Marty Lederman

And it's an anti-semitic trope at that! So they're now furiously trying to retract. Comeuppance.

Either the SG didn’t tell the WH before refusing to approve appeal in the law firm cases (almost unthinkable), or he did and then capitulated after Trump changed his mind last night. Either way, it’s difficult to imagine him retaining credibility and respect in his building or with the Court. Yikes.

Is it possible that Sauer decided not to authorize appeal without telling the WH? Seems very, very unlikely. But what other explanation is there?

Is it possible that Sauer decided not to authorize appeal without telling the WH? Seems very, very unlikely. But what other explanation is there?

Is it possible that Sauer decided not to authorize appeal without telling the WH? Seems very, very unlikely. But what other explanation is there?

YCMTSU.

Of course, it’s exactly what to expect from this crew. Which is why the lion’s share of the moral outrage should be directed at Senate Republicans, who facilitated this knowing full well what the results could be.

newrepublic.com/post/207263/...

Kash Patel gutted FBI counterintelligence team tasked with tracking Iranian threats days before US strikes, sources say | CNN Politics Just days before the United States launched a major military operation in Iran, FBI Director Kash Patel fired a dozen agents and staff members from a counterintelligence unit tasked with monitoring th...

YCMTSU.

Of course, it’s exactly what to expect from this crew. Which is why the lion’s share of the moral outrage should be directed at Senate Republicans, who facilitated this knowing full well with the results could be.

www.cnn.com/2026/03/03/p...

And they try to affect legal developments in very different ways: the ABA mostly through amicus briefs; FedSoc by cultivating future judges. One tactic has obviously been far more effective than the other. Neither is illegitimate. [2]

I don't think either organization is (fairly) perceived as either "neutral" or "partisan." They each have memberships that are substantially inclined to support and advance certain substantive legal views rather than others. [1]

Turns out I didn't have to agonize about whether to teach the Law of Religion or the Law of the Use of Military Force this semester--I could've simply consolidated them. Separation of powers and separation of church and state--equally obsolete!

... even though he could be a legitimate target in an armed conflict, because killing him was done not to secure a direct and concrete military advantage but specifically for purposes of regime change--the classic scenario the Assassination Ban was designed to prohibit. Not really close questions.

In addition to the fact that the campaign is unconstitutional and breaches the Charter (which is US domestic law), and that any aid to targeting civilians such as Ahmadinejad would violate the LOAC and the Assassination Ban, assisting the targeting of Khamenei also violated the Ban, ... [1]

Schmederalism.

Well, as with the higher ed extortion, the damage is done even though they've known all along that they didn't have a legal leg to stand on. Many firms, like schools, have been chilled and aren't about to go back to business as usual even with the assurance of legal right.

Seems like a million years ago, but if you're still interested in knowing more about the SCOTUS decision on IEEPA and tariffs ...

totally different question (and at a different time)--the Krass opinion was about whether the *initiation* wo congressional authorization was constitutional. You can believe -- OLC did -- that it was but that the WPR required withdrawal after 60 days.

didn't sign off on what theory?

... and because here the POTUS is causing the U.S. to breach the Charter (which, IMHO, the Constitution does not allow absent statutory authority).

I have serious doubts about the two "nature/scope/duration" grafs of the Libya opinion (pp. 37-39)--particularly its reliance on the Kosovo campaign, which was likely unconstitutional--but, in any event, this action is significantly distinguishable in terms of the risks of "escalation" ...

I'm afraid, therefore, that if the judge imposes contempt sanctions for conduct that doesn't violate an actual injunction, those sanctions likely won't be sustained. [4]

Absent a class action or a valid "universal" injunction, a district court does not have any "equitable authority to prevent the same defendants from engaging in the same unconstitutional conduct again" with respect to nonparties. [3]

The judges' outrage here is completely understandable, but Judge Goodwin is mistaken to assume that district courts' "constitutional rulings" as to particular plaintiffs "govern the conduct of federal officers operating within the jurisdiction of this court" with respect to *other persons.* [1]

I don't understand what effect "has specific law on its side" is supposed to do, in a case where, as here, that "specific law" imposes no such limitations.

I don't think 2(c) is either a statutory prohibition or a conditional statutory authorization. It's expressly a statement about Congress' view on the scope of "[t]he constitutional powers of the President."

Taking Stock of the Birthright Citizenship Cases, Part II: Making Sense of the Three Established Exceptions Analysis of the aftermath of Trump v CASA and the pending litigation about the Trump executive order on birthright citizenship.

If plain text were enough, the controversies in Elk and Wong Kim Ark would never have arisen. My initial take on this aspect of the case here:

www.justsecurity.org/119104/takin...

Raffi: I agree that it ought to be an extremely easy case, in large measure because of the three-branch settlement Jamal describes. The problem w/relying solely on the text, though, is that the "STJT" clause must be given some effect that explains the conceded diplomat and tribal exceptions. [1]

Sorry, I lost you there.

In case anyone was wondering what "'war' in the constitutional sense" looks like ...

www.justice.gov/d9/olc/opini...

Not just OLC. No one in Congress, and few if any outside it, understood it to be a statutory limitation.

Sure, if 2(c) had been written as a statutory prohibition. But it wasn't, because if it had been there wouldn't have been the votes to override Nixon's veto. The entire rest of the statute is drafted on the assumption that 2(c) is not itself independently binding.