سوريا.. تعميم يعيد العمال المفصولين إلى وظائفهم أصدرت وزارة التنمية الإدارية في حكومة تسيير الأعمال تعميمًا للعاملين في الجهات العامة، الذين فصلهم نظام الأسد المخلوع من العمل. وقال مسؤول مكتب وزارة أصدرت وزارة التنمية الإدارية في حكومة تسيير الأعما...

The Sharaa government promises to rehire ministry employees fired for political reasons in the Assad era, while planning 400% pay hikes. But the state seems to be more or less broke? Unless foreign donors step in, the economic situation could turn sour quickly. www.enabbaladi.net/730534/%D8%B...

Drop me a line if you want to read the paper. We’re currently looking at cabinet-level appointments globally post-revolution and have a detailed analysis of Egypt post-1952, when 300 junior officers seized power with no prior experience in state administration

We’d also expect promotions of junior officials into elite positions, along with small numbers of returners and outsiders. HTS officials and allies will dominate the security ministries and key executive roles, likely “layered” with retained holdovers and promotees elsewhere

Given a decade of sophisticated rebel governance and concerns about consolidating power, the new authorities in Damascus are likely to purge much of the old elite. Only a few holdovers in technical, non-security roles are likely to remain in place in the long term ...

Holdovers bring expertise but are a counter-revolutionary risk. Promotees, junior officials from the old regime, can be converted to the cause. Returners, elites who broke with the regime, are skilled but rare. Outsiders, often exiles, have competences but are unknown entities

But the new elite will still face constraints in terms of competence in key areas. In these situations, we theorize four other types of officials who they can turn to: holdovers, outsiders, promotees, and returners. Reports already suggest such outreach is taking place in Syria

We argue that the new state elite is shaped by the characteristics of the mobilization that brought it to power. A low-participation but long-duration one that involves forms of rebel governance (as in Syria) generates know-how that is directly transferable to governing

The new authorities in Syria are facing a familiar dilemma: who should staff the bureaucratic elite after capturing the state? In a new paper, Neil Ketchley and I look at this aspect of post-revolutionary state-building

Thanks!

Thanks!