totally different question (and at a different time)--the Krass opinion was about whether the *initiation* wo congressional authorization was constitutional. You can believe -- OLC did -- that it was but that the WPR required withdrawal after 60 days.
28.02.2026 16:31 — 👍 1 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0didn't sign off on what theory?
28.02.2026 16:11 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0... and because here the POTUS is causing the U.S. to breach the Charter (which, IMHO, the Constitution does not allow absent statutory authority).
28.02.2026 15:54 — 👍 3 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0I have serious doubts about the two "nature/scope/duration" grafs of the Libya opinion (pp. 37-39)--particularly its reliance on the Kosovo campaign, which was likely unconstitutional--but, in any event, this action is significantly distinguishable in terms of the risks of "escalation" ...
28.02.2026 15:54 — 👍 4 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0I'm afraid, therefore, that if the judge imposes contempt sanctions for conduct that doesn't violate an actual injunction, those sanctions likely won't be sustained. [4]
28.02.2026 15:45 — 👍 10 🔁 1 💬 2 📌 0Absent a class action or a valid "universal" injunction, a district court does not have any "equitable authority to prevent the same defendants from engaging in the same unconstitutional conduct again" with respect to nonparties. [3]
28.02.2026 15:45 — 👍 7 🔁 1 💬 1 📌 0The judges' outrage here is completely understandable, but Judge Goodwin is mistaken to assume that district courts' "constitutional rulings" as to particular plaintiffs "govern the conduct of federal officers operating within the jurisdiction of this court" with respect to *other persons.* [1]
28.02.2026 15:45 — 👍 15 🔁 4 💬 2 📌 0I don't understand what effect "has specific law on its side" is supposed to do, in a case where, as here, that "specific law" imposes no such limitations.
28.02.2026 15:23 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0I don't think 2(c) is either a statutory prohibition or a conditional statutory authorization. It's expressly a statement about Congress' view on the scope of "[t]he constitutional powers of the President."
28.02.2026 15:21 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0
If plain text were enough, the controversies in Elk and Wong Kim Ark would never have arisen. My initial take on this aspect of the case here:
www.justsecurity.org/119104/takin...
Raffi: I agree that it ought to be an extremely easy case, in large measure because of the three-branch settlement Jamal describes. The problem w/relying solely on the text, though, is that the "STJT" clause must be given some effect that explains the conceded diplomat and tribal exceptions. [1]
28.02.2026 15:18 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0Sorry, I lost you there.
28.02.2026 15:01 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 2 📌 0
In case anyone was wondering what "'war' in the constitutional sense" looks like ...
www.justice.gov/d9/olc/opini...
Not just OLC. No one in Congress, and few if any outside it, understood it to be a statutory limitation.
28.02.2026 14:52 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0Sure, if 2(c) had been written as a statutory prohibition. But it wasn't, because if it had been there wouldn't have been the votes to override Nixon's veto. The entire rest of the statute is drafted on the assumption that 2(c) is not itself independently binding.
28.02.2026 14:50 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0... I think it's vitally important to explain why these attacks are unlawful (under both the Constitution and the Charter). But I think it doesn't help matters--indeed, I think it hurts them--to invoke 2(c). No one unconvinced by the Charter/Constitution arguments will/should be swayed by the WPR.
28.02.2026 14:24 — 👍 2 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0Well, it's "embodied" in a statute, sure. But I don't think it's useful to say that acting inconsistent with it is a "violation" of law any more than it would be to act inconsistently with a statutory "finding." Besides which, virtually no one thinks 2(c) is correct. Don't get me wrong ... [1]
28.02.2026 14:24 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0Violating a congressional "interpretation" isn't a violation of "current law." This is certainly unconstitutional, and even more certainly breaches the Charter, but not because of Section 2 of the WPR.
28.02.2026 12:46 — 👍 2 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0
I know this isn't the most important aspect of this alarming action, but, simply from a legal perspective, what would be worse: if the administration offers a formal argument that the attacks don't violate the Constitution and/or the UN Charter, or if it doesn't?
@justsecurity.org
Of course not.
28.02.2026 12:35 — 👍 2 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0This obviously violates the Constitution and the Charter, Niko. Which is more than bad enough. But it doesn't (yet) violate the War Powers Resolution, Sec. 2 of which doesn't impose any substantive limitations.
28.02.2026 12:21 — 👍 3 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 1
This is an extremely important piece by @jacklgoldsmith.bsky.social about the evisceration of legal norms and processes (and workforce) within DOD. Similar things happening at DOJ, the IC, etc., but the effects at DOD are as calamitous as anywhere.
www.execfunctions.org/p/the-decayi...
No. Not even close.
www.nytimes.com/2026/02/22/o...
Department of presidential euphemism:
"In light of recent events, ..."
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential...
Who says the SCOTUS is reluctant to weigh in on war powers questions? From the IEEPA decision today: "The United States ... is not at war with every nation in the world." So there.
20.02.2026 19:24 — 👍 80 🔁 21 💬 3 📌 0Yes, it is--like everthing Jamal writes.
20.02.2026 03:17 — 👍 0 🔁 0 💬 0 📌 0
The ACLU's brief for the plaintiffs in the birthright citizenship case.
www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25...
Fear not: He's not abandoning the absurd UE theory in any respect (alas). The names "Wilcox" and "Slaughter" don't appear. He's merely saying that Trump is asserting some *substantive* powers that haven't been conferred by Article II or by statute (duh).
19.02.2026 12:25 — 👍 2 🔁 0 💬 1 📌 0
I have a bit more here to supplement that account, focused mostly on further examples of the Executive Branch's views and practice between 1898 and 1940 (and explaining why DOJ's allegedly contrary sources don't amount to much).
www.justsecurity.org/121397/birth...
