@monapaulsen.bsky.social
Assistant Professor in International Economic Law, LSE Law School. Specialisation in international trade law and economic security, in addition to research and teaching interests in international investment law, international development, and IPE.
My Trade Secrets today. You'd think China, the world's biggest oil importer, is being hammered by the Iran war. In fact, via careful preparation and advantages elsewhere, Xi Jinping will be better positioned than Donald Trump when the two meet at a summit later this month.
as.ft.com/r/df007860-0...
But, inevitably, what they are suggesting is a permanent shift for trade along the frontier (a new status quo). And before governments promote selective discrimination as the rule, it's worthwhile for Ministers to think about what this means for SD&T and developing countries graduation.
I remain unclear how sincere Members are in proposing Big-D deviation from MFN. The EU may be merely discussing additional TDI, which would be more consistent with its promotion of strategic autonomy.
And in considering differentiation owing to geopolitical rivalry, there are still ongoing discussions to balance differentiation based on development, trade, and financial needs.
The point? As developed members contemplate more sustained deviations from MFN/reciprocity, they need to consider how this upsets the design of SD&T.
Some thoughts on "small-d" differentiation inspired by the ACP Group communication on WTO reform and thinking about relative reciprocity and development policies: www.linkedin.com/posts/mppaul...
This week, someone flippantly dismissed history, telling me it doesn’t solve “now.”
But history isn’t about searching for lost solutions. Remembering Manzanar when thinking about ICE reminds us of the danger in seeing people as enemy. To question why moments repeat, forgotten or stir up revisions.
Canada’s boycott of US booze began a year ago with the first round of tariffs from the Trump administration. It has proven surprisingly durable. Read more in the Canada Daily newsletter.
Unfortunately this can’t happen. The rules don’t accommodate preferential treatment.
From the moment the Trump admin imposed tariffs on select steel and aluminium products, carving out countries and exempting products, corruption concerns existed.
They say that markets move policy. It will be years but we can imagine how investment disputes will challenge the US's industrial strategy and security-for-materials agreements. What happens when the DRC is hit with claims years from now?
www.state.gov/strategic-pa...
Exhibit A
For the executive to assert that the IEEPA tariffs are easily replaceable (or are already replaced) eliminates the legitimacy of the investigations required to use other statutory authorities. Regardless of what the executive asserts the authorities’ scope is very different.
Congress has a constitutional responsibility to check the executive branch’s powers, from economic warfare with tariffs, kidnappings, and military strikes.
Time for Congress to take seriously legal limitations within the executive branch.
www.execfunctions.org/p/law-is-irr...
I worry about the legitimisation of these Iranian strikes through the asserted authority of the Board of Peace to usurp the role of the UN and international law.
Now is the time for governments to stand strong and clear against such currents.
While the intention was to have a meeting on children and education in time of war remains urgent, wouldn’t this be postponed owing to the strikes?
I worry about derailment of UN agencies in light of the US push for the Board.
"Whatever happens, though, one thing is clear – that this use of force by the US and Israel is manifestly illegal. It is as plain a violation of the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as one could possibly have."
@ejiltalk.bsky.social
www.ejiltalk.org/the-american...
It’s an excellent reflection, one that traverses questions of AI to the supply chains that will feed off of it, and the energy supplies that will feed it.
Could?
All nascent research documents that the executive’s assertions foreign companies do not pay for the tariffs.
New @scotusblog.com by Abbe Gluck, using the USSC IEEPA case to argue the court is on the cusp of a major fight over the concept of ambiguity. www.scotusblog.com/2026/02/the-...
It occurs to me that we are about to have a very significant discussion about financial pressures on the US, and I'm not entirely clear WHO will be the decision-makers in the room. What role will the Fed Reserve have and what will be its relationship with the executive branch?
If you want a distraction from Section 122 and other tariffs, and feel like speculating about the future a bit, I have a piece in the National Interest asking whether AOC's recent trade policy comments could help Democrats craft a positive trade agenda.
The key part of my analysis, though, and it deserves emphasis, is that, regardless of my assessment of what I think USTR could argue, this does not change the fundamental concern about recognising the statutory basis of these deals.
ICYMI from me: if you want to understand how USTR could argue that all trade/security deals remain in good standing even after the Supreme Court ruled the President cannot impose tariffs under IEEPA, please do take a read.
ICYMI from me: if you want to understand how USTR could argue that all trade/security deals remain in good standing even after the Supreme Court ruled the President cannot impose tariffs under IEEPA, please do take a read.
However, it does suggest that the executive branch anticipated that the deals could outlast the IEEPA reciprocity tariffs, to the extent that companies or trading partners did not challenge the underlying emergency in effect.
This post explains how the US has sought to separate the authority to negotiate agreements from the authority to impose IEEPA tariffs, in terms of statutory basis and EOs. This does not change the fundamental concern about recognising the statutory basis of these deals.
With the Supreme Court ruling (6-3) that the President lacks inherent peacetime authority to impose tariffs under IEEPA, the question is what happens to the trade/security deals (informal and formal agreements) negotiated in the shadow of the IEEPA tariffs? ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2026/02/what...
Though there are many unknowns, there is now one clear known: When Trump seeks to impose tariffs to punish another country -- for whatever reason -- it cannot be done without something more: evidence of dumping, subsidising, discrimination, or a security interest.
Not the whims of a President.