Carlton Haelig, PhD

Tune in tomorrow, October 23rd at 11am for a conversation surrounding our recent @cnas.bsky.social report on the FY 2026 defense budget, military modernization, and the challenge of matching resources to strategy.

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Stuck in the Cul-de-Sac For more than a decade, the United States has sought to modernize its military to deter China, but it has become stuck in a developmental cul-de-sac.

Without a re-calibration of the Pentagon’s modernization plans, deterrence could fail before highly capable technologies become available. (12/12)
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Overall, the intensity & composition of US modernization plans risk prioritizing long-term investments at the expense of critical near-term capability. (11/12)

🛰️ Secure critical space supply chains & expand launch capacity to enable rapid proliferation of new systems once available. (10/12)

💨 Speed up the transition from R&D to procurement — esp. the Army’s Typhon missile, extended-range PrSM, & hypersonic weapons. (9/12)

🤑 Buy more of what’s available now to shift the balance — esp. F-15EX, B-21, long-range fires & maritime strike missiles. (8/12)

Our report identifies several opportunities to improve this situation: (7/12)

😬 Weapons that have been purchased often lack the capability or quantity to shift the balance in the Indo-Pacific.

💸 Major programs like missile defense, the F-35, Columbia-class subs & Constellation-class frigates are delayed & over budget. (6/12)

🔬 Pentagon spending has favored R&D over fielding new capabilities.

📈 R&D has increased while procurement has decreased as a share of the budget. (5/12)

❓How is it possible that despite spending nearly $1 trillion a year on defense, the US military is losing its edge? (4/12)

⚠️ This increases the likelihood that China may see a window of opportunity where it believes it can successfully challenge the United States in the Indo-Pacific. (3/12)

🇺🇸🇨🇳 The US is losing its edge over China in the Indo-Pacific.

⌛ Despite years of investment in modernization, the Pentagon has little to show. As China’s military grows in size & capability, the US military is becoming older & less capable. (2/12)

Stuck in the Cul-de-Sac For more than a decade, the United States has sought to modernize its military to deter China, but it has become stuck in a developmental cul-de-sac.

Here is a quick thread highlighting my recent @cnas.bsky.social report with Phil Sheers on the FY26 defense budget. (1/12)
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One of the bright spots early in my national security career was the opportunity to work with Cassandra for a stint at Penn. Ahead of the curve, her work — and her story! — is worth reading.

NB: Congress has asked repeatedly for detailed spending plans for the defense portion of the BBB. DOD has yet to provide those plans. Regardless, by skirting the regular appropriations process, those plans would not bind the Pentagon in the same way that the annual defense budget process does.

One of the most significant risks to defense modernization associated with reconciliation is that by not tying the $150 billion dollars in defense funding to specific programs you leave the possibility that these funds will be redirected, unspent, or otherwise wasted. (2/2)

POLITICO Pro: Trump could shift funds to pay troops, White House officials say GOP congressional leaders are resisting standalone military pay legislation, fearing it will take pressure off Democrats.

In a forthcoming @cnas.bsky.social report we highlight several pitfalls with relying on reconciliation for defense modernization. (1/2)
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Applications are now open for the 2026-27 predoctoral and postdoctoral fellowships with the America in the World Consortium!

Applicants from all disciplines whose research bears directly on American grand strategy, broadly defined, are welcome to apply.

Deadline: December 1

13/
Instead, indications of cuts to both procurement & RDTE do not inspire confidence that the Pentagon is postured to modernize the force.

12/
The Pentagon’s promised 8% reallocation was supposed to cut waste, streamline acquisition, and let the U.S. buy more hardware now and speed up future systems.

11/
Our analysis suggests a balance can be struck b/w equipping the force w/ enough capability to deter today and still fielding the next-gen systems that will form the war-winning backbone of tomorrow’s force.

10/
We focus on key areas of modernization, including: ground-based long-range precision fires, space modernization, hypersonic weapons, ships, and tactical aircraft.

9/
In our upcoming report on the shifting relationship between procurement & RDTE, we examine how the FY26 request affects these trends—and recommend targeted adjustments to both areas.

8/
These are the very spending categories essential to military modernization.

7/
Yet what we know about the FY26 budget doesn’t suggest a shift. Compared to the Biden Admin’s projection for FY26, Trump’s actual FY26 request makes deep cuts to both RDTE and procurement.

6/
(2) Ensure research and development programs stay on schedule and transition into procurement faster than they have in the past.

5/
To shift course, the Pentagon’s 8% rebalancing must address 2 challenges:

(1) Ensure enough spending goes to equipping the force now—bridging the gap between today’s outdated systems & the next-gen force of tomorrow.

4/
Meanwhile, RDTE spending has steadily increased, and programs have suffered delay after delay. Unlike past modernization periods, there’s been no significant procurement payoff from this prolonged period of RDTE.

3/ Forthcoming @cnas.bsky.social research by myself & Phil Sheers finds that since 2012, Pentagon spending on procurement hasn’t increased—despite an aging force structure—contradicting the objective of modernization.

2/
Despite that objective, the Pentagon’s FY26 budgeting plans actually represent a decrease from the FY25 defense budget.