Fabian Hoffmann

What happens if and when U.S. generals receive orders to instruct lethal force against their -- on papers -- allies that they have trained with for decades and build deep personal connections?

Is there going to be any pushback or is it just "orders are orders"?

I've stopped trying to understand what's going on with Ukrainian heavy missile production. It's extremely odd. Across all missile types btw, not just Flamingo.

I'll look into it in more detail once I'm done with my PhD.

The Oreshnik Problem for Europe Technical constraints, opportunity costs, and Europe’s unresolved deterrence deficits

Hi all,

I published my latest Missile Matters post earlier today, examining the challenge the Oreshnik missile poses to European defense.

You can access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/oreshnik-i...

Short summary below.

1/5

Europas Oreshnik-Problem: Technische Einschränkungen, Opportunitätskosten und ungelöste Abschreckungsdefizite In der Nacht vom 8. auf den 9. Januar 2026 startete Russland den zweiten bestätigten Oreshnik-Raketenangriff gegen die Ukraine.

Das russische Raketensystem Oreshnik stellt @frhoffmann.bsky.social zufolge eine Herausforderung für die europäische Sicherheit dar. Diese Herausforderung ergibt sich jedoch weniger aus den technischen Eigenschaften der Rakete, die nach wie vor überbewertet werden.

www.hartpunkt.de/europas-ores...

That is the core issue with Oreshnik. The missile itself is operationally unimpressive.

But it exposes broader gaps in Europe's deterrence posture, which lacks credible counterstrike capabilities and remains too dependent on the United States in the nuclear domain.

5/5

Non-nuclear Oreshniks are best deterred through Europe’s own deep strike capabilities, which are currently not available in sufficient numbers.

Nuclear Oreshniks are covered under NATO’s nuclear deterrent, which, however, remains overly dependent on the U.S. contribution.

4/5

From a missile defense perspective, it may be preferable for NATO to ignore the threat altogether and focus on higher-priority targets.

Politically, however, this may not be an option, as leaders & publics may demand interception attempts even if they are cost-ineffective.

3/5

In short, I continue to view the Oreshnik as barely operationally useful. It can effectively be employed only against large area targets, including industrial sites, residential areas, and air bases.

Higher-value military point targets cannot be engaged effectively.

2/5

The Oreshnik Problem for Europe Technical constraints, opportunity costs, and Europe’s unresolved deterrence deficits

Hi all,

I published my latest Missile Matters post earlier today, examining the challenge the Oreshnik missile poses to European defense.

You can access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/oreshnik-i...

Short summary below.

1/5

Looks like Russia ordered the Tiktok shop version of a Ukrainian mini cruise missile lmao.

I'm not one to cite Thucydides all the time, but the saying "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" bears repeating these days.

Europe's decisionmakers should take note.

2026: The Year of the Mini Cruise Missile? How low cost cruise missiles are reshaping arsenals, procurement, and market competition after Ukraine

The war in Ukraine has highlighted the significant utility of so-called mini cruise missiles.

In my last Missile Matters post in 2025, I provide an overview of the European mini cruise missile market in 2026.

Access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/2026-the-y...

Summary below.

1/6

Thread. NB: “Mini cruise missiles may allow states that were previously priced out of the missile market to acquire deep missile arsenals.”

That would imply ~20% systemic error rate, which should be above the expected threshold.

I was just making an argument about systemic error rate, not overall effectiveness of the strike.

Tomahawk has ended up in China a long time ago. JASSM would be much worse.

How bad this is really depends on how many Tomahawks were launched.

If it's on the order of 30, it's in line with a 10 percent systemic error rate which is rather typical for most conventional long-range strike weapons.

Anyone has the number?

Destinus is incredibly underrated. I recently visited their production facility in Hengelo. Extremely impressive what they've been doing.

"In Europa levert Destinus [uit 🇳🇱 Hengelo] de beproefde Ruta mini-kruisraket, die veelvuldig is gebruikt in Oekraïne."

Ukrainian manufacturers could eventually play a role as well, offering combat-proven systems, though export capacity remains unlikely in the near term.

6/6

American and European manufactures, including established firms and new market entrants, are competing for market share in Europe.

Given the state of transatlantic relations, European suppliers may have an advantage. American competitors try to counter by offering localization of production.

5/6

An exception may apply to their role in the arsenals of smaller states with constrained defense budgets.

Mini cruise missiles may allow states that were previously priced out of the missile market to acquire deep missile arsenals. Here, the capability is not merely complementary but enabling.

4/6

Mini cruise missiles fill the gap between affordable, expendable long-range drones and costly, high-end missile systems, including heavy cruise and conventional ballistic missiles.

In this regard, they primarily serve complementary purposes.

3/6

Mini cruise missiles are distinct from long-range drones.

In fact, they share more in common with heavier legacy cruise missiles, although they are offered at substantially lower price points (around 150-300k per unit), which in turn shapes their capability profile.

2/6

2026: The Year of the Mini Cruise Missile? How low cost cruise missiles are reshaping arsenals, procurement, and market competition after Ukraine

The war in Ukraine has highlighted the significant utility of so-called mini cruise missiles.

In my last Missile Matters post in 2025, I provide an overview of the European mini cruise missile market in 2026.

Access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/2026-the-y...

Summary below.

1/6

Too early, would have been later.

Extremely nerdy missile question, but maybe someone can help out:

What is the first 3M-54 variant that features satellite-assisted midcourse guidance and when did it enter into service with the Russian Navy?

The basic problem with the United States' call for Europe to lead on conventional forces while it takes care of nuclear deterrence.

Yes, and its an absolute defense bro product. So China now has its own kind of this breed.

May god help us all, the defense bros have made it to China.