Julius Stoll

Interessant. Ein weiterer Aspekt der Pendlerpauschale, der mir nicht bewusst war, ist zudem die Subventionierung von Land vs. Stadt. Obwohl ich kein Fan bin Preise zu verzerren, gibt es ggf. eine Lenkungswirkung, um ländliche Regionen nicht (so schnell) abzuhängen.

Faszinierend, wie günstig Gas war (noch ist). Aus naiver ökonomischer Sicht hätte ich erwartet, dass der Preis einer kw/h über die Energieformen ähnlicher war und ist. Vermutlich sind Gebühren-/Netz-/Nutzungsstruktur doch zu unterschiedlich. Dennoch ein Grund hier näher hinzuschauen, Danke!

Good point; there you go opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/f...

If you want to dive into that, have a look at a recent study I did on realtor commissions in Germany. Despite the different system (selling and buying agent in the US vs selling agent in Germany only), several insights carry over to the US.

bsky.app/profile/juli...

Wildest thing about the American economy I've learned after two years at the Federal Reserve: Almost 1% of US GDP is residential realtor commissions!

fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1b2IC

The Bestellerprinzip makes the commission private info, stopping price coordination and "ortsübliche" Provision. Further, it should maximize salience for sellers without being diluted by the "fairness" argument. Looking at the global experience, the Bprinzip appears to be the best policy available.

Good question: Bestellerprinzip should in theory not affect the economic incidence (or anything else). However, neither should have the studied reform - but it affected market power. That's why I believe there is a behavioral component: either via the "ortsübliche" Provision or the incidence neglect

Check out the paper here: opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/f...

Big thanks to my supervisors @chtraxler.bsky.social, Dorothea Kübler, Egon Tripodi and everyone else for the great feedback along the ride, e.g. @tomasoduso.bsky.social, Peter Haan and @hannesullrich.com

Although descriptive only, it is conspicuous that all countries with the lowest commission rates around the world share this principle, where commission rates are much lower at 1-2%, despite similar housing prices. See Netherlands, UK, or Scandinavia.

Furthermore, having only sellers paying the formal commission in full would reduce the opportunity to implicitly coordinate prices with the obscure "regionally typical" commission rate. Bonus: having only sellers pay for the selling agent only is least bureaucratic solution.

A clear policy solution would be the "Bestellerprinzip": sellers should pay for the formal commission in full. Only sellers have the option to negotiate lower commissions, as only they can compare and choose among different agents.

(B)  Sellers could be influenced by the ``regionally typical” commission rate. Often used for reference, this rate refers not to the average but the most common rate. Real estate agents know that the empirical average is lower but communicate inflated values when not incentivized.

(A) Sellers could underestimate their economic incidence. Randomized and incentivized experimental questions with real estate agents show that agents downplay the commission incidence by default, despite knowing better (when incentivized)

I argue that sellers are passive/inattentive to commissions. In a survey experiment, I show that 85% of sellers do not bother to demand lower commission rates when hiring a real estate agent. Furthermore, I offer two interpretations for this inattention:

Which brings me to the key question: Why do sellers not demand lower rates instead? How could real estate agents perform this price increase if sellers would benefit from demanding lower rates?

How could that be? Economic theory would argue that the statutory shift should be irrelevant. I analyze the economic incidence of the commission and show that even before the reform sellers bore most of the commission incidence.

The law shifted the statutory incidence of the commissions from buyers to sellers, splitting the commission between both parties. Results: Commissions did not go down but up. Regionally different with 4%-6% before, most agents charge 3% from both after the reform (6% in total).

Pre-reform, sellers hired the real estate agents but could force buyers to pay for their selling agent (Buying agents are not a thing in GER). Still, just the selling agent regularly made 5-6%. The reform hoped to lower commissions making costs more salient for sellers. How?

💥 New Working Paper 💥 How not to Reduce Commissions of Real Estate Agents: Evidence from Germany.

I show that a policy reform in Germany which aimed to reduce commissions of real estate agents backfired. Real estate agents actually increased their rates in response.

So, how could that happen? 🧵👇

Für alle, die weiterlesen wollen: Hier gehts zur Studie 👇
opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/f...

Die Makler kassieren zu viel Die Provisionen für Immobilienmakler liegen in Deutschland höher als zum Beispiel in den Niederlanden. Daran sind die Deutschen selbst schuld, weil sie zu passiv sind.

Schön, wenn die Promotion nicht nur in der Schublade landet: Die @faznet.bsky.social hat über meine Studie zur Maklerreform berichtet.

Kurzfassung: Gesetz zur Courtageteilung ist nach hinten losgegangen. Provisionen für Makler sind nicht gesunken, sondern gestiegen.

www.faz.net/aktuell/fina...

Die USA haben ein deutlich höheres BIP als Österreich. Vergleicht man aber das BIP, das in einer Arbeitsstunde erwirtschaftet wird, liegt Österreich (und Dänemark, Belgien und die Schweiz) vor den USA.

Die Produktivität hier ist höher. In USA wird mehr gearbeitet.
www.economist.com/graphic-deta...

Really encouraging results about the impact of WFH on gender equity.