Gabriela I. Rosa

The tl;dr: We should not view Minsk simply as a passive client. It’s actively shaping the significance of nuclear deployments on its territory, although there are limits to this. In the words of @olyaoliker.bsky.social, Belarus is either super fascinating or a huge psy-op. 3/?

When Nuclear Weapons Return to Belarus: Evolving Concepts in Russian Escalation Strategy The deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to Belarus marks an important shift in Russia’s nuclear posture.

This piece builds on findings from our latest report for CNA in which we examined what the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus means for Russia's escalation management strategy.
www.cna.org/analyses/202... 2/?

@dexeve.bsky.social and I wrote this piece a while ago for
@bulletinatomic.bsky.social. In it, we propose interpreting the Russia-Belarusian nuclear sharing agreement along with Minsk's behavior surrounding it as a tool for the political survival of the Lukashenko regime. 1/?

The deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus marks Moscow’s effort to adapt its deterrence posture to a shifting geopolitical landscape by evolving its escalation management strategy, analyze @gabrielairosa.bsky.social, @dexeve.bsky.social & Paul Schwartz @cna.org 6/10

tl; dr @dexeve.bsky.social and I had a conversation in the hallway and decided to do something cool. 10/?

Again, some argue that this complicated Russia’s ability to develop a coherent escalation strategy. Overall, Russia is experimenting with different concepts and measures to enhance its coercive credibility. Russian nukes in Belarus are just one example of this trend. 9/?

Such changes are intended to prevent a recurrence of what happened in Ukr, when Moscow found itself embroiled in a hybrid conflict which some argue did not clearly meet the criteria of either a local war or a regional war. 8/?

Although direct linkages to the agreement are less clear in other articles, Russian military scholars are also proposing changes to the system of conflict typologies; to include new concepts of proxy war considering they are expecting more proxy-conflicts w/ the West. 7/?

These actions such as these were carried out in one form of another during the operationalization of the Belarus nuclear sharing agreement. 6/?

These include demonstrations of military capabilities, increases in combat readiness, demonstrative weapons tests, combined military exercises, force deployments to threatened border areas, and similar measures. 5/?

Yet, we also found strong indications of continuity in the nuclear sharing agreement. For one, the measures taken to operational the new agreement were largely consistent with those prescribed in Russia’s prewar escalation management strategy for the demonstration phase. 4/?

Indeed, Russia agreeing to a nuclear-sharing arrangement with Belarus was not on anyone's bingo card as Moscow was categorically opposed to such agreements, arguing that NATO’s nuclear-sharing agreements were contrary to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 3/?

@dexeve.bsky.social and I show that Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus function as an extension of Russia’s force, reflecting both enduring and evolving elements of its escalation management framework. 2/?

In our latest, @dexeve.bsky.social and I change it up by combining an analysis of satellite imagery and military writings to assess what the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus means for Russia's escalation management strategy. 1/?
www.cna.org/analyses/202...

@olyaoliker.bsky.social Another question is whether this is truly just a Russia thing or a phenomenon found in most militaries. Ask an E6 and an O6 the same question and you are likely to get different answers.

Arguably, it's more about the maybe rather than the definitive assumption that the US is going to fight for NATO allies. The maybe is still very powerful.

Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future | International Crisis Group What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a chan...

I consider this work to be a companion piece to the work I did with @olyaoliker.bsky.social. Check it out here: www.crisisgroup.org/europe-centr... 11/?

Instead, they emphasize the symbolic importance of U.S. strike assets near Russia and the risk of escalation. At the same time, they are increasingly alarmed by Ukraine’s own offensive capabilities, which they interpret as Ukraine becoming a forward base for Western attacks. 10/?

In addition, Russian military thinkers see Western mil assistance to Ukraine as part of a broader strategy to weaken Russia. They view long-range strike weapons as a sign that the West accepts greater risk of direct confrontation, though they doubt these systems are decisive. 9/?

Secondary concerns include the possible proliferation of US strike capabilities in eastern Europe and Scandinavia, as these capabilities could affect Russia’s military assets in the Leningrad military district. 8/?

The proposed Russian response remains focused on escalation control and decisive action to inflict “unacceptable damage.". “Most advocate for space systems that protect nuclear forces and troops, enable rapid orbital launches, and support ground and naval operations.”
7/?

The development PGS programs also continues to be a concern along with space-based intelligence and denial capabilities. This concern is embedded in the broader scenario of a massed aerospace attack, a staple of Soviet military thinking. 6/?

In response, many argue for sustained investment in offensive strategic systems capable of overcoming or saturating US missile defenses. Others pose that Moscow should bolster its own missile defense capabilities. 5/?

Even though many observers doubt that the project can be implemented as envisioned, for now, military-analytical thinking about Golden Dome remains consistent with previous assumptions about the development of US BMD capabilities. 4/?

Several recurring threats are identified in Russian strategic writing. These include U.S. ballistic missile defense projects such as the envisioned “Golden Dome,” Prompt Global Strike programs, and space-based intelligence and denial capabilities. 3/?

Rather than introducing fundamentally new assessments, military discourse tends to reinterpret established concerns through the lens of ongoing conflict. In effect, Russia's experience in Ukraine has not altered Russia's security anxieties but has instead amplified them. 2/?

In this new @CNA_org report, I analyze how authoritative figures in the Russian mil view threats in the wake of the war in Ukraine. The key insight: Traditional Russian threat perceptions haven't shifted — they've been sharpened. 1/?
www.cna.org/analyses/202...

Stay tuned to this space for more cool work on Russian strategic thinking that will be out in the next two months. 6/fin?

Lastly, Russia’s reliance on the Initial Period of War as a strategic linchpin means that nations must continue to develop advanced systems capable of providing strategic and tactical indications and warning. 5/?

In essence, they argue that their concepts were correct all along and that the failure of the Russian military in Ukraine is due to poor planning and operationalization of valid and long-standing concepts combined with massive and unforeseen Western support for Ukraine. 4/?