Daniel Drucker

Portrait of a Young DOGE Coder Dismantling America’s Institutions Luke Farritor could have been an artist, or a builder, or someone dedicated to seeing a great historical mystery through. Instead he wound up at the Department of Government Efficiency, slashing, dism...

www.bloomberg.com/features/202... It seemed people tried (Scott Henderson reached out to his father "Is this true? As a father of a son the same age, you can do something about this. If this is true, what are you going to do about this?" An artist mentor (Charley Friedman) did too, no response.)

Is there reason to think extending it from belief to knowledge is plausible? (I think it's not plausible even for belief, but I find it even weirder in the knowledge case.)

There’s something in the vicinity that I find plausible, that maybe Kp requires stronger evidence than p does, of the same kind. But how it can avoid needing any narrowly psychological evidence at all is beyond me.

Nope, no difference — that does indeed sound wrong.

‘In’, for sure.

I like to think most of them are further pseudonyms of Professor Rails.

Sometimes he got it totally wrong what creatures' natures were, or what was good for creatures with those natures. In some cases that was egregious (e.g., 'natural 'slaves'). But the mistake isn't to read off ought from is, but rather to make horrible inferences about underlying nature.

I guess I just don't think that's a mistake he makes. He does think what's good _for_ a kind of creature depends on what kind of creature that is, but at some level that's obvious (cold weather is good for penguins but not for cobras, etc.).

Aristotle thought what was best for us by our nature were lives of theoretical contemplation only made possible by advanced civilization.

Sometimes I worry that it feels this way because people who are vocal on the subject and get pick up to be dunked on, gawked at etc. are more 2 than 1?

I guess I think biscuit conditionals are just regular conditionals with relevance implicatures, and I'm wary of treating 'fuck' as implicitly illocutionary rather than object-level, but this is an interesting and important option to consider.

Land of the Giants: Delivery Wars Podcast Episode · Decoder with Nilay Patel · 07/06/2021 · 34m

podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/l... I thought this was good

It drives me nuts that the whole essay is this criticism of overly ideological philosophy that leads to worse philosophy, and then they don't give literally any space to people who think of woman as a social kind like parent, son, etc.

There's a slide I see, e.g. in the recent essay. I get wanting one's opposition not to just take it for granted that W ≠ AHF, but they write as though they expect their opposition to take it for granted that W = AHF. Objecting to begging the question is one thing, but don't then do it yourself.

Reading the article that set off the most recent round of this shit, I think Williamson being liberal on trans stuff specifically disappoints them lol

I think they want the fancy people at fancy places who "got there on merit" to respect them. It's not that they especially respect these people, insofar as they think they're cowards who won't say what they obviously know, but my sense is that they nevertheless respect them "enough" for this.

Their way would be that the majority of philosophers they respect (you know the ones) say openly that their arguments are right and important. They won't be happy until that happens, is my guess, and it won't ever happen.

Really interesting stuff, thanks for sharing.

That said, I get that these are difficult matters, and I certainly don't have a knockdown argument for anything besides differing evidential bases (i.e., I can't show even in the eye color case it's not even implicitly general or historical). I just find that a less natural hypothesis I guess.

Yeah, but it's not really about the difficulty with it, but rather in the case of my friend, I _do_ have to think in implicitly general or historical terms. ("Someone situated in clear view of someone's eyes, who is not relevantly color blind, and who trusts their vision, will on this basis...")

Like, suppose I thought my friend had blue eyes, but then I look and realize they're green. Don't I know, just based on my conscious introspection, that the reason why I now think they're green is because I just saw them? Do I have to think about myself in general, historical terms to know that?

Well, I wonder how much this is just Hume's idea that there's no direct perception of causation in any case? I'm not sure I agree (some people think we can perceive causes, so why not mental ones?), but I just wanted to emphasize that the evidence bases between me and others is very different.

I would distinguish between infallibility and sameness-of-method. I am not saying our reasoning processes are not often opaque to us. Rather, I am saying we have important evidence for our beliefs and decisions in our own case we don't with others: our conscious reasoning processes.

I think it's just really hard for me to judge proportions here. Most of the stuff we do during the day is really explicable by quite conscious goals and beliefs/reasoning (have to be at this meeting by this time, need to feed the dogs, etc.).

But don't I at least often (not always!) have direct access to my own reasoning processes? That was my original worry about even this claim. Obviously confabulation is possible, but in many cases, I just go through some conscious reasoning and then do exactly as you'd expect given the reasoning.

Right, we’re very fallible about this like most other subject matters. I was just objecting to a strong claim, because in fact we’re really really good at introspection across a wide range of beliefs, probably most, so I wondered what the claim really could be.

This just seems way too strong to me. Of course sometimes we know why we believe what we believe (we read a proof, we saw the color of our friend's shirt and now believe it's red, etc.) Perhaps you mean "often we don't know why we believe what we believe"?

Sorry, to be clear, you're saying humans don't know why we reach conclusions? So if I reason consciously to myself ("if it was the butler, he would've been in town on the fifth, but he wasn't, so...", I don't know why I concluded it wasn't the butler?

Imo that's throwing the baby out with the bathwater. You can accept the possibility of ineffability — ultimately a thesis about what's expressible — without accepting the possibility of physical duplicates that differ in consciousness.

I'm not sure I see what the relation between ineffability and dualism would be. Even if physicalism were true and somehow consciousness were reducible to the behavior of physical stuffs, why should the (physical) laws that produce raw feels be articulable?