Gerald C Brown

Hope it's interesting! Good to see you again Sharon.

Well if everyone's going to be talking about nukes, might as well learn what China's moving towards on that front...

Seriously though, these problems aren't going away and are more relevant than ever--this affects much more than a small cadre of nuclear specialists.

What is the CCP’s vision for the PLA as a world-class military, and how does it intend to use this force to attain other national goals? Read the intro to NBR's new book "The PLA's Long March toward a World-Class Military": www.nbr.org/publication/... #China #XiJinping #PLA

Curious about what China’s nuclear force is evolving into? Using Chinese primary sources, my latest publication from
@nbr.org maps out what China is building and the goals it intends to serve. 🧵 www.nbr.org/publication/...

Lot of attention is being given to raising the "nuclear IQ" in the conventional community, which is valid. But it's just as important to raise the nuclear communities' understanding of conventional force.

I've been yelling for folks to better understand the intersection of conventional and nuclear forces for quite some time, they don't work in isolation. Glad Adam dug into this, I'm looking forward to reading.

I appreciate the upgrade, but I only have a masters degree as of now and am thus just a Mr.! But I hope it proves useful, hope all is well Jon.

Really excited this is finally out, a breakdown of my own chapter on the direction, goals, and application of China's nuclear force can be found linked here: bsky.app/profile/gera...

NEW BOOK! "The PLA's Long March toward a World-Class Military" examines #XiJinping ’s requirement for the #PLA to achieve "world-class" status by midcentury and the role it will play in supporting the #ChineseCommunistParty 's pursuit of national rejuvenation: nbr.org/publication/...

Together, these developments aim to create a force that is more survivable, ready, and flexible—able to limit US nuclear options, manage escalation, and create political space for Beijing’s core goals, especially over Taiwan.

The PLA is advancing technologies for defense penetration and causing effective damage on targets, such as hypersonic glide vehicles, MIRVs, and FOBS that seek to bypass US missile defenses.

Beyond readiness, China is also improving survivability: more mobility, hardened protection measures, and a growing arsenal to ensure enough weapons survive for retaliation.

Most notably, China is moving toward an “early-warning counterstrike” capability—allowing it to retaliate upon warning of an incoming nuclear attack rather than after impact.

Numerous capabilities support this “world-class” force. Improving reaction time and maintaining a higher state of readiness are key priorities. The PLARF has streamlined launch operations and keeps some battalions on “high alert duty”.

This reflects a shift from “existential deterrence” to nuclear “actual combat deterrence.” Low-yield nuclear weapons could provide limited, proportional response options for escalation control in a regional conflict.

However, these strikes on military targets appear to be focused on retaliatory strikes against targets such as regional air and naval bases, not the large-scale counterforce strikes others have hypothesized.

PLA planners distinguish between theater and strategic nuclear campaigns, and between civilian and military target sets. Strikes on military targets are seen as especially “beneficial for controlling the war situation.”

While there remains no evidence that China currently intends to use nuclear weapons first, it’s clearly developing a force that can strike a wider range of regional targets and manage escalation through multiple waves of limited counterstrikes.

To deter adversaries, the PLA envisions nuclear “deterrence operations” at three intensity levels—low, medium, and high—ranging from showcasing silos to foreign officials to live missile launches into the ocean or public dissemination of target lists.

Under the Nuclear Shadow How and why China has pursued information-age weapons to gain leverage against its adversaries

It’s important to remember that within the PLA, “strategic capabilities” or “strategic deterrence” do not solely allude to nuclear forces, @fiona-cunningham.bsky.social has great work here. However, nuclear forces are an increasingly key component. press.princeton.edu/books/paperb...

These also have clear links to the PLA’s 2027 goals. One text intended to be studied across the PLA states that “forming strategic capabilities is the core task of achieving the goal of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Army” in 2027.

“…This is also an unequivocal message to external interference forces that no one should underestimate the Chinese people’s determination, will, and ability to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

“…The use of force is still an option that cannot be abandoned… Building a strong strategic deterrent force system is the trump card for safeguarding the country’s core interests…”

“..Solving the Taiwan issue and achieving complete reunification of the motherland is the Party’s unswerving historical mission… and the inevitable requirement for realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation…”

One PLA researcher writing in a Party journal wrote bluntly: “China is building a strong strategic deterrent force system to resolutely oppose the interference of external hegemonic forces in national sovereignty and security issues…”

However, an increasing number of writings also allude to a direct nuclear role in deterring conventional operations. Some PLA sources now add preventing “possible military interventions from other countries” as a goal of nuclear deterrence—a striking broadening of purpose.

The PLA is seemingly concerned that the US will employ nuclear weapons against it in a regional conflict, and it seeks a more capable arsenal to deter US nuclear options while enabling PLA conventional operations.

This effort is most directly tied to the Party’s long-standing goal of national unification and the capture of Taiwan. Nuclear weapons are becoming a key tool to deter US intervention and constrain Washington’s nuclear options in a Taiwan fight.

Political Drivers of China’s Changing Nuclear Policy: Implications for U.S.-China Nuclear Relations and International Security The message from Chinese officials has become increasingly clear: the United States and China should first stabilize their political relationship before taking on nuclear issues.

I’d be remiss if I didn’t also mention @tongzhao.bsky.social's recent great work on this concept of strategic counterbalance, though unfortunately it came out after the conference carnegieendowment.org/research/202...

The Rocket Force highlights that “in the era of ‘returning to great-power competition,’ the role of nuclear weapons as the trump card not only remains undiminished but is increasingly prominent.”