Pasi Paroinen

towards Kostyantynivka as well as finally pushing forwards from Chasiv Yar where the battle for the city center seems to be wrapping up after months of pitched battle. Some sort of general push towards Oskil and Lyman from the Zherebets line could also be in the cards. 9/9

Where Russian forces are steadily expanding the bridgeheads and pushing Ukrainian defenders further away from likely future sites for pontoon bridges. Another possible development to keep an eye on is the breakout from recently conquered Toretsk 8/

bsky.app/profile/emil... In this thread Emil goes over some of the key events in January and discusses some possible future developments. In addition to these I would also pay special attention to the developing Russian bridgeheads across Oskil near Dvorichna, 7/

Overcast and misty/foggy weather hampers air activity and possibly reduces the amount of glide bombing sorties flown by the Russians. The usage of drones is affected by these weather conditions as well, although in this case, the Russians are likely to benefit more. 6/

and begins to run into increasing manpower problems. Quality and quantity of Russian armored vehicles is also continuing to deteriorate, and increasing reliance on light wheeled vehicles could, among other issues, be a source of problem in muddy winter conditions. 5/

The likely reasons for this slowdown include the season and once the ground conditions and weather improve, we might see the pace of advance pick up and accelerate once again. But it is also possible that Russia is finally approaching the limits of its recruitment system 4/

but at least for the moment the trend is pointing towards eventual stabilization during this spring. Russians will likely try to reverse this course and regain momentum as soon as possible. 3/

Compared to 451 and 61 sq kilometers in December respectively. This is a second month in a row of gradually slowing down Russian advance after the high point of November. I would still caution against being overly optimistic towards the overall situation, 2/

Even though the Russians were able to capture Velyka Novosilka and secure rest of Kurakhove, the overall pace of Russian advance continued to slow down during January. Russian armed forces were able to conquer 332 square kilometers of Ukraine and regain some 68 sq km in Kursk. 1/

Light Infantry Attacks – A Thread

Why does our @jjhelin.bsky.social keep rejecting the "human waves" narrative, instead calling the reported North Korean attacks in Kursk "basic infantry drills"?

Let’s dive into light infantry on the attack and why this distinction matters.

1/

This piece offers a useful perspective. Recommend reading. t.co/pwCYuw9mg4

Decided to visualize the range that of both ATACMS and SCALP/Storm Shadow could theoretically have inside of Russia. The darker blue line is the range of ATACMS and the lighter blue is the range of SCALP/Storm Shadow.

ATACMS has been limited to be used only within Kursk oblast.

Russia is advancing relatively quickly, but it’s also spending significant amounts of men and material in the process.

In this thread I’ll take a look on two important directions: Kurakhove and the concerning developments there, and the politically motivated Kursk counteroffensive. 1/