Brian Kerg

In this analogy, which side am I fighting on? 🥲☠️

It bears pointing out that this entire conversation kicked off with your observation that he remains locked in an argument with a priest about roles and responsibilities of battling allegedly demonic symbolism from the Winter Olympics opening ceremony.

Historians are going to love this era.

And so the rest of the force will live with that experience, and its culture will likely be adversely impacted as a result - when the ethical fire was hot, no one dared approach it.

I don't expect every senior person to be a bastion of ethical purity or to uniformly stamp out this behavior. But it is surprising that there does not seem to be any effort at all, even in the face of risk, to enforce one of the most basic premises of the professional American officer corps.

Some held their tongues, others did not. Some FOGOs spoke out survived with the vocal support of Congress, others were relieved for cause despite the support of Congress.

But this showed a willingness to engage with ethical and career risk to protect the institution and what it did for the nation.

This tension is not novel - we've seen it before. As one example, significant ethical battles were fought in the 'unification debates' following WW2. The Truman Admin was very adamant in its views and aimed to stifle dissenting opinions from its military officers on the matter.

In the meantime, we still have the institutional damage from the fact that no senior officer is holding a subordinate officer accountable. This manifests from partisan political protection, but remains revealing of the willingness of GOs to risk their own prospects to hold a FGO accountable.

A key dilemma with the most vocal instance of this phenomenon is that he is working directly for political appointees such that it appears that uniformed GO's are incapable of wielding the UCMJ to these ends.

If that protection disappears, I imagine it will be a weapons free environment. But-

I think about this a lot. How does the military come back from this kind of norm erosion?

Increasingly you see officers empowered to shout partisan screeds from the heart of the digital town square.

Tomorrow always comes, but how do we repair the professional norm and win back trust?

Without naming your job, tell me something you say over and over at work.

"What does the order say we MUST do, and what does the order say we MAY do?"

So much closing with. So much destroying.

I’d like to thank Dr. @philipwblood.bsky.social for this episode on Aachen, which we recorded a year ago so bear with me when there are notes such as the release of his latest book, War Comes to Aachen. We also recently recorded a new episode but it will be out when I get to the 1945 content.

“Every record has been destroyed or falsified, every book has been rewritten, every picture has been repainted, every statue and street and building has been renamed, every date has been altered.”

YouTube video by Open to Debate U.S. Presence in Greenland: Necessary or Not?

In this debate, @maxboot.bsky.social and I made the case the Trump administration is doing real damage with threats to Greenland

One day their podcast is going to melt so many brains:

And the author dives deep into how the political intrigues over the unification fight impacted each of the players, from FOGOs to field grades working for the CNO and elsewhere. Some were canned outright, some came perilously close to being fired, and others seemed to be natural bullet dodgers.

The human factors in play were really compelling, specifically the foibles of many of the members of the Chowder Society. The tale of Merritt Edson is particular tragic. He was deeply troubled and terribly flawed, driven by ambition, martyrdom, and guilt.

It was! The first half is dedicated to the battles over unification in the DoD, and digs deep into the activities of the Chowder Society (OG Chowder, not those Chowder 2 hooligans).

The second half focuses on the Korean War and its impact on the follow-on legislation impacting the Corps.

The Marines' Fight for Survival The compelling history of how the US Marines and their allies fought to preserve the Corps and establish its role in national defense.Only five years after M...

Yessir - published in 2025 by University Press of Kansas:

kansaspress.ku.edu/9780700640485/

Just finished cruising through this banger on behalf of @usniproceedings.bsky.social. A full review will appear in a forthcoming issue.

BLUF: The author argues that the Corps' post-WWII survival took more than legislative battles. The decisive action was the Corps' performance in the Korean War.

This story about Epstein Island just nails it:

The essential idea is that the CCP is far more threatened by U.S. attacks on the political status quo than the military balance in and around Taiwan. At the same time, avoiding war with the U.S., even over Taiwan, has remained an essential CCP interest since the first crisis.

"By timely, thoughtful application of naval and amphibious forces, a Chinese invasion can be deterred, and peace can prevail."

BLUF: "... the past teaches us that the path to maintain #stability in the #Taiwan Strait is twofold: Avoid threatening the political status quo vis-à-vis #China; but invest U.S. forces in Taiwan such that a Chinese attack risks war with the United States..."

China’s Redlines Aren’t Where You Think They Are The First, Second, and Third Taiwan Strait Crises show what today’s U.S. planners risk getting wrong.

My latest for @usniproceedings.bsky.social: "China's Redlines Aren't Where You Think They Are."

This article examines the #Taiwan Strait crises, #CCP actions in each, and reveals there is significant maneuver space for the US to secure #deterrence and avoid escalation.

www.usni.org/magazines/pr...

One of my favorite moments from the Sharpe series is General Nairn’s 15-second distillation of the importance of hours (days, weeks) of staff work and logistics to ensure that the bloody few seconds of combat actually succeeds in achieving its objectives:

Dort is really dumb y’all. I love that the first reply I saw is from a former SAMS Director stating, “Actually, Napoleon created the modern staff….”

Even if he was the tactical mastermind he portrays himself to be, it's hard to win if your supply and maintenance are in the red. Those graded inspections aren't 'warfighter' enough for you? Well those show you can actually get your formation out the gate and to the battle in the first place.

Not to mention, that the role of commanders at any echelon has significantly evolved. As much as we don't like to say it out loud, it's far more than warfighting. In fact, it's mostly NOT warfighting, but preparing for it, which entails admin, management, maintenance, organizational leadership, etc.

Doing a SAW (read: SAMS but for Marines) payback at a corps-level HQ, and then assuming command even at the O-5 level, has taught me how little I knew and how much I needed to learn... and how much I still need to learn... before even being considered for such a role.