Russian military medicine since 2022, by @gabrielairosa.bsky.social for CNA. Really informative. Check it out.

Moscow is also building new military medical facilities, involving volunteer groups to rectify material shortages, placing medical personnel closer to the front line to stabilize the wounded before casualty evacuation— despite the risk of being targeted by enemy weapons. 6/?