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31.07.2025 09:37 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0@andrewprlevi.bsky.social
▫️Technology investor, former diplomat and corporate executive▫️“Top” New York Times▫️“Leading” Der Spiegel▫️“Senior” BBC▫️“Valued” Financial Times▫️“Persona non grata” Vladimir Putin▫️
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31.07.2025 09:37 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0I concede that if the definition of success in 1948 was that Israel should still exist decades later, it was achieved.
But that’s rather like saying the fact Serbia & Croatia exist & haven’t been “taken over by Muslims” vindicates Serbian/Yugoslav & Croatian actions against Bosniaks in the 90s.
Consensus ≠ right or best.
No it didn’t happen. That ≠ what did happen having “worked” in its own terms or otherwise.
Mine is indeed a counterfactual perspective.
That things happened the way they did isn’t “trouble”, it’s the starting point for analysing decisions, events and their consequences.
But: there are no good reasons - although plenty of bad ones, such as racism and post-hoc propagandistic justification of the unjustifiable - to assume Israel would not have been founded, would not have survived and would not have prospered had the right and decent choices been made in 1948. /9. End
30.07.2025 17:34 — 👍 2 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0That choice was a bad one. Israel has, for sure, survived and in many ways prospered.
Counterfactuals are, by their nature, unprovable in such cases. /8.
They chose to do so. Partly out of (grim) expediency: easier, cheaper and quicker to do that than to negotiate and cooperate. Partly, for some, out of disdain toward, shading into hatred of, those they killed, injured and displaced. /7.
30.07.2025 17:33 — 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0So here’s my take. The founders of Israel had no need to kill and displace the people they did. (Some casualties were unavoidable under the fraught circumstances of the time, including a security vacuum left by Britain. But that’s a different matter). /6.
30.07.2025 17:32 — 👍 2 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0Best avoid them altogether. Again, better alternatives …
Still, I expect you’re scratching your head wondering why I don’t tell you what I think the effect of the events of 1948 was, and why, beyond the gruesome facts of which we’re all aware, I wouldn’t see it as a “success” in its own terms. /5.
But to express oneself in such a manner - even in the context of judging actions in the terms set by the perpetrators - without the most careful, sensitive and knowledgeable explanation of essential context to accompany those words is, in my view, both irresponsible and disrespectful. /4.
30.07.2025 17:30 — 👍 2 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0Industrially, systematically, brutalising, dispossessing and murdering 6 million Jews, for example, could - revoltingly - be considered to have “worked” and been a “success” measured against objectives agreed at the Wannsee Conference, or earlier set out in Mein Kampf. /3.
30.07.2025 17:29 — 👍 2 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0Assessing a policy, or set of actions, in its own terms takes us to an often darker place, where we consequently need to be exceedingly careful what we’re talking about and how we’re expressing ourselves. /2.
30.07.2025 17:26 — 👍 2 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0I wouldn’t use the term “work” for a policy which involved mass killing and ethnic cleansing, wherever or at whose hand it took place. Full stop. Other words are available. /1.
30.07.2025 17:25 — 👍 3 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0Your choice.
For my part, I’d take very great care.
Of course, it’s right for high quality journalistic sources, reporting in good faith, to inform their readers of what is being said and done even (or sometimes especially) if it’s deeply inappropriate or disturbing.
Thanks to you both.
300 characters may indeed be a suboptimal format.
On the substance, I’m more of the view that the tactics employed in 1948 didn’t “work”, then or subsequently, even in their own terms.
The use of the word “solution” in this context is problematic & should, IMHO, be avoided.
It’s Israeli public opinion (or was: that has now changed).
Public opinion wasn’t the issue, in fact it was a force which tended toward a decent outcome for all.
Entirely understandable fear of making an irrecoverable error, plus the determination of extreme political factions, was.
In July 2023 polling recorded 60% support among “Israeli Jews” for peace, based on a two-state solution or a single state with full equal rights for all, and 67% support for restoring Gaza to Palestinian Authority control and mobilising the international community for Gaza rehabilitation.
29.07.2025 20:49 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0Not really.
Israeli public opinion in summer 2023 was pretty positive about Palestinian statehood alongside Israel.
It’s almost as though those who launched the 7 October attack knew that.
“Decimation”, literally or more loosely defined, is a grotesque act. To the extent it’s an accurate term for events in 1948, effectively praising it is horrifying & wrong.
It wasn’t a “solution” & didn’t “work”. Unless one perversely redefines each word way beyond its reasonable definition.
I didn’t intend any trickery, but just so we’re clear: that’s a version of “no solution”.
Still, I understand. Art of the possible and all that.
What I understand less is why that should preclude efforts, however faint the hope of success may often seem, toward a two state solution.
If not a two state solution, what solution should we be aiming for?
No solution?
Continuation, broadly, of the status quo, but with whatever (presumably relatively minor) improvements can be achieved from time to time? Which? How obtained, and sustained?
One state? Whose?
Something else? What?
The US does indeed have to be the one to clear up any mess they may have created. We can’t do it.
That’s different from saying that the vital role the US plays in European defence, without which Europe would be defenceless for a decade, should just be assumed to be “over”.
Non sequitur, IMHO.
I’m lost now. Sorry.
28.07.2025 20:12 — 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0I understand where you’re coming from.
I’d point out, though, that numerous countries - Germany, France, Poland, even the likes of Italy, also Scandinavian countries, others - NATO Secretary General etc. aren’t “British Aristocracy”, but are working on similar principles to those I’ve implied.
Depends what existential or otherwise crucial influence Toad has over Ratty’s and Mole’s futures; and whether and to what extent Ratty and Mole reckon there’s something of those important (or vital) issues they have at least a chance of salvaging.
28.07.2025 17:59 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0The underlying problem with both is the inherent assumption that the UK, or European countries, individually or collectively, are able, through choices they make, to affect, one way or the other, whether a US politician becomes or remains president, or is successful (or not) in the job. They aren’t.
28.07.2025 17:00 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0Another good interview by @tomfletcherun.bsky.social
All the requirements he points to are correct and essential.
It’s unlikely any statements, in public or behind the scenes, from Europe, have influenced the circumstances on the ground.
US pressure - public, private - is a different matter.
I don’t understand the utility of recognition now, other than, perhaps, as a belated admission recognition should’ve happened decades ago (otherwise not until a deal is imminent); or as a convenient tool for (G7) leaders now under domestic political pressure.
Maybe I’m missing something. /3. End
There’s also a pretty good argument for holding off until negotiations on a long-term deal are in their final stages, when the prospect of recognition might be a powerful incentive (with the Palestinian side) to get the deal over the line. /2.
28.07.2025 16:40 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0I, too, think it’s a big deal in principle, although I’m less convinced it’s a big (and positive) deal right now.
There’s a strong argument that recognition should have happened ages ago: it’s fundamental to the logic of supporting a two-state solution. /1.
Not just defence (although I agree).
More generally: it’s better for governments to spend adequately on important stuff - and there’s plenty of it - even if the spending is somewhat inefficient, than to spend inadequately in those areas, with all the negative, resultant likely consequences.