Trent Hone

A 2 panel sketch disgram of a 1 meter tall pod. in the second panel, an oval section pops off and a demonic little face with short tentacles flies out, crudely drawn.

My favorite artifact in the "you don't need AI to do art" discourse is, of course, screenwriter Dan O'Bannon's sketch of the facehugger to explain it to Giger.

Sunset over Bamburgh, 2016, photo by north-east photographer Sophie Henderson.

‘The State and the Soldier’ Review: Washington’s Worthy Example The Founders worried that the U.S. could be undermined by a powerful standing army. Civilians needed to be in control.

"Both elected branches seem to have grown uninterested in making political...arguments to the American people, & rely on both active-duty & retired officers to do it for them. Ms. Schake rightly warns that this practice undermines their long-term interest in political supremacy over the military."

I took brother Soren in the winter, during a term when we set a record for consecutive days (>35) without sunlight. His attitude was… relatable.

Never mind the jobs you had, tell me five classes you took in college

Nagarjuna to Nishitani
Soils
Soren Kierkegaard
From Blues to Rock
Sanskrit (loved it)

a man with a mustache is wearing a striped shirt and a tie Alt: Danny Glover as Roger Murtaugh in one of the Lethal Weapon movies saying, “Oh, I’m too old for this.”

Caught myself telling the youngest this morning,

“There’s much more to life than the internet.”

a close up of a man 's face with the words i 've seen things you people wouldn 't believe Alt: The character Roy Batty’s final a close up in the original movie “Bladerunner” saying, “I've seen things you people wouldn't believe…”

Me, recounting this post to my colleagues.

Exhausted Danish infantry soldiers during operation Panther's Claws in Afghanistan's Helmand Province, July 2009

Helmand, July 2009. Danish soldiers resting after 8 hours of breaching minefields and clearing houses. Seconds later, I had to wake them to move forward again.

To claim allies weren't on the front lines is a lie and an insult to those who served and lost.

We stepped up. That's what allies do.

Indeed. I’ve been studying Navy PME practices from a century ago and it is remarkable how ill-informed some of the modern commentary is. Much completely ignores war as a *cognitive* endeavor, with all that entails regarding politics, ethics, national identity, etc.

U.S. Navy Admiral Raymond Spruance, pictured in his whites.

Excellent!

You know who else drank weapons-grade coffee? This guy.

Dr Kareem Carr man: i wish to publish @kareem_carr Jan 21 reviewer 2: your paper is no good man: i'll do anything to improve reviewer 2: it's simple. you must read the work of the great scientist Pagliarini man: *bursts into tears* but i am Pagliarini Andre Pagliarini @apagliar Jan 21 a first: in rejecting an article I submitted to a journal, reviewer 2 noted I failed to engage the work of one Andre Pagliarini Jan 21, 2026 • 3:47 PM UTC

I just thought everyone should see this

Why the U.S. Navy Doesn’t Build Battleships Anymore On Apr. 7, 1945, aircraft from the U.S. Navy’s fast carrier task force sank the largest battleship ever built, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Yamato.

Battleships once defined naval power. Today, they mostly define nostalgia.

Really enjoyed joining @wardcarroll.bsky.social for this one. More thoughts about battleships and their modern suitability.

Why the U.S. Navy Doesn’t Build Battleships Anymore On Apr. 7, 1945, aircraft from the U.S. Navy’s fast carrier task force sank the largest battleship ever built, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Yamato.

Something to think about by @honer.bsky.social
warontherocks.com/2026/01/why-...

Love it. Thank you for writing this.

My latest in #MarineCorps Gazette: "Digging is Winning."

BLUF: Our above ground CPs in Okinawa are sitting targets. Friendly IADS can't interdict PLA precision fires targeting them at scale. We gotta go underground.

Below posts contain the remaining pages - give it a look! #WriteFightWin

Fuel economy—to project power at range—was the driving factor.

Interesting to note the degree of cohesion beginning when the General Board assumed responsibility for design (through the collaborative preliminary design process): Oil Fuel, Turbines, “all or nothing” protection. The standard type.

Why the U.S. Navy Doesn’t Build Battleships Anymore On Apr. 7, 1945, aircraft from the U.S. Navy’s fast carrier task force sank the largest battleship ever built, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Yamato.

America doesn’t need battleships, but it may need the idea of them.

The cover of the book “Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898-1945” by Trent Hone

One of my objectives with Learning War was to provide a more holistic view of U.S. Navy tactical development during that period. Reynolds is very good but he assumes the existence of a “gun club cabal” that is unsupported by contemporary evidence.

*extreme* distress.

A superb piece rich in naval history with contemporary operational and budgetary implications. If you need to help others understand why committing resources to battleships isn't operationally or financially feasible, point them to this article:

Why the U.S. Navy Doesn’t Build Battleships Anymore On Apr. 7, 1945, aircraft from the U.S. Navy’s fast carrier task force sank the largest battleship ever built, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Yamato.

I have thoughts about the recent announcement that the US Navy will build battleships once more. @warontherocks.bsky.social was kind enough to publish them.

warontherocks.com/2026/01/why-...

@bafriedman.bsky.social also approached complexity directly in this excellent article: digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/v...

That's the angle I took with Learning War. It's less about conflict itself and more about how effective tactics and doctrine emerge. I treat the Navy as a complex adaptive system and explore how it established effective constraints to induce learning and innovation. www.usni.org/press/books/...

There are some bangers here:

@bafriedman.bsky.social
@walkerdm.bsky.social
@honer.bsky.social
@heatheratacts.bsky.social
@joannasiekierska.bsky.social
@iantb.bsky.social
@warinthefuture.bsky.social

www.military.com/feature/2025...

Jungle Commandos Drawing on unpublished first-hand accounts, this is a gripping history of the experiences of the Commandos and their unsung allies in one of the bloodiest battl…

I've just finished reading @lmbd1418.bsky.social 's excellent Jungle Commandos (www.ospreypublishing.com/uk/jungle-co...) - it's an excellent read, very well-researched, accessibly written, and does a good job of placing the events in the broader context of the Burma campaign. (1/3)

A ten-part thread on misreading Trump:

A number of thoughtful observers argued Trump would not pursue regime change in Venezuela. From the outset I argued that he would on the podcast and in private conversation.

Thank you!

And I agree. The museum in Fredericksburg is excellent. The archivists there were very kind to me.

Episode 3 - Admiral Nimitz, mastermind of victory in the Pacific, with special guest Trent Hone Podcast Episode · Generals of WWII: The Art of Command · 12/26/2025 · 39m

podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/g...

@honer.bsky.social nice podcast! A lot of things I did not know.

Also, the WWII Museum of the Pacific in Nimitz’s hometown of Fredericksburg, TX is exceptional.

That makes sense. I think there’s an inexpressible element to it too, at least when it works well. An unconscious competence that emerges from deep experience and familiarity.