Alec Worsnop

For anyone interested, my book Rebels in the Field is now available to order with a 30% discount. Use code AUFLY30 here: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/9780197817933. In addition, Chapter 1 is available for free until November 24 here: https://academic.oup.com/book/60727/chapter-abstract/5

It's easy to see this speech as just weirdly performative, but there's a lot more—and a lot worse—going on here.

The meeting & speeches are part of a larger project aimed at promoting the military leadership’s partisan alignment with the administration.

How? 1/

👋 Kent State grad here with 26+ years in the Guard and Reserve.

It draws on my forthcoming book, Rebels in the Field. In an interview with me, a US SF officer put this research in context: ‘I just don’t understand our military’s baseline assumption that insurgents aren’t “real” forces who train and fight well, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary’

To fight this way, I argue that insurgents, like any other military actor, need capable small units that can fire and maneuver without suffering extensive losses. This requires skilled and committed small-unit combat leaders who plan operations, train fighters, and generate task-based cohesion

Rebels fire and maneuver too: How small-unit combat leaders sustain guerrilla warfare Guerrilla warfare is perhaps the most iconic strategy that less powerful insurgents have employed to defeat, or at least stymie, much stronger fighting forces. While many have identified the strate...

I have a new publication out in the Journal of Strategic Studies. It observes that while many have identified the strategic benefits of guerrilla warfare, there is much less understanding of why some organizations have the military capacity to implement these strategies and others do not.

The book is available here
global.oup.com/academic/pro...

Interestingly, these leadership changes were inadvertently aided by the US decapitation campaign, which removed many leaders who opposed reform.

It was only after the Taliban introduced a cadre of small-unit combat leaders, which they referred to as nizami massuleen, that their ability to fight began a to improve.

Illustratively, the Taliban’s long-standing social, political, and ideological foundations created resistance to tactical adaptation and improvements in military training and preparation.

This means that the social, material, and political endowments that insurgents can draw upon do not result in meaningful combat power on their own. It is what insurgents do with what they have that matters.

And military cadres are central to how rebels can benefit from weapons, sanctuary, or external support. Military cadres plan operations, generate force through training, and create task-based cohesion, uniting fighters around shared expectations of competence and trust.

Cadres represent a missing link needed to activate many processes identified in the study of civil war. For example, political cadres are a central factor in explaining when processes such as political education, indoctrination, and discipline work.

Without any type of cadres, the theory explains how some organizations can only employ simple (though still meaningful) forms of military power. But, to fight with more complex forms of military power, I argue that a cadre is fundamental.

To explain variation in military power, I propose the "cadre theory" - which argues military power is a function of how rebels forge connections. Small-unit leaders, I argue, create the strongest connections.

Drawing on evidence from the Taliban after 2001 and 17 organizations in Iraq (2003-present) and Vietnam (1945-1975), the book develops a novel spectrum of what insurgents actually do on the battlefield.

The book is motivated by the puzzle of how the Taliban turned from a broken organization to an effective military force. More broadly, how should we describe variation in insurgent military power? Why can some insurgents deploy these various forms of power on the battlefield while others can't?

I'm excited to share that my book, Rebels in the Field, will be coming out with Oxford University Press this summer. The book focuses on the military processes involved in deploying force in substate conflicts.

Risa is a preeminent scholar of U.S. and comparative civil-military relations. As a rule, if she takes the time to write it, I take the time to read it. #civmilsky

This is a great resource for aspiring military writers. The Harding Project and Army University Press put together a top-notch product. It was a pleasure to make a small contribution that reviews the earliest US Army professional journals. Check it out!
www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Mil...

Excited to share the latest from me, @risabrooks12.bsky.social, and @eclipticevader.bsky.social in TNSR which centers on a novel survey of retired flag officers and features a framework to assess the state of the norm against retired officer political activism. (1/2)

tnsr.org/2023/11/spea...

Totally agree. It's a notable challenge to sort this out, but it's meaningful. The article mostly discusses the role of political integration in shaping the military, but there are plenty of insurgent examples (eg, the LTTE), where the military embeds cadre in the political wing to establish control

@profmusgrave.bsky.social could I be added to the Polisky list? Thank you!

I do think that when the political and military leadership is separated, in this case in different countries, it can shape the power dynamics of insurgent civ-mil -- often strengthening military leaders. @judah-grunstein.bsky.social, happy to send the AFS article, I'm at aworsnop@umd.edu CivMilSky