Emil Kastehelmi

The War in Ukraine Map depicting the frontlines of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as analysed by Black Bird Group

Thanks for reading, it's been a while since I last wrote a longer thread here. I've been simply very, very busy recently.

Our map can be found in the link below. 14/14

www.scribblemaps.com/maps/view/Th...

This is an issue elsewhere too, but the situation around Pokrovsk and Dobropillia is especially dynamic. It is clear that the Russians can feed troops into the battle from the southern side of the city, but after that, their actual level of control is a rough estimate. 13/

Note: Maps from this area are indicative visualizations. In practice, there is no clearly traceable frontline. Patrols can slip through porous defenses. Ambushes are a constant risk, and troops hide amid the ruins of buildings, often in overlapping positions. 12/

Even though land and cities would be lost, abandoning the salient could benefit Ukraine militarily. The most acute threat of encirclement would be gone, units could operate under better logistics, and the front would straighten and shorten by dozens of kilometers. 11/

After a year of fighting on the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad axis, losing the cities now would have limited effect on the broader operational picture. A Ukrainian retreat from the area doesn’t mean Russia would automatically gain momentum which they could capitalize on immediately. 10/

Politically, leaving Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad would be a bitter setback, but if Ukraine retreats and conserves as much manpower as possible while avoiding the worst scenarios, the end result can be viewed as a Pyrrhic victory for the Russians. 9/

The tendency to hold ground as long as possible gives an opportunity for the Russians to attrit the defending units. Staying in Myrnohrad extends the Ukrainian frontline by roughly 40 kilometers, and keeping the gap between Rodynske and Pokrovsk open is difficult and costly. 8/

Even though advancing is slow and costly for Russia, Ukraine also suffers unnecessary losses in these situations. It has avoided major catastrophes, but decisions to withdraw have often come dangerously late. The latest example was the hasty retreat from Kursk in spring 2025. 7/

This phenomenon has been seen multiple times before. Russia advances on the flanks and creates an encirclement threat; logistics become untenable for larger forces; coordinated defense crumbles; counterattacks don’t fix it – and finally Ukraine withdraws at the last moment. 6/

In Pokrovsk, the chance of a decisive outcome is higher, as the situation for the Ukrainians keeps deteriorating. Russian advances and continuous drone strikes have crippled key logistical routes. Getting reserves and supplies in – or the wounded out – is arduous. 5/

In Russian operational art, reinforcing success is a core element. After several failed mechanized assaults in the Dobropillia direction in October, Russia appeared to cease committing more resources to the failing salient and put even greater emphasis on Pokrovsk. 4/

The latest Ukrainian counterattacks have not turned the situation decisively in Ukraine's favor. They managed to recapture various positions in Rodynske and in the Dobropillia direction, but the threat of encirclement in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad has not been removed. 3/

The situation in Pokrovsk is difficult for the Ukrainians. Russians have consolidated positions in the southern parts of the city, and are advancing further north. Most of the city is a gray zone, where infantry groups fight without a clear frontline. 2/

Ukraine may be repeating a costly mistake in Pokrovsk.

It’s a recurring pattern, seen for example in Vuhledar and Kursk – a reluctance to conduct a controlled, militarily justified withdrawal from a threatened salient when the situation no longer favors the defender. 1/

Operation Spiderweb, BDA

Here's the link to our sheet. If you spot mistakes, please inform us. The assessment was made by me,
@eerikmatero.bsky.social and @jjhelin.bsky.social from our @blackbirdgroup.bsky.social. Thanks to Wihuri Foundation for funding us – it made this BDA possible. 17/17

docs.google.com/spreadsheets...

Russia can’t replace the lost bombers by simply ordering new ones, as neither Tu-95 or Tu-22M have been produced in over 30 years. The aircraft are aging, and a significant proportion of the operational planes were rapidly lost – some can’t even be used as spare parts. 16/

These bombers have been used extensively in missile attacks against Ukraine, and they were very legitimate targets. The missile threat does not disappear directly with these losses, but especially in the long term Russian strategic aviation faces challenges. 15/

Before the operation, Russia most likely had less than 100 operational strategic bombers in operational condition, so likely somewhere between 11-14% of Russian strategic bombers have been destroyed. Total losses are higher, but difficult to exactly estimate. 14/

However, it’s unlikely that the losses would mount up to 41 destroyed or damaged aircraft. Even if the total losses were limited to the 14 confirmed bombers, it would still be a very significant success for Ukraine, which should not be underestimated. 13/

It’s possible that there are undocumented but damaged aircraft. Unpublished video footage of additional strikes could exist, and it’s not always possible to reliably assess limited damage from satellite imagery. Total losses may be slightly higher than currently known. 12/

Ukraine’s General Staff has stated that 41 Russian aircraft were destroyed or damaged. However, visual evidence currently supports only 23 aircraft being hit or approached by drones. It is highly unlikely that any destroyed aircraft would have gone unnoticed. 11/

Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told TASS that no aircraft were destroyed, only damaged, and all would be repaired. This claim either reflects complete ignorance or is deliberate disinformation, as multiple aircraft were damaged beyond repair. 10/

The evaluation is based on videos and satellite imagery. Each aircraft was identified and geolocated to avoid double-counting, as some appeared multiple times in the footage. The condition of the planes was then assessed by combining video, imagery, and geolocation data. 9/

For example, the two high-value A-50 reconnaissance and radar planes targeted by Ukraine likely fall into this category. It’s very likely neither of them got fully destroyed, but we couldn’t accurately assess potential damage. It’s also possible the drones did not detonate. 8/

As you can notice, not all targeted aircraft were operational at the time of the strikes. Some have been stationary for long periods and may lack parts, such as engines. However, they’re proper targets too, as non-operational aircraft can be used as spare parts. 7/

In Dyagilevo:

1 x Tu-22M3 damaged

1 x Tu-22M3 unknown condition after the strike, likely non-operational

1 x Tu-22M3 likely undamaged

In Ivanovo:

2 x A-50 unknown condition, planes non-operational, engines missing

6/

In Belaya:

3 x Tu-95MS destroyed

4 x Tu-22M3 destroyed

1 x Tu-22M3 damaged

1 x Tu-22M3 unknown condition

1 x IL-78 undamaged (aerial refueling tanker)

It's uncertain if the damaged Tu-22M3 can be repaired - it seems the hull was damaged. 5/

Next, we’ll examine the damage in each individual air base. In Olenya:

4 x Tu-95MS destroyed

1 x An-12BK destroyed

2 x Tu-22M3 likely undamaged

One of the Tu-22M3 was very likely in a non-operational state, a flap was missing from its left wing. 4/

The highest possible number for total losses is 19, if all aircraft in unknown condition are actually damaged. However, this can’t be confirmed at the moment.

In 4 cases, it appears the drones likely missed, did not explode or cause visible damage for other reasons. 3/

From videos and satellite images, 23 distinct aircraft were identified in total as potentially targeted. The condition of 4 aircraft seen in videos remains unclear. Available evidence doesn’t allow for assessing potential damage or whether nearby drones even detonated. 2/